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HENRY NELSON WIEMAN'S FUNCTIONAL THEISM AS TRANSCENDING EVENT

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PREFACE

Henry Nelson Wieman, through his teaching, writing and personal impact has been a major formative figure in American liberal religious thought. The response to Wieman's work has been in the form both of enthusiastic acceptance by those for whom his thought has been a clarifying light, and resistance from various intellectual and religious fronts. Wieman's own mode of presenting his religious naturalism has encouraged vigorous response, whether through the exercise of his gift for cutting through the confusions in which issues are enmeshed, or in his readiness to point an identifying finger at obscurantism, sham, and delusion.

However, it is another type of response which has given rise to the concern central to this study. This response to Wieman sees him as being surely within the liberal tradition, yet as engaging in a work of recalling the liberal mind to see in a new light the claim of Christian theism that God is a historically active reality. This is not to say that Wieman was fundamentally motivated to reassert a traditional affirmation about God. Such an apologetic concern is quite foreign to his personal intellectual commitment to discern the nature of man's involvement in events, and the possibilities inherent in this involvement for the future of human life. However, this very concentration of purpose reveals an abiding characteristic of his orientation. In its all-absorbing attention to the immediate can be found the theme of the Judeo-Christian intuition that the divine is an immediately operative, historically concerned, redemptive reality. With the assertion that in immediacy is ultimacy, is the correlate insistence that this immediacy is truly divine, that is, it is an ultimate active reality with an integrity of its own, not subject to human design. Wieman consistently sees God as that which is operative in yielding good for human life, such as man cannot do, regardless of human technological proficiency.

However, another theme arises in Wieman's expression which has a jarring effect when it becomes dominant. This is the recurrent contention that the work of God may be released in the events of human life by the appropriate measure of human control of conditions. This theme appears early in Wieman's work, and in the progress of his thought it seems to emerge as dominant over the balancing emphasis on placing human life under the control of that creative activity which cannot be controlled by human design. This tension in Wieman's thought points to a problem which needs to be clarified for one who approaches the task of interpreting Christian faith with the resource of naturalistic philosophy. The problem is that of presenting in some coherent manner the contrast between the divine initiative and response toward man and the human approach and response to God.

This study has emerged from an effort to clarify the basis for Wieman's naturalistic theism, especially in view of the evident tendency in his thought to generate a tension, if not divergent emphases in expression arising from his awareness of manageable and unmanageable aspects of man's existence. Considering the historical context, it can be readily recognized that Wieman's theism sustains a view of divine transcendence which contrasts strongly with dominantly Kantian immanental theism characteristic of American liberal protestantism in the first decade of this century. When Barthianism began to find a response in American religious thought, Wieman was recognized also to be contending for the "otherness" of God. Although Karl Barth professed a non-philosophical method, yet the Kantian orientation was discernible as underlying his thought. On the other hand although Wieman was ever ready to make use of philosophical resources, the philosophical rootage of his own personal development of thought was never entirely clear. Wieman himself indirectly furthered this concealment by his own lack of historical concern. In one sense, concrete historical concern was central to his view as expressed in his attention to the theme of growth. But to the history of interpretive ideas, he gave very little attention. In regard to his own thought, his concern was ever focussed on present issues, and only minimally on how his thinking moved to that point of focus.

Perhaps this non-historical attitude led his readers to pass over lightly the few clues he offered to his own intellectual growth. From these various clues we find a movement of ideas in Wieman's work which suggests that his thought had its source in the ferment of Roycean idealism, was freed from an idealistic allegiance by Bergson, found initial definition in the context of academic inquiry at Harvard, and grew with nourishment from the thought of Whitehead and Dewey.

The thesis defended in this study defines a theme central to Wieman's theism, and points to the historical roots for this theme. The theme by which Wieman has interpreted theism is related to the type of interpretive thinking which had been developing within evolutionism, and in theological appropriations of evolutionism from the later decades of the nineteenth century onwards. The emphasis on functional analysis of natural processes by the evolutionary naturalists had its impact on theistic evolutionists like Fiske and Abbott. Josiah Royce resisted this course of crude naturalistic evolutionism, but in his response to it the concern for functional analysis is persistently in evidence. In fact, Royce's central inquiry into the relationship of the world and the individual can be seen as an inquiry into the functional interrelationship of the world whole and individuals. Royce was finally led to specify this interrelating function in a structured process of interpretation. For Royce, the ultimate is immediately functional in empirically discernible events.

Bergson, with his notion of duration, and his analysis of the divergence of human intellect and intuition, undercut the Idealist superstructure, and restated the theme of ultimacy in immediacy in terms other than idealistic metaphysics. Wieman's work clearly has the marks of a careful reading of Bergson. However, his work also indicates a resistance to Bergson's rejection of structure as a mode of ultimacy. Wieman's notion of creativity is indebted to Bergson's duration, yet it is evident that Royce's response to Bergson operates as a formative element in Wieman's own response. The idealistic concern for structure is found at work in Wieman alongside a more Bergsonian view of the fundamental nature of natural process in Wieman's doctoral dissertation, "The Organization of Interests." These two inheritances operate through Wieman's imaginative response to the work of R. B. Perry, particularly to his interest theory of value, wherein Wieman defended the notion of the highest good as a function in events which he designated "creative interest."

Among Wieman's writings, "The Organization of Interests" most clearly reflects the philosophical resources which Wieman derived from Roysceanism and his study of Bergson. Further, this work discloses themes which later were expressed in Wieman's response to the work of Whitehead and Dewey. His later attention to these men tends to obscure the earlier roots of his thought. For this reason I have given primary attention to

Wieman's early work in tracing the strands of influence shaping his thought.

After noting the early emergence of a theism which pointed to an ultimate function in empirical events, our study moves to consider the development of religious instrumentalism, following Wieman's employment of Whitehead's analysis of functions in nature. We find basic to Wieman's religious instrumentalism the theme of the immediacy of the ultimate as a structured process, in which is continued the function of the Roycean absolute. The creative function and the unitary structural image of the absolute is found to persist in the notion of divine transcendence which characterizes Wieman's theism. This theme of transcendence becomes explicit in Wieman's own development of the notion of the creative event as a functionally transcendent activity.

I wish to acknowledge that guidance, encouragement, and resources which have been received for this study from numerous persons and several institutions. The points of detail at which I am indebted to others are too numerous to list, so the following acknowledgements cannot but be incomplete.

First, I wish to acknowledge the assistance and guidance of my thesis advisor, Professor Bernard Eugene Meland, in establishing the initial direction of my thesis inquiry. I am indebted to him for his patient counsel and probing without which the final form of my argument could not have been formulated. Also, what literary merit may be found in this work owes much to his valuable assistance on questions of style.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the University of Chicago Libraries in the use of library facilities, and particularly in making available H. N. Wieman's doctoral dissertation from the Harvard College

Library. Henry Nelson Wieman also generously gave the needed permission to acquire a copy of this work. I am also indebted to Professor Wieman for his kind response regarding questions about his early intellectual history, and for making available biographical materials which gave guidance in my research for this study.

My wife, Kikue K. Rich, and two student assistants at Colorado Woman's College, Miss Lonnie Kay Perkins and Miss Marcia Whitten, shared the task of transcribing my manuscript text to typed form. My wife also gave considerable attention to technical details.

Early interest in this study took form while studying under fellowship grants from the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School and the University of Chicago. Conclusion of this work was greatly facilitated by the willingness of the administration of Colorado Woman's College to adjust my teaching schedule to allow the needed time.

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CHAPTER I

CONTRAST IN VIEWS OF THE FUNCTION OF GOD: HENRY NELSON WIEMAN AND RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM

With the publication of Religious Experience and Scientific Method Henry Nelson Wieman appeared as a significant figure on the American religious scene.[1] Although he wrote on liberal themes, he expressed himself in ways which set him apart from the dominant religious liberalism of the third decade. The feeling and effect of this difference has been portrayed by Professor B. E. Meland in his description of the initial encounter between Wieman and the "Chicago School" of liberal religion.[2] Wieman's exposition of Whitehead's Religion in the Making before the faculty and student body of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago demonstrated a fresh approach to philosophy of religion, and opened new vistas for religious inquiry.[3] This act also gave evidence of a liberal theological perspective which contrasted in important ways to that held by the Chicago Liberals.

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[1] Henry Nelson Wieman, Religious Experience and Scientific Method (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926). This book is largely a collection of previously published articles, uneven in style, yet drawn together by the thesis that God is an objective fact for awareness and knowledge. Hereafter this work will be cited as RESM.

[2] Bernard Eugene Meland, "From Darwin to Whitehead: A Study in the Shift in Ethos and Perspective Underlying Religious Thought," The Journal of Religion, XL (October, 1960), 229-45.

[3] Professor Meland pointed out the contrast between the way in which evolutionary thought had been appropriated by liberalism for the interpretation of development in religion and Whitehead's notion of the growth or "making" of religion.

Wieman's unqualified liberalism was evident in his dedication to free inquiry into the issues of religion, in calling to the service of religious inquiry the resources of any relevant studies, and in clearly stating the implications of scientific theories for religious thought as he saw them. His liberalism was evident also in his attention to the fundamental theme of religious experience in religious liberalism. Yet in this very appeal he was set apart from the liberalism regnant at the University of Chicago Divinity School in 1926. Wieman's appeal to religious experience reversed the prevalent concentration of attention on the personal structure as defining the area of religious concern, and the personal inner life as the area for the realization of religious values. This reversal of attention was most strikingly expressed for the contemporary scene in Wieman's assertion that God is a fact. For a liberal of conceptualist orientation, this way of speaking undercut the system of interpretation by which the life of the human spirit and the function of the idea of God were understood.

Wieman also considered value experience to be central to the meaning of religion, and religious experience to be an avenue of access to that datum which may be called God. But in discussing these notions, Wieman and his listeners often employed differing categories of thought. In Religious Experience and Scientific Method, Wieman had stated that God is a fact. For the liberal, the realm of religious value was in contrast to the realm of fact. However, a liberal could translate such a statement into his forms of thought, with the result that Wieman's intent was misread. To counter any misappropriation of his thought, Wieman attacked the problem of breaking through the patterns of conceptual thinking from different approaches: as method of inquiry, theory of value, conception of the nature of experience and knowledge, and metaphysics.

All of these approaches were a part of a basic effort to present a view of religion as a response to an ultimate in the concretely given. The meaning of religion for Wieman as operative in creative living is indicated in this summary passage.

> Human creativity consists in bringing together these two sides of discovery, open awareness on the one hand and theorizing on the other--with its analysis, discrimination, definition and experimentation. When these two are united and rightly balanced, human life leaps forward like an open spillway or a hound unleashed. Life becomes suddenly marvelously abundant. When these two are brought into fruitful interaction, the richness of the world and the fertility of life is shown to be amazing. The artist, the prophet, the moral and social reformer, the scientific genius, the religious seer, all rise up in numbers and power when awareness of the wide, rich, novel fullness of concrete experience can be combined with the scientific method. But wide open mystic awareness flounders helplessly and blindly when unassisted by scientific methods. And scientific method becomes a barren definition of concepts without yielding anything to enrich life when not supported by open awareness.[1]

This passage speaks eloquently to the liberal spirit concerned with the growth of human culture and the deepening of the life of the human spirit. However, there are aspects of this statement which were disquieting to the liberal mind. In reviews of Wieman's first two books G. B. Smith and J. S. Bixler voiced a critical response which displayed central features of the thought of these liberal theologians.

Gerald Birney Smith, reviewing Wieman's first book was most receptive to Wieman's effort to bring religion and science into a mutually contributory relationship.[2] Smith commended Wieman for his assumption that religious as well as scientific ideas are still in the making. But he was uneasy about Wieman's appeal to scientific method as a method for religious inquiry, and questioned whether religious experience "thus cultivated will make as definite connections with science as the author assumes."[1] Smith doubted that the religious object could be specified by scientific definition without losing the reference to a "feeling of reality," which he held to be the primary datum of religion.[2] In contrast, he suggested: "Must not religion, in order to remain religious at all, aim at symbolic expression rather than at scientific formulation?"[3]

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[1] RESM, p. 197.

[2] G. B. Smith, "Science and Religion," The Journal of Religion, VI (November, 1926), 637. Part of this article is a review of H. N. Wieman, Religious Experience and Scientific Method.

These criticisms reflect the Kantian dichotomy in liberal religious thought between the realm of the sciences and the realm of religious values, and a corresponding insistence on the use of a method distinctive and appropriate to each. With such a contrast of method implicit in the conception of science and religion, definite cognitive connections between the two are not conceivable, and scientific formulations can only be deemed highly inappropriate for signifying the reality of religion.

Other aspects of the liberal reading of Wieman are indicated in J. S. Bixler's review of *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*.[4]

Julius Seelye Bixler linked Wieman's work to the philosophical advance of pragmatism. He was impressed by the logic of Wieman's argument for theism, but found unintelligible Wieman's insistence that religious experience is sensuous. Bixler favored the view of religious experience in contemporary psychology which suggested that the significance of religious experience "lies in the fact that it effects a new and creative synthesis of subconsciously felt purposes and desires."[1] Bixler also objected to Wieman's statement that in religious experience "we have reached the ultimate source and conditions of any world, in adaptation to which all possible worlds may be developed," responding that this statement "would be more exact if it were expressly limited to the realm of ethical and religious value."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 640.

[2] *Ibid.* Note that Professor Smith has interpreted religious experience as a *feeling* of reality, which is not the same as Wieman's "concrete datum," in that "feeling" still bears the connotation of a subjective response distinct from the reality to which the response is made.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] J. S. Bixler, "Religious Quest for Truth," a review of *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, by H. N. Wieman, *The Journal of Religion*, VIII (April, 1928), 288.

On neither of these points could Wieman yield, and Bixler's failure to see their importance for Wieman indicates a failure to grasp the central drive of Wieman's work. Both Smith and Bixler responded favorably to Wieman's work, but with some uneasiness. Neither man isolated the source of their misgivings. Smith was mistrustful of the mood of inquiry which was to issue in a drive toward the specification of the religious object. Bixler considered Wieman's appeal to Whitehead's metaphysics as of dubious value, and discounted the importance of the sensory given in religious experience. These responses indicate that the liberal mind was not reading fully what Wieman intended to say, in part because the modes of thought of the liberal mind filtered out Wieman's meanings to fit liberal meanings.

Two questions concerning this intellectual encounter will direct our immediate inquiry. The first is: What was the general controlling perspective which governed the liberal theological understanding of Wieman's work? The second question is: What is that basic feature of Wieman's thought which was not grasped by the liberal, and hence remained a surd in the liberal's understanding of Wieman's thought?

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[1] Ibid., p. 291. [2] Ibid.

Several features in the reviews just cited indicate a Kantian orientation in the minds of the reviewers. The recognition of this perspective as operative in these responses is important for an understanding of what these liberals did and did not see in Wieman's work. For instance, Wieman's definition of the function of concepts in relation to concrete experience can be read with a Kantian interpretation if the reader's understanding is structured by the Kantian perspective. If such is the case, then the notions of "concept" and the "datum" shift radically from Wieman's meaning, or, as with Bixler, the emphasis on the function of the concrete given is discounted.

In American liberal protestantism, the Kantian orientation, as a pervading philosophical climate, was effective in forming the theological mind through three major historical channels of thought. These are the development of theological liberalism in America in the early nineteenth century, the liberal theological influence from Ritschl and Herrmann, and certain aspects of philosophical pragmatism.

The influence of the Kantian critical philosophy is evident in the theological expressions of William Ellery Channing and Theodore Parker. These men consolidated their emancipation from puritanism in the proclamation of the fundamentally moral character of the deity. Faith was spelled out as a moral sentiment identified with the love of God.[1] Parker's transcendentalism contained the bold assertions that the empirical consciousness is based on the consciousness of the idea of God, and that the "coincidence of man's will with God's" is possible.[1] Bushnell, under the influence of Coleridge, emphasized the practical dynamics of religious living, as a witness to the activity in life of truth which cannot be bound by rational forms.[2] The dominant thrust of this theological liberalism was to identify faith with moral concern and quality of life, in contrast to doctrinal formulations. In this shift in focus of religious concern we have a movement toward seeing religious notions as meaningful in terms of relationships and characteristics in events. At this stage of liberal thought, the function of a religious concept, such as God, is seen in human consciousness.

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[1] William Ellery Channing, "Unitarian Christianity," The Development of American Philosophy, ed. Walter G. Muelder and Laurence Sears (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 127.

In Ritschl and Herrmann we find a self-conscious appropriation of Kantianism for the development of a theology of moral faith. This further directed religious attention to the personal inner life of the individual, as against the orthodox emphasis on the objective foci for faith. The power of the Kantian position for these men was in its ability to resolve tension between the sciences as knowledge of nature, and religion as the life of value in relation to ultimate meanings. Religious interest centered in man's inner moral character. This inner life of the spirit was identified as the point of contact with the transcendental realm of value which is "other" than the realm of phenomenal nature. Despite the transcendental theme, this identification had the effect of domesticating the transcendental through the doctrine of the immanence of God in the inner moral life. American Kantians, such as McGiffert, were especially forthright in asserting God to be irrelevant to human life apart from his immanence in the human person. Consequently the Christ figure, or more exactly in the terminology of Liberalism, the historical Jesus, was a revelation of God as the perfect moral will. To know the person and will of Christ was to know the will of God. For a religious thinker, sensitive to the claims of modern science, the appeal of the Kantian position was appreciable. The isolation of the realm of the spirit from the deterministic rigors of the world of nature may well have seemed the best defense of the values of the human spirit. A pluralistic and individualistic perspective can be seen to emerge from this view. Not only does a high estimate of the personal structure result, but individuality is emphasized as the mode of relation in which the greatest value is achievable. The standard of the good was individualized in the conscience as the surest guide for the moral sense.

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[1] Theodore Parker, "The World of Matter and the Spirit of Man," ibid.

[2] Bernard Eugene Meland, "Kantian Influence in Christian Thought," (Chicago, 1950), pp. 18-21. (Mimeographed.)

The social Gospel movement sought to secure the growth of personal values through the ordering of social life according to ethical ideals which would release persons from a stunting bondage to the impersonal industrial order. This concern for the personal led men such as Rauschenbusch to find in Spencerian individualistic evolutionism a secular expression of the Gospel.[1] Paradoxically, Spencer's system also provided the philosophical defense of the economic system against which the person need to be protected.

These movements of religious thought had the effect of setting forth religious concepts as having reference to a mode of relation of the human person in natural events, either by way of securing a contrast of value with events in nature, or by way of relating inner and external aspects of personal existence.

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[1] Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1912), p. 90.

The individual-pluralist stream flowing from Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy found expression in a variety of ways in the growth of American philosophy. For the religious liberal the Kantian position was persuasive in part because it did not contest the positivist mood of the sciences, enabling him to enthusiastically embrace the scientific exploration of nature, and the promise of increased control over the environment of human life. However, for many of a scientific temper, evolutionism served to reinforce agnosticism, if not a straightforward materialistic determinism. Such a view can be interpreted as issuing from Kant's first critique, cut off from his later work.

Although William James defined his position against Kantian and Hegelian idealism, we find in his voluntaristic individualism the persistence of the Kantian heritage.[1] C. S. Pierce, the father of pragmatism, is explicit about his early Kantianism.[2] Central to pragmatism is a prime contention of Kantianism, namely that the mind is an activity with the function of yielding perception and knowledge. For Kant the mind brought _a priori_ transcendental forms and categories to order, and thereby produced experience. For the pragmatists the mind is an imaginative constructive activity, a response to events in which abstractions are ventured as instruments for the control of experience.

This perspective found expression in the interpretation of religion and religious concepts by Edward Scribner Ames. With the resources of functional psychology, Ames saw ideas as having two functions in human experience: as expressive of processes in human life and as instrumental for adjustment between the individual and his world. Ideas are accordingly not the stuff of reality, nor are they thin abstractions. "The real ideas," wrote Ames, "are bathed in the full stream of concrete experience, and retain the quality of life only so long as they are saturated and dripping with its waters."[1] Consequently, if religious notions such as the idea of God are found meaningful, they must be examined in the life context of their employment.

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[1] William James, _A Will to Believe and Other Essays_ (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 1 ff.

[2] Justus Buchler (ed.), _Philosophical Writings of Pierce_ (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 2.

Historically, Ames saw, religious conceptions had served man's social interests. The religious conceptions of the middle ages, for example, reflected and undergirded the social structure of the era. The conception of the deity idealized the system of feudal authority. In general, Ames concluded, an idea of God serves the ideal aims of the society holding that conception. Accordingly,

> A person's idea of God may be taken as comprehending the highest ideal interests known or felt by him. It stands therefor for concrete purposeful activity and effort in those directions. Calling this idea to mind means putting one's self in an attitude consistent with the interests which controlled its formation.[2]

Ideas, including the idea of God, are not constitutive of reality, but refer to activities in the world. It is significant that Ames did not write of God as the object of the God-idea. Instead he found that the object of this idea is the world as the context of human experience, interests, and activities. This means that the God-idea is essentially a human value conception.

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[1] Edward Scribner Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910), p. 24.

[2] Ibid.

> The idea of God, when seriously employed, serves to generalize and to idealize all the values one knows. Our actual interests move in the social world and in the vast order of nature. In the simplest reflections upon the facts of life one is led into the labyrinth of the natural and of the human worlds. The idea which gathers into itself the interests and values of our daily concerns must signify what are for us the greatest realities in nature and in human experience.[1]

Value conceptions for Ames were not separable from the natural processes in which values are realized. Consequently, Ames explicitly rejected any absolute disjunction between a world of value judgments and a world of fact judgments. However, the persistence of the Kantian solution of the problem of God in the postulation of a regulative idea through the pragmatist understanding of ideas as functional for adjustment is evident in Ames' statement that "the God-idea is a teleological idea." For Ames this follows from seeing the God-idea as fundamentally valuational, since for him value defines the purpose for activity.

Religion, for Ames, parallels the function of idea at the level of feeling. "Religion is a feeling adjustment to the deeper things of life, and to the larger reality that encompasses the personal life."[2] Feeling here is a subjective response to the activities in a personal life process. The subjective character of immediate feeling is emphasized in Ames' analysis that "the function of feeling in the total experience may be stated as that of a sign of the value of the activity in which the organism is engaged."[3]

Both this pragmatic functionalism and the more explicit Kantian liberalism issued in an emphasis on personal subjective feeling as being at the heart of religious experience, the specifically religious feature being in the value reference of the experience. We will find that the dominantly subjective reference of this meaning of "religious experience" offers a contrast to Wieman's meaning.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 318. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 321. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

For Wieman, religious experience is an awareness of the fullness of the concrete datum. This datum is not a static sensory presentation, or a subjective quality of experience, but an objective activity with a given qualitative character. In events in their immediate givenness is found a total happening which may enter awareness as a power transforming the individual in his concrete relatedness.

Within both understandings it could be said that religious experience is an experience of a functioning. However, there is a radical difference between the meaning of "function" in the two contexts. Ames' meaning for "function" applies to the role of an idea or insight in directing the activity of the self according to individual or social purposes. The idea is functional in producing a humanly intended change. The idea is an instrument of control or principle of organization for the change produced. For Wieman, it is the datum which is functional and ideas may more or less effectively relate human life to this functioning.

In these observations we have been moving toward an answer to the question raised concerning the central characteristic of Wieman's thought which set him apart from the liberal audience to which he spoke. The answer to this question comprises the thesis of this study.

Other questions concerning the direction of Wieman's religious inquiry can help to bring us to focus upon this central question. We have noted Wieman's attention to the complexity of the religious datum and to the role of religious awareness in apprehending the "rich fullness" of experience that may yield evidence of this datum. From this one might expect more ready reliance upon the appeal to faith or to religious experience, with an insistence upon disciplining these forms of response. Instead one senses in Wieman's thought a suspicion of these forms of religious response, except as they are subjected to the most rigorous kind of intellectual testing. This would seem to shut off the very abundance of sensitive meaning to which such forms of response point.

Wieman has given some explanation of his insistence upon religious ceetainty as the aim of religious inquiry in his criticisms of religious feelings as well as of religious experiences. One is led to assume from these criticisms that his own encounter with pietistic protestantism as well as with anti-intellectual tendencies in liberal protestantism, issuing from the appeal to religious experience, has given impetus to his drive toward certainty in religion.

One may also see grounds for this drive, as an act of self criticism, in Wieman's own sensitive response to the "rich fullness" of experience. Professor Meland has characterized Wieman as "a mystic who is concerned that mysticism shall not get out of hand."[1] To this characterization of himself, Wieman has responded agreeably.

A clue to this preoccupation might be sought in Wieman's avowed pragmatic alliance. Wieman himself has seen his religious instrumentalism as being consonant with Dewey's instrumentalism.[2] With Dewey, Wieman sharply distinguishes between immediate feeling and knowledge. However, even accepting this limitation of knowledge to the cognitive relation defined by the process of imaginative abstraction and verification, it would seem that

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[1] B.E. Meland, "The Mystic Returns," The Journal of Religion, XVII (April, 1937), 156.

[2] H. N. Wieman, "Religion in John Dewey's Philosophy," The Journal of Religion, XI (January, 1931), 1.

Wieman would make a correlative emphasis on the role of a unique responsiveness to the particular given in sensitive awareness as a mode of religious inquiry which would not be overwhelmed by the cognitive demand. So we are led to inquire into the basis of Wieman's thought for the persisting tension between the motivations of faith and the urge to secure the act of faith itself through an unambiguous identification of the object of faith.

Again, we may ask why Wieman's inquiry into value theory seems to be subordinated to a quest for certainty, in his persistent concern to define that functioning which is the highest good. This concern stands sharply against the anti-absolutist mood of many religious liberals, and later stirs Dewey to vigorous response. Also, this concern seems to contrast acutely with the pluralism which obviously pervades Wieman's thinking. So we might well ask if there is a theme or characteristic in Wieman's inquiry which is expressed both by his inquiry into theory of value and his general development of religious instrumentalism.

In seeking an answer to these questions about the basic perspective which operates in Wieman's philosophy of religion, we can find some indicators for the direction of our inquiry in looking at those factors which contributed to Wieman's intellectual development. We find several suggestive clues in Wieman's autobiographical statements.[1]

Looking back over a half century devoted to religious inquiry, Henry Nelson Wieman has expressed the judgment that throughout this time he was guided by one problem: the problem of the human discernment of the relationship to human life to the ultimate religious object.

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[1] H. N. Wieman, "Theocentric Religion," in Contemporary American Theology, ed. V. T. A. Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), I, 339-52. H. N. Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography" (an unpublished paper written for inclusion in a projected volume on Wieman's theology, Carbondale, 1959). (Typewritten.)

> The problem which has engaged me for the past fifty years can be put in the form of a question: What operates in human life with such character and power that it will transform man as he cannot transform himself, saving him from evil and leading him to the best that human life can ever reach, provided that he meet the required conditions?[1]

This formulation of the problem does reflect his thinking as it came to be expressed in the later context of religious naturalism. However, to a considerable extent, in the earliest phase of his religious quest, this problem issues in an empirical inquiry.

Given this dominantly empirical thrust in his inquiry, Wieman recognized a shift in his conception of the nature of the religious object as an object of inquiry.

> A change in my treatment of this religious problem has been developing through the years. It is a shift of the focus of inquiry *from* the universe and *from* speculation about the power of being allegedly creating and sustaining the universe *over* to what operates in human life.[2]

Although this empirical thrust expresses his conviction that an effort to answer this question of religious inquiry "is misdirected when some presence pervading the total cosmos is sought," it should be recognized that even in this shift something of the character of the "cosmic" conception of the religious object persists in the late statements of the nature of the inquiry. Wieman suggested that throughout the various phases of his inquiry he has understood the religious object to be some sort of discernible unity. With the religious quest analyzed in terms of a pluralistic view of nature, the religious object then stands in contrast to the pluralities of existence as a process of a clearly definable unitary character.

The dominant thrust of Wieman's philosophy of religion is the discernment of this one ultimate object of human concern and commitment. In his

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

"Intellectual Autobiography" the major critical response to Tillich's notion of the power of being is the lack of any clearly definable form of event in which the power of being can be known to operate. Without this Wieman finds no basis by which to distinguish the operation of the religious object from other types of events, such as processes of degeneration and evil.

Sources for this single minded concern are indicated in the religious context of his early life, as well as in the intellectual factors which shaped the development of his thinking. To pursue our problem we need to give attention to some of these early conditioning influences.

Henry Nelson Wieman was brought up in a Presbyterian manse. The dominant figure in his early home life was his mother, a woman whose life manifested to Henry Wieman the power of religious living. As he has testified, "She shaped the minds of her children in ways religious not by verbal instruction but by the encompassing might of her faith."[1] In this early context of experience can be seen a religious resource that later enabled Wieman to say that he never had any doubt as to the reality of God. Such an early communication of the power of religious commitment, and the sense of the indubitable reality of God, certainly was a factor keeping Wieman's energies from being diverted by the radical humanists.

Wieman later saw his home life to have been dominated by religious concern but not ordered either by specific creedal belief or overwhelming concern for institutional church life. In this religious context, he discovered a breadth of literary values, and was introduced to the view of life arising from the success of evolutionary theory. He recalls reading Fiske's Destiny of Man at the age of 14 with no sense of intellectual conflict. Several years later, while at college preparatory school in California, he delved into Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. At the time he felt this to be a wholly acceptable world view.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

It was with the intent of preparing for a career in journalism that he went to Park College in Missouri. This purpose held him until

> one evening six weeks before my graduation I came to my room after the evening meal and sat alone looking at the sunset over the Missouri River. Suddenly, it came to me that I should devote my life to the problems of religious inquiry. I never had a more ecstatic experience. I could not sleep all night and walked in that ecstasy for several days.[1]

Weiman recognized the influence of two of his teachers at Park in this decision. One, Ernest McAfee, was the teacher of Comparative Religions. The other was Silas Evans, teacher of philosophy, college preacher, and disciple of Royce. Wieman testifies that it was Silas Evans who "first awakened [him] to the imperative urgency of the intellectual problem involved in the conduct of religious living."[2] Silas Evans had led his students into the depths of Royce's thought, spending one course with The World and the Individual alone. It was in the intellectual context of Royce's Absolute Idealism that his initial decision was made to engage in religious inquiry as a life vocation.

This decision led him to enter San Francisco Theological Seminary. He was not interested in preparing for the pastorate, but for him at this time graduate study in religion meant a seminary education. After graduation he spent a year in Germany on a traveling scholarship. Rudolph Eucken at Jena was a leading figure in philosophy of religion, who, within the perspective of Absolute Idealism was pressing for a spiritual renaissance in cultural life. Wieman stayed with Eucken only half a year, finding in him "great enthusiasm and an inspiring personality but no clarification of ideas."[1] The rest of the academic year was spent in Heidelberg under Windelband and Troeltsch.

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[1] Ibid., p. 5. [2] Ibid.

Most of his time was spent under Windelband. He found Windelband helpful in the clarification and systematization of thought, although Wieman felt that this was achieved "at the expense of depth and constructiveness."[2] Troeltsch, or Harnack at Berlin, did not call forth a response in Wieman. As he interprets his feeling at a later date, "while a study of history is of great importance, it can never do for us what the great historians of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century seemed to think it could do."[3] In his judgment the years in seminary and in Germany were years of very little change in his thinking. However, he does indicate that he was disturbed when he found that idealism altogether too neatly supported prevailing religious thought. He was suspicious of such a vested interest, and so was stimulated to look into other points of view. It was in such a mood for inquiry that he read Hobhouse and Bergson as major alternatives to idealism.

Wieman testifies to an intellectual ferment during his pastorate at Davis, California. On returning from Europe he had entered the pastorate, being unable to locate a teaching position. It was in his private study during this time that he encountered the work of Henri Bergson. The reading of Creative Evolution was decisive in determining the direction of this thought.

> Bergson gave my thinking a direction which deflected the influence of Harvard and caused me to reinterpret my teachers as I would not otherwise have done. Ever since those days of private study in Davis my

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[1] Wieman, "Theocentric Religion" in Contemporary American Theology, p. 343.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 344.

> thinking has been deeply influenced by Bergson's idea of Creativity, although my interpretation is different from his.[1]

At Davis, Wieman's interest was in a ministry to the students at the state school. He evidently experienced some frustration in his efforts since he came to the conclusion that he could effectively reach the college student mind only as a faculty member. Consequently in 1915 he enrolled at Harvard in the Department of Philosophy to study under Hocking and Perry.

> Harvard was the most stimulating and intellectually transforming experience of my life up to that time. It seemed to open a new world and a free wide range of thought.[2]

Although Royce died during the summer following Wieman's first year, the lure of idealism was still strong at Harvard in the person of William Ernest Hocking.

> In Hocking, I found another devoted follower of Royce. But Bergson had already intervened to turn me away from the metaphysics of idealism; and Hocking himself was carrying further the changes initiated by Royce whereby idealism was becoming increasingly a kind of interpersonal creativity. This is the direction in which I myself have been moving to the point where my idea of creative interchange can no longer be called idealism in the sense in which Hegel intended.[3]

Ralph Barton Perry introduced Wieman to the philosophical study of the problem of value, and to scientific method as a method of philosophical inquiry. At Harvard he read John Dewey for the first time. Eventually Dewey's work came to be of major importance for Wieman. However, this initial contact in his Harvard studies was peripheral, limited to the reading of several articles, and did not significantly contribute to the shaping of his thought as developed in his doctoral dissertation.[4]

We have noted that the major early change in Wieman's thought was in his movement out of Absolute Idealism as a philosophical context for his inquiry. However, in this study of Wieman's work and its intellectual background, it will be seen that the early idealistic phase of Wieman's intellectual life had important consequences for his later thought. From a study of the various factors operative in Wieman's intellectual history, and of his own expressions, I have come to believe that the basic answer to the questions we have asked about his work, both as to contrasts with other liberal thought, and as to the direction of his inquiry, is to be found in a relationship to this idealistic starting point, which has persisted as a controlling factor in all his thought.

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[1] Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 7.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Letter from H. N. Wieman to C. M. Rich, February 11, 1961.

I am contending that central to the development of Wieman's philosophy of religion is his notion of functional theism in which he retains the function and image of the absolute as specified in late Roycean idealism.

In defense and explication of this thesis, I shall try to show that for both Royce and Wieman the ultimate is identified as an empirical function in events, and characterized by the terms interpretation, transformation, or creativity. Further, this function is conceived as a definite specifiable structure in and for events. This transformative event is specified as a functioning which transcends any human functioning. In this way divine transcendence is shown to be a relationship between that function for human good which is other than man's function, and those functionings in events of which man is capable.[1]

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[1] The term "function" has several meanings which pertain to its use in this study. The first meaning, signifying "the operation of an activity or a structure" is the more generally employed. The second meaning derives from the more technical logical usage signifying "expression of" as in the usage "function of." In a theological context this meaning is useful as a logical expression signifying the relation of human life to that which is being served. The use of these latter meanings will be indicated by the context, the use of the construction "function of," or by footnote. Whenever the word "functioning" appears, it is the first meaning which is intended.

My concern will also be to show that even as Wieman moves out of the orientation of idealism, the image of the Absolute is retained in much of his thought. It is retained, for example, in his conception of the highest good. Again, it is found in the unqualified unity of Wieman's conception of God, which appears as a spatial unity in concrete events, as a unity in a definite structure of events, and as an unalloyed qualitative character.

By retaining the function and image of the Absolute, Wieman's empirical inquiry is led to give attention to the specifiable structure of this unity of functioning in events and to focus upon it as an object of cognition.

His insistence on the empirical givenness of this transcendent functioning in events, which has roots in Royce's own direction of inquiry, is expressed in the view that the highest good for human life is opened up as human life itself becomes a function of this transforming reality in events.

Wieman's functional theism thus sees human life itself as a potential function, as well as a certain specific type of functioning. In pointing up the contrast between Wieman and liberal functional theism, we can say that Wieman and Royce stand together in a common tradition of religious thought. This tradition asserts that God is that which operates to produce the greatest good by transforming human life into a function of itself. This is the thrust of Royce's absolute voluntarism and of Wieman's functional theism. For liberals to whom Wieman spoke, God was a function of man's striving for greater good. For Wieman, human good is seen to be a function of God.

This thesis does not seek to minimize the importance for Wieman of the theme of religious experience as an immediate apprehension of the richness of the total datum. What I am asserting is that this understanding of religious experience is a part of a tradition of emphasis on attention to the discrimination of structured activities in the concrete. We will find this concern to constitute a major qualification Wieman imposed upon Bergson's notion of creativity. Bergson lifted up the sense of ultimacy in the immediate. However, in Wieman's notion of appreciative awareness Bergsonian irrationalism becomes a phase of the process of transformation.

The course of the study undertaken in defense of this thesis moves first to examine certain features of a major movement in the history of modern science bearing upon our problem. In the rise of evolutionary thinking we will find a growing attention to functions in natural processes, as the object of both scientific and philosophical inquiry. We will find Royce responding to this procedure both by resistance and accommodation. Royce resists the equation of moral good with the course of natural processes, but at the same time he looks for that function in events which points to the nature of the relationship of the Absolute to the individual. We shall then observe how this intellectual orientation of Roycean thought both stimulated and helped to formulate Wieman's own intellectual inquiry, and how this Roycean mood operated in Wieman's response to Bergson, who offered an alternative to idealistic monism. Bergson led Wieman to attend to the immediate flux of experience as the locus of any ultimate functions which may be discerned, and lifted up creativity as a central philosophical notion. However, Wieman did not accept Bergson's emphasis on the non-rational; instead he saw creativity as a structured process in happenings. At Harvard Wieman expressed in his doctoral dissertation the confluence of his Roycean background, his reading of Bergson, and the impact of Perry and Hocking upon his effort to delineate the highest good as an ultimate function in the world. With this concern, Whitehead's unfolding philosophy of organism was later to capture Wieman's imagination as a philosophical vehicle for his inquiry into the function and nature of the religious object. At this time the philosophy of Whitehead seemed supremely to focus the point of view which had been taking shape in Wieman's own thinking up to that time. In Dewey he also found a mode of thought which gave attention to processes in nature which yield unities from given pluralities. But in his application of instrumentalism to philosophy of religion Dewey contended that ideals constitute the religious object as functional in the human quest for greater good. In response to this pragmatic instrumentalism Wieman pressed on to define faith as absolute commitment to that which functions for good, for the human service of this functioning. Wieman found that this commitment was served by an effort to specify the functioning of the creative event and those conditions which human functioning may provide for the creative event. This creative good was thus interpreted by Wieman as a functionally transcendent and specifiable structure. In this we find the function and image of Royce's Absolute reformulated.

CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF THE FUNCTIONAL EMPHASIS IN EVOLUTIONARY THEISM

Among the factors which constituted the intellectual environment from which Henry Nelson Wieman's thought took form, Wieman took evolutionary thinking for granted.[1] His reading included evolutionary philosophy and writings of evolutionary theists by the time he entered college. In his later writing he shows a readiness to deal with evolutionism as being of fundamental philosophical importance. Also he acknowledges the singular importance of his study of Bergson's Creative Evolution for the shaping of his philosophical orientation. In his doctoral dissertation we find that a central feature of the Darwinian thesis is reflected in Wieman's own notion of creative interest. With this notion Wieman contended for the creative function of conflict, recalling the central function of conflict in the theory of natural selection. The structure specified by the two ideas of conflict differ in important respects, although both views see conflict as that structure in events whereby change and novelty are advanced.

However, rather than looking to evolutionism as a source for detailed influences on Wieman's thought, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of evolutionism on the direction of religious inquiry pursued by those who were persuaded of the truth of evolutionism.

Of the factors which have shaped the life of western man through effecting a major change in the understanding of the nature of the quest for scientific understanding, few have been of greater importance than the Darwinian evolutionary theory. In its impact on western society it stands with the Newtonian system of mechanics in the generality of its conceptions for the understanding of life processes, in its power to stimulate further scientific investigation, and in stimulating the reconception of fields of investigation by the contribution of new interpretative patterns for the scientific mind. In its immediate effect, Darwinism provided a model for the organization of the new fields of sociology and psychology.[1] In long-term importance, the biological imagery of organism and the insistence on relativity in natural relations contributed to the upheaval in the physical sciences which issued in the reconception of the basis of physical theory in Einstein's formulation of the theory of relativity.

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[1] Wieman, "Theocentric Religion," in Contemporary American Theology, p. 341.

The work of Charles Darwin drew together and added impressive empirical support for developmental thinking regarding natural processes. Developmental thought had appeared earlier in various areas of intellectual effort. Among the romantic poets and the post-Kantian idealists the themes of development and growth had been major interpretative notions. Development in nature had been suggested in various scientific studies from geology to botany, and Lamarck had generalized a theory of development based on the mechanism of the use of acquired characteristics. These themes, however, had not offered a perspective which could open doors for scientific inquiry, and major support for them had not been aroused. Cuvier, a leading scientific light of his time, bitterly resisted these hypotheses in his orthodox view that species were created in the original creation of nature just as his student, Louis Agassiz, later resisted Darwinism.

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[1] Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (1st ed. rev.; Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 38 ff, 84 ff.

In 1858, Darwin and Wallace presented papers defending a new thesis regarding the origins of natural species.[1] This theory of natural selection held that not only are life forms subject to developmental processes, but the process is described in the form of a verifiable proposition. This empirical specification of the mechanism of development set Darwin's theory apart from that evolutionary thinking which appealed to a general principle of development. Darwin held that species developed by a process of differentiation within lower simpler forms. The mechanism of the process of differentiation he identified as "natural selection." Natural selection of characteristics for the differentiation of a species Darwin saw to occur in the survival of the individuals possessing variant forms which enhanced their ability to survive. In short, Darwin saw the key to the understanding of the evolutionary process to be in the survival value of spontaneous variations.

In both the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories is found a distinct effort to specify functions within natural processes which establish biological species. Lamarck contended that patterns of use or disuse functioned to establish the characteristics of a species. Darwin specified "natural selection" as a pattern of activities in natural events which functions to produce biological change, ultimafely issuing in the emergence of new species. Variations in characteristics of individuals within a biological family was established as the result of the functioning of spontaneous variations in the heredity mechanism. Survival value of the variant is not an inherent characteristic of the variant itself. Survival value is established as a function of the variant in contributing to or detracting from the individual's ability to survive in his environment.

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[1] The work of these men was presented as a joint paper to the Linnean society in July, 1858. In 1857, Darwin had explained his views in a letter to Asa Gray, professor of botany at Harvard University.

The term "natural selection" itself indicates a reference to a function. It refers to the function of selection of variants as species characteristics. This function is not provided by some one factor in the environment, but is a function of a type of process in natural events. In specific instances, this function will occur in a highly complex event involving relationships between individuals and the environment, including other life forms and physical conditions. Consequently, we can see the direction of scientific inquiry turned from preoccupation with the discovery of specific determinate factors, to structure in interrelationships which function to organize a multiplicity of determinate factors.

Concommitantly, the notion of value becomes a functional characteristic. This is indicated in the notion of "survival value." Value is accorded to a factor as it functions instrumentally to promote survival.

The theory of evolution was met with a variety of responses. Some found support in the theory for a thoroughgoing deterministic naturalism. The attention to functions in natural processes as adequate explanations of biological differentiations was taken as support for agnosticism concerning cosmological beginnings. Orthodoxy saw the origin of species in the primal divine creation. For many of a scientific temper this presented an occasion for a declaration of independence from orthodox religion, and some rejected religion as a vestige of primitivism in the human race. Simon Newcomb, astronomer at John Hopkins University, found the theory of evolution to be an adequate explanation of the order of the world and thereby ruled out any notion of divine design.[1]

T. H. Huxley who early acted to defend evolutionary theory from the attacks of orthodoxy, found a humanistic challenge in the theory.[2] Among life forms, he found man to occupy a unique position, in that man is able to combat the cosmic process by developing his own fitness to survive through the exercise of intelligence. He saw man as a pinnacle of structural achievement in nature; a structure which displays continuities in detailed functionings, but a discontinuity from the brutes in conscious intelligence.[3]

This naturalism cut ethical conceptions free from Biblical revelation and supernatural sanction. Consequently it was not surprising that the theory of the "survival of the fittest" (to use Herbert Spencer's phrase) was vigorously attacked on the theological ground that it ruled out divine creation. The origin of species by a primordial divine fiat, as envisioned by orthodox biblicism was effectively undercut. Yet there were many American scientists, who, having been subjected to the liberalizing influences of the century, were ready to consider the theory of evolution on its merits and to write in its theological defense.

Perceptive men, within and without the sciences, saw in the natural processes wherein new forms are established instances of creation receptive to religious meanings. The Harvard botanist, Asa Gray, who was the first reviewer of The Origin of Species for the American scientific audience, was a vigorous defender of Darwin against the charge of atheism. When Gray spoke before the Yale Divinity School, he said that he was "unable to perceive that the idea of evolution of one species from another, and of all from an initial form of life, adds any new perplexity to theism."[1] The resolution of the claims of the sciences and religion might require philosophical study, he admitted, yet he saw no reason for inherent conflict between the two fields. As a theory of nature, he considered Darwinism to hold a definite advantage over its rivals in that the theory of natural selection proposes more than a general explanatory principle, such as development or anticipation. The power of the theory, he argued, is in its specification of a modus operandi, whereby a pattern of activity is specified which can be verified by further investigation.

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[1] Simon Newcomb, et al., "A Symposium: Law and Design in Nature," in The Development of American Philosophy, pp. 195-209.

[2] The controversy over evolution reached its climax and subsided much more quickly in England than in the United States. A famous encounter with orthodoxy was in the debate between T. H. Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce in 1860.

[3] T. H. Huxley, Man's Place in Nature (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1902), pp. 150-53. This work, originally published in 1863, contributed a study of comparative physiology of apes and man to the literature supporting Darwin's theory. Huxley lent critical support, reserving judgment on Darwin's position on genetics.

Gray noted a constructive philosophical suggestion in the theory of natural selection; namely, that strife is shown to function in the production of good.

> By taking advantage of "every creature's best" for bettering conditions, natural selection has made strife work for good, throughout an immensely long line of adjustments and readjustments, in a series ascending as it advanced; that is presupposes a process, not from discord to harmony, but from a simpler to fuller and richer harmonies, conserving throughout the best adaptations to the then existing conditions.[2]

The advance of the good is accordingly viewed as a growth of variety or complexity of goods. Each good is valued according to its function in promoting survival under existing conditions. Here we find biological naturalism moving toward expression as a theory of value. The theory emerging here might be summarized in three propositions: first, specific goods are relative functions of adaptation for survival; second, the increase of good is defined as biological ascent, that is, the movement from single to complex organizations of goods; and third, the criterion of the highest good is the harmonization of goods.[1]

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[1] Asa Gray, Natural Science and Religion (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1880), p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 55.

Gray was not willing to allow the theological notion of creation to be limited to the *ex nihilo* conception propounded by orthodoxy. He cited the emergence of new forms in the evolutionary process as an instance of divine creation. For Gray, divine creation was intelligible as a continuous activity in the world evidenced in the birth of both individuals and species. Gray's position can be interpreted to assert that not only can the origination of species be understood as a function of the process of natural selection, but that the process of natural selection can be understood as a function of divine creation.

This reconception of divine creation was lifted up by a number of religious leaders who investigated the relation of the new evolutionary understanding of nature to their understandings of Christian faith. Men such as Noah Porter, James Freeman Clarke, and James McCosh were significant figures in this effort. These men saw the evolutionary process as a working out of divine design in nature.[2]

The form in which evolutionism had its most immediate and popular effect as a philosophical orientation was through the influence of the system of Herbert Spencer. Spencer had begun work to construct a speculative evolutionary system before Darwin published the results of his investigations. Spencer's grandiose speculation was built upon various elements, including the law of bhe conservation of energy as enunciated by Helmholz in 1848, themes of development in nature as expressed by Lamarck and Coleridge, a laissez-faire economic bias, and, later, acknowledgement of the principle of natural selection.

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[1] This theory of value implicit in Gray's expression is suggestive, in its general features, of the realistic value theory of R. B. Perry. Perry's notion of value as a fulfilment of interest can be seen as the functioning of an adaptive aim. It was Perry's use of the criterion of harmony that focussed Wieman's value theory in his doctoral dissertation "The Organization of Interests."

[2] Newcomb, *et al.*, "A Symposium: Law and Design in Nature," in *The Development of American Philosophy*, pp. 195-209.

Spencer was not concerned to generalize his theory of evolution as a physical theory. His system was the result of having given attention to the theory of mental evolution which followed from Lamarck's contention for the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarckianism was the basis for Spencer's theory of progress, or evolutionary optimism.[1] Spencerianism became the philosophy of rugged invididualism, and the rationale of late nineteenth century industrialism. For Spencer, social development was a long term process of nature, not to be tampered with lightly according to human designs. This natural process, he argued, can work effectively only through the guarantee of complete individual freedom. The resulting social struggles ensure that the strongest and best survive, the best being the strongest by definition. In this survival of the best, progress is assured as inevitable.

This theory, though more limited in potential than Darwin's, and subject to disproof on basic points, prompted several lines of development important for our study. First, Spencer stimulated interest in the study of the mental aspect of human life as a phenomenon in nature. Although dissent was soon to develop, Spencer's work in psychology and sociology provided a basic impetus to the scientific development of these fields of inquiry. In this we also see added impetus to the idealist's attention to the notions of self and consciousness, as well as to the psychological and philosophical explorations of William James.

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[1] Hofstadter, ibid., p. 39.

Secondly, although Spencer used the Benthamite criterion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the ethical norm, the conception of progress as a movement in nature and its constituent relationships toward this goal, however static, linked the notion of the good to natural processes, and specifically to functions in those natural processes. In this way it could be said that Spencer's individualism did not extend to his theory of value. Ultimately the reality of a value was only in its functional relationship within the progress of nature. The enjoyments of the millionaire and the sufferings of the laborer shared alike in value insofar as they were a part of the movement of nature toward utopia.

In his cosmic philosophy, John Fiske undertook to systematically define those relationships and functionings in the world process which may be identified with the religious dimension of human relationships. Few men were more enthusiastic converts to evolutionism than John Fiske. He was overwhelmed by the vision presented in Spencer's system, and wrote and spoke extensively for the new world view, both as a scientific philosophy and as a new perspective for religious thinking. The struggles of life were accordingly seen by him as expressions of an underlying moral purpose. His faith was that through struggle this moral purpose would be realized in a redeemed human society.

In his theism, Fiske identified Spencer's notion of God as "the Hidden Power" with the idealistic formula of "the One Reality which underlies all appearances."[1] With this identification he asserted that "the only conclusion we can consistently hold is that this is the very same power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness."[2] This "Hidden Power" or "One Reality" is thereby identified as an ultimate which functions in human life as consciousness. Stated with the logical meaning of "function," human consciousness can be said to be a function of the ultimate. The importance of this identification is that in this immediate empirical phenomenon, or better, in the fact of the awareness of empirical phenomenon, is found an ultimate functioning which "underlies" or functions in all appearances.

This continuity of function discerned in consciousness and in individuated appearances in experience is emphasized in Fiske's intuitionism. This intuitionism has been shown to have an affinity with the transcendentalism of the Unitarians, Emerson and Parker.[3] For these men intuition was a cognitive function, an activity of the subject in relation to the object.[4] Intuition is here accepted as a mode of apprehension in concrete experience. The intuitive grasp of experience is structured by forms, not a priori in the Kantian sense, but developed in the historic experience of the human race.[5] This idea that forms of intuition are historically developed fostered attention to the theme of growth in human apprehension of functionings. This is not a growth in discernment of one's own subjectivity, as the life of the universe in the self, rather, in intuition the attention of the self is directed outside the self to the context of the self in nature. It is in the appearances of nature outside the self that one may discern the activity of the ultimate, and thus recognize the continuity of the self with nature as both being functions of the ultimate.[1]

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[1] John Fiske, The Idea of God (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1885), p. 152.

[2] Ibid., p. 154.

[3] H. Burnell Pannill, The Religious Faith of John Fiske (Durham: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 43 ff.

[4] Ibid., p. 86. [5] Ibid., p. 93.

Fiske interpreted religion under the theme of adjustment. Evil and sin for him were shown to be the results of lack of adjustment or of maladjustment. "Obedience to the so-called 'laws of nature,' which are the decrees of God," asserted Fiske, "is therefore the fundamental principle of religion viewed practically."[2] The "laws of nature" are functions of God in impersonal natural events, and Good and Evil have their standard in this functioning of the ultimate in the laws of nature. Human sin, in being defined in terms of adjustment, is in effect defined as a functional failure, the failure to be a function of the ultimate.

This assumption of continuity between a functioning found in human life and in appearances with an ultimate functioning in the world order is operative in Fiske's distinction between moral sense and religious sense. He interpreted moral sense as having to do with the relationship of the individual to the community; and the religious sense as having to do with a larger potential relationship, namely, the aspiration after "complete fulness of life."[1] "Religion," he continued,

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[1] John Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (8th ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1874), II, 67. Basically, Fiske held a correspondence theory, as in his statement that "Life--including also intelligence as the highest known manifestation of life--is the continuous establishment of relations within the organism, in correspondence with relations existing or arising in environment." This correspondence theory serves to amplify our statement on continuity in pointing out that Fiske assumed a fundamental functional continuity in the world, which mediates between relations in the intelligence of the organism and those existing in the natural environment.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 465.

> therefore, extends the rules of right and wrong primarily derived from the relation of the individual to the community, until they cover even the self regarding actions of the individual. And what is this but establishing rules of action concerning the individual in his relation to what we call Nature or the Universe.[2]

For Fiske, human capacity to adjust to the ultimate functioning is not inherently limited. In this capacity, Fiske contended, "human life transcends other forms of life."[3] He anticipated that in time this human capacity to adjust completely to divine law would usher in the Spencerian millenium. Thus he wrote,

> it has appeared that war and all forms of strife, having ceased to discharge their normal function, and having thus become unnecessary, will slowly die out; that the feelings and habits adapted to ages of strife will ultimately perish from disuse; and that a stage of civilization will be reached in which human sympathy shall be all in all, and the spirit of Christ shall reign supreme throughout the length and breadth of the earth.[4]

Progress for Fiske, thus meant a change in the dominant relationships in nature. Progressive change in dominant patterns meant a change in those relationships and patterns of relations which serve as functions of the Ultimate. Conflict will lose its function, in Fiske's eschatological picture, and sympathy will gain the function of being the major historical instrument of the ultimate purpose. This evolutionary succession of functions, each established and superceded by use and disuse, with Fiske's conception of good and evil as adjustment and maladjustment within these functional relationships, yields a conception of value as a relationship to a function. Accordingly, an activity is said to be good in relation to some specified function, and an activity can be said to be an ultimate good only when its function is integrated with the ultimate function in nature. At one stage of development strife will be good because it is so integrated, whereas at a later stage strife may be evil because it cannot serve as an integrated function.

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[1] Ibid., II, 466. [2] Ibid.

[3] Fiske, The Idea of God, p. 162.

[4] Ibid., p. 163.

Another vigorous proponent of theistic evolution was Lyman Abbott. Unlike Fiske, his theological effort was not stimulated by the vision of a new all-encompassing architecture of scientifically grounded theory, but was primarily concerned to interpret the doctrines of Christian theology in the light of the principle of evolution.[1]

Accordingly, Abbott found evolutionary theories to illuminate the history of life under divine design. This evolutionary interpretation of divine purpose in history is effected by displaying specific natural processes as functions of the purpose of God. God, as an object of religious faith, is thus no longer conceived a primarily a first cause of the world, which may intervene in history on crucial occasions, but is understood to be operative in the world, such that the history of evolution is then understood as the history of divine creation. This history is "a continuous progressive change, according to certain laws, and by means of resident forces."[2] This definition of evolution was, for Abbott, unambiguously theistic. He asserted these laws and resident forces to be functions of God: "there are no laws of nature which are not the laws of God's own being."[3]

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[1] Lyman Abbott, The Theology of an Evolutionist (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1897), p. iii.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 9.

Abbott summarized his faith as he wrote:

> The Theistic evolutionist believes that God is the one Resident Force, that He is in His world: that His method of work in His world is the method of growth; and that the History of the world, whether it be the history of creation, of providence, or of redemption, whether the history of redemption in the race or of redemption in the individual soul, is the history of a growth in accordance with the great law interpreted and uttered in that one word evolution.[1]

In this statement we find three points pertaining to the conception of God as an object for knowledge.

First, in Abbott's view, God is immanent in the world of evolutionary processes. What can be known of God is God as immanent in these evolutionary processes. Abbott admitted that theism established on this basis is an interpretation of the data of nature. However, Abbott argued that the theistic interpretation of evolution is valid, since the theory is not a causal explanation of the world, but a description of progressive natural change. He contended that this description could alternatively be interpreted as a description of God's formative activity in nature.[2] Abbott clearly rejected the Kantian formula for distinguishing the spiritual and the natural. He saw the laws of the spiritual life to be analogous to the laws discovered by natural sciences, and found a similarity in religious and scientific inquiry. "Religion is a spiritual life;" he wrote, and "theology is the science of that life."[3]

This sense of the unity of human life and existential interpenetration of the various areas of human concern was to become characteristic of later religious naturalism. However, there is no evidence to suggest that for our study we should see in Abbott's work more than an exploration of a confluence of evolutionary thinking and Christian theism with the assistance of philosophical idealism.

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[1] Ibid., p. 15. [2] Ibid., p. 21. [3] Ibid., pp. 180-81.

By identification of the laws of God with the laws of nature, Abbott tended toward philosophical monism, yet he sought to remain free of the charge of pantheism. He cautioned that the empirical world and the divine spirit are not to be equated, nor is God to be conceived as the sum of all phenomena. Instead, God is to be understood as "an Intelligent and Beneficent Will working in the so-called forces of nature."[1]

In the notion of a Universal Will, Hegelianism had provided a philosophical conception of divine transcendence. This background is clearly evident in the view of natural law as particularization of divine will. But Abbott seemed concerned to fully emphasize the contrast between the human and the divine along with divine immanence. He accomplishes this by stating that God's immanent working in the world is "other" than man's working, although the work of God and man are in the world of concrete experience.

This lifts up the second feature of Abbott's theology to which we wish to direct attention. This is the conception of the work of God as an activity in the processes of growth in nature. Abbott stated that the method of God's work is the method of growth. Divine activity contrasts with human activity in that God makes something by growth, whereas human activity makes something by way of manufacture. God's activity produces life, whereas the end product of human manufacture is something dead.

God is immanent as "the one Resident Force." This presents God as the primordial condition for any world, but God as the "Resident Force" is a continuing "working" or activity in His world. The divine activity is a purposive working. Knowledge of God is not a simple discovery of truth about the divine working in nature, but is a matter of revelation, which Abbott understood as the unveiling of truth "by God and man working together."[1] God is a Will revealed to man through his works: "All nature interprets Him to us."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 14.

The third point we find of importance is the identification of evolution as the functioning of the divine "method of growth." This in effect is a functional definition of divine will. This divine functioning in nature, in Abbott's thought, then became a functional model for interpreting the life of the intellect and spirit. Accordingly, the law of evolution is not limited to biological growth, but was found by Abbott to apply to the intellectual and spiritual life. Struggle, he pointed out, is required for intellectual growth, just as struggle is required for biological development.[3] He saw moral progress as the result of struggle, a struggle which is the essence of life itself. Spiritual struggle has a definite order of progress. "The passage of life is from innocence, through temptation, to virtue."[4] Abbott defined virtue as life according to God's law. Sin is thus conceived, similarly to the view of John Fiske, as a violation of God's laws.[5] The life of virtue is life according to the equation of 1) the law of God with 2) the law of nature with 3) the "law of man's own being."

By this equation, the life of virtue is the religious life. Abbott defined religion as "the life of God in the soul of man."[6] Accordingly, we would distort Abbott's intent to accuse him of moralism in the equation of religion and living according to divine law. Divine law is growth, so we would better say that Abbott offers a reconception of virtue as living in accordance with the divine functioning in the world. The basic character of religious life was found by Abbott to be essentially a constant throughout the history of man's spiritual life. He claimed that a continuity is to be found in the life of faith, hope and love as exemplified in the major religious figures.

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[1] Ibid., p. 55. [2] Ibid., p. 77. [3] Ibid., p. 61.

[4] Ibid., p. 92. [5] Ibid., p. 190. [6] Ibid., p. 191.

In contrast to the constancy of the religious life, Abbott saw the science of life as always changing. Understandings of the religious life are subject to development according to the advance of the understandings of the functioning of God in the world.

From his point in the advance of theological understanding, Abbott in effect saw the universal religious life as a human-divine relationship, which is itself a process of growth. The human-divine relationship being understood as a working together of God and man, the religious life is accordingly not seen as produced only by the working of God, but may be advanced by human activities. Accordingly, the "life of God in the soul of man" may be fostered by institutions. However, these institutions have value only as instruments which may serve the growth of religion.[1]

For the theistic evolutionist then, the world was seen as thellife of God. The divine life was considered a knowable function in nature's processes and in human moral life. For the evolutionary theist, these were functional expressions of one divine creative activity. The forming of this theistic view, in which man's inner life and the life of nature are seen as similar and related processes expressing the Will of God, is important in the formation of a mood of religious inquiry directed to discerning ultimate functions in nature.

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[1] Ibid., p. 190.

As we have noted, Wieman has written that the reading of Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution had a decisive influence on his intellectual development, such that his response to Perry and Hocking at Harvard was critically qualified. We find, however, that Wieman does not accept Bergson's position fully as his own, and on major points he later refers to Bergson's thought to clarify his own by way of contrast. Wieman's summary judgment about the importance of Bergson was that Bergson lifted the notion of creativity to central position in his own thought. However, it is not creativity as conceived by Bergson that figures as the central notion in value theory and for the interpretation of God as the ultimate religious object.[1]

We will also find that Bergson's Creative Evolution, is of importance as a development of evolutionary thought influential for the background of Wieman's thought prior to his concentrated study of the work. To a significant extent, Royce responded to Bergson in his Problem of Christianity, offering a critical response to Bergson's notion of creativity. So, if we see Wieman's movement out of idealism as taking place within an interplay between Roycean and Bergsonian interpretations, then the lines of influence from these philosophical perspectives in Wieman's thought can be expected to be complex. This complexity of inheritance stands in some contrast to the clarity which Wieman achieves in his own expression, thus adding to the problem of delineating the intellectual inheritance operative in his thought. Because Royce did respond to Bergson in regard to the metaphysical interpretation of the notion of creativity, we will inspect salient features of Bergson's Creative Evolution as a philosophical movement within evolutionism, and reserve detailed comment on the employment of Bergson's thought by Wieman as this appears in Wieman's work at Harvard.

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[1] Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 1.

Bergson sharply questioned the assumption of the philosophies of evolution that the fundamental evolutionary life process can be specified as a rational pattern in events. He found the human intellect to be a specialized function, and because of its special character, it is severely limited as to the kind of knowledge it can yield of life processes. For him, any metaphysics raised as an extension of abstract intellectual notions can only be misleading in any effort to know the basic evolutionary character of the world of events.

Consequently, Bergson expressed his anti-intellectualism in his rejection of the scientism of Spencerian evolutionism.[1] Such a doctrine, he argued "will _a priori_ accept the doctrine of the simple unity of knowledge and of the abstract unity of nature."[2] Consequently, the effort of philosophy betrays an ambivalence between the conceptual effort of idealism and the agnosticism of scientism regarding ultimate notions. As he wrote:

> To a metaphysical dogmatism, which has erected into an absolute the factitious unity of science, there succeeds a skepticism or a relativism that universalizes and extends to all the results of science the artificial character of some among them. So philosophy swings to and fro between the doctrines that regards absolute reality as unknowable and that which, in the idea it gives us of this reality, says nothing more than science has said.[3]

The key to the solution of the impasse is in clearly distinguishing between the inert and the living. When this is done, "we shall find that the inert enters naturally into the frames of the intellect, but that the living is adapted to these frames only artificially, so that we must adopt a special attitude toward it and examine it with other eyes than those of positive science."[4] The scientific truth is instrumental; it extends human action with respect to inert things.[1] But its own admitted relativism means that at best it can only be symbolic as it seeks to deal with life. This means that some other kind of knowledge is required to penetrate life.

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[1] Henri Bergson, _Creative Evolution_ (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 214, 396 ff.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 215. [3] _Ibid._, p. 216. [4] _Ibid._, p. 217.

> On this ground philosophy ought then to follow science, in order to superimpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another kind, which may be called metaphysical. Thus combined, all our knowledge, both scientific and metaphysical, is heightened. In the absolute we live and move and have our being. The knowledge we possess of it is incomplete, no doubt, but not external or relative. It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy.[2]

The two types of knowledge can work together, but they are distinct modes of knowledge. The implicit positive relationship of the two types seems to be that of mutually opening areas for the application of the other, with full recognition of the function and limitations of each. The two types of knowledge are two types of functions. The intellect functions instrumentally. Metaphysical knowledge, gained by the intuition, transcends the intellect in function.[3]

The transcendence of intellectual knowledge by metaphysical knowledge means a contrast in function. The function performed here is the achievement of an awareness of life itself. These two functions correspond to the two directions in which the vital impulse has expressed itself in evolution.[4]

Bergson contended that the data of life cannot be interpreted to reveal the nature of life as long as the fundamental system of interpretation is mechanistic. Accordingly, Bergson sets forth to undercut the assimilation of evolutionary theory to mechanism, arguing that the use of mechanistic principles of explanation for life processes serves only to cut philosophy off from the evolutionary life process itself. He pointed to

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 217. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 218. [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*

Spencer's system as a prime illustration of the effort to reproduce intellectually evolutionary process according to the model of mechanism.[1] Such an effort is doomed to failure, according to Bergson, because of the dichotomy in nature between the intellect and its objects on the one hand, and the fundamental nature of the life process, on the other.

The character of this distinction is indicated in Bergson's conception of the nature of real time, or "duration." By "real time" he means "experienced time," as contrasted to "mathematical time." Real time, as experienced in human consciousness is, first, continuous change, and secondly experienced as the persistence of a memory in the present. This experience of the inheritance of the past amid real change is, for Bergson, an experience of duration, that is an experience of the fundamental life process, real time, evolution, itself. In contrast, mathematical time is defined as a relation between points, reducing a process of change, for instance, from the continuity of the event to the image of a series of stages. This distinction becomes for Bergson, the basis for a radical criticism of the activity of the intellect in the construction of its conception. On the basis of this analysis Bergson finds the intellect to distort the continuity of the real by forcing it into set, repeatable forms. This procedure of the intellect effectively divorces conceptual knowledge from concrete duration. This criticism cuts at the roots of most efforts to construct a world view, since the world views of philosophy are based upon a mechanical model derived from the intellectualizing of concrete experience. Consequently, Bergson's critique of intellectualism constitutes a critique of any metaphysics conceptually structured, including the metaphysics of Absolute Idealism.

Another aspect of the mechanistic spatial conception of time which contrasts to real time as duration, is that spatial time involves the assumption that the present is inherent in the past. This conception of time Bergson found to operate in the evolutionary thinking of Laplace and Huxley, with the philosophical consequence that the fact of evolution was effectively denied.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 396 ff.

> For time is [in such a view] deprived of efficacy, and if it does nothing, it is nothing. Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once. But duration is something very different from this for our consciousness, that is to say, for that which is most indisputable in our experience. We perceive duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live. It is of no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling prospect of a universal mathematic; we cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of a system.[1]

With the notion of duration as the key to any metaphysics, Bergson in effect stated that the ultimate reality of the world, or of the whole, is not of the nature of a finished conceptual unity, as the idealist conceives the world. If the ultimate is known at all, it is known only in the concreteness of the immediately given in experience. The immediately given is duration, the ultimately real.

However, it should be noted that Bergson's implicit criticism of idealistic metaphysics does not eliminate the notion of a world unity or whole as an organically structured reality as a metaphysical notion. Bergson does retain the notion of a "whole" as more than a totality of processes. One constructive remark he makes, almost in the manner of an aside, posits the reality of an active unity, a whole "which at every moment puts on a new form and which communicates to [its constituent events] something of its novelty."[2] But this is not the primary aspect of the novelty of concrete events; the fundamental novelty in experience is inherent in the nature of duration itself. Duration is experienced as change, and real change means real novelty.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 45. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 371.

In the study of the nature of time, Bergson's critique is based on an analysis of the functions of time. His argument might be restated as follows: According to the data of experience, the function of time, or duration, is novelty. Mathematical time ignores this, and functions to define spatialized order. In the metaphysical application of the mathematical view of time, the function of immediately given reality is denied. According to the mechanistic view of time, the future and the past are regarded "as calculable functions of the present," and thus imply that all is given in any present.[1]

In contrast, Bergson contended that reality "appears as a ceaseless upsurging of something new, which has no sooner arisen to make the present than it has already fallen back into the past.[2] This theme of the ceaseless coming into being of new things is the central characteristic of Bergson's view of nature. The mechanistic understanding of nature explains evolutionary process by the principle of adaptation, but Bergson contended that this explanation is unsuccessful in accounting for the inventiveness in evolution.[3] Finalism offers an explanation by positing a plan which evolution is to realize. To this Bergson replied that this would imply a progressive harmony with evolutionary advance, which is not empirically substantiated.[4] However, Bergson's basic objection is that any unity imposed on the life process by an end would actually exclude any future with real novelty.

> Before the evolution of life, on the contrary, the portals of the future remain wide open. It is a creation that goes on forever

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 43. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 53. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

> in virtue of an initial movement. This movement constitutes the unity of the organized world--a prolific unity, of an infinite richness, superior to any that the intellect could dream of, for the intellect is only one of its aspects or products.[1]

The unity in evolutionary process is in its creative impetus. This is the only principle which Bergson found adequate for an explanation of evolution. This vital impulsion which is basic to all reality finds expression in the forms of adaptive mechanism, in forms of material organization which exhibit intellectually apprehendable patterns of causal determination, as well as the form-breaking temporal surge from novelty to novelty. To these functional expressions of the vital impulsion correspond three types of consciousness. Instinct as adaptive consciousness, Bergson saw, has developed as a dominant form in insect life, but a core of this type of consciousness, Bergson believed, can be found in human experience. "In the phenomena of feeling," wrote Bergson, "in unreflecting sympathy and antipathy, we experience in ourselves . . . something of what must happen in the consciousness of an insect acting by instinct."[2] In human life evolution, or the vital impulsion (Bergson often uses the terms interchangeably) has developed intelligence in its most refined form. Intelligence is, "before anything else, the faculty of relating one point of space to another, one material object to another; it applies to all things, but remains outside them; and of a deep cause it perceives only the effects spread out side by side."[3] These modes of consciousness correspond to the modes of mechanism and finalism in evolution. These are two conscious functions in life which are respectively the immediate feeling response of automatic behavior and the constructing and relating activity of intelligence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 116. [2] Ibid., p. 192. [3] Ibid., p. 193.

Bergson asked whether the life process has irrevocably divided these functional tendencies and their modes of consciousness. His answer is that there is a third mode of consciousness, intuition, which, in function corresponds to the evolutionary movement of creativity, or creative evolution. This mode of consciousness is an awareness of pure duration, or reality itself. But this level of consciousness is not a reversion to pure immediacy. It is an attentiveness to the immediate, to "the very inwardness of life." "Intuition," Bergson defined, "in instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."[1] This reflective immediacy without a demand for automatic feeling responses for automatic physical action has a function similar to that of intellect. Bergson thus saw intuition as instinct purified by intellect. However, intuition is the growth of a level of consciousness which is more than instinct and intellect combined. Intuition has a distinct function which presses beyond the limits of the intellectual function, but is impossible without the intellectual function. This is best stated in Bergson's own words.

> Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the vital process. Then by sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest, and turned outward by it into movements of locomotion.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 194. [2] Ibid., 195.

With this attention to functions in life activities as the basis for differentiation in nature, its forms, processes, and qualitative characters (as the "subjective" aspect of consciousness,) Bergson suggested that religious notions will find meanings in contrast with those supplied by earlier philosophies. Bergson suggested that this view of evolution involves a basic change in thought regarding the notion of God. In this view things are precipitates of the passage of time, so that within the ultimately real there are not things, "there are only actions."[1] Accordingly, the idea of God cannot refer to a thing, even an ultimate thing, creating other things. Rather, states Bergson, God "is unceasing life, action, freedom."[2] The religious object thus cannot be an object in the traditional sense of an ultimate entity, or a finished totality. If there is an ultimate it is an ultimate activity. Bergson does not pursue a constructive development; his own identification of the idea of God seems to be "a continual growth of the universe."[3] The thrust of this position for philosophy of religion is the identification of the religious object as an activity, and to see divine activity as a function in events contrasting to the human cognitive function.

~~We~~ have seen that Darwinian evolutionary thought advanced an empirically specifiable notion of creation which was identified as a mechanism of biological variation, conflict and survival. The evolutionary theists tended to see in this mechanism a theistic function, i.e., God's way of doing things, with the consequence that progress in nature and human society could be equated with divine will.

The association of the themes of conflict and creativity was continued in Henri Bergson's creative evolutionism, although he rejected the intellectualistic specification of creation as a pattern of activities. Creation, for Bergson, was pure activity itself, sheer temporal advance into novelty, or "duration." Creation, accordingly, can never be captured by concepts of the intellect. Mechanistic concepts can only freeze the process, Bergson contended, they cannot preserve its life. Creativity is the movement of reality, it is the ultimate in the immediate. Bergson argued for the empirical immediacy of the creative function, but contrasted the creative function to the intellectual function of the human mind.

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[1] Ibid., p. 271. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., 373.

Our study will lead us to see how these evolutionary notions were of major importance for the formation of Wieman's thought. The association of the themes of conflict and creation, the effort to identify creativity with a particular structure in conflict situations, as well as a rejection of mechanistic theories of evolution are all characteristic marks of Wieman's early expression. These themes are held together in a viewpoint which arose most immediately from Wieman's study of Bergson. However the resulting perspective which we find in "The Organization of Interests" displays features which bear a striking affinity to Josiah Royce's response both to evolutionary thought and to the work of Henri Bergson. Consequently, we will seek next to discover those features of Royce's philosophy which seem to have contributed to the development of Wieman's thought.

CHAPTER III

JOSIAH ROYCE'S SPECIFICATION OF THE FUNCTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

The absolute voluntarism of Josiah Royce, which formed the context in which H. N. Wieman's early philosophical self-consciousness was nurtured, in part expressed a response to evolutionary naturalism. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce attacked Spencer's effort to base a theory of value on the conception of automatic progress in nature. The theory of the inevitability of evolutionary progress had been proposed by Herbert Spencer as a deduction from the law of the conservation of energy. Royce first attacked Spencer's logic, contending that the evidence of nature did not necessarily admit his optimistic conclusion. Royce pointed out that scientific opinion could equally well conclude from the evidence of nature that the ultimate fate of the human race may be determined by the law of the dissipation of energy.[1] Also, he suggested that this conclusion could be supported by the common sense observations that human life seems always subject to frustration, that it is often the wicked that prosper, and that no man knows his individual fate. With the failure of Spencerianism to accept at face value these aspects of human experience, Royce saw that a fundamental weakness of evolutionary naturalism was in its handling of the problems of evil. If a philosophy is to claim any measure of truth, Royce contended, it must admit the integrity of human experience. "In dealing with this world of concrete facts," wrote Royce, "we must be realistic.

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[1] Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper Bros., 1958), p. 439.

it is our duty . . . to have faith in the great postulates of common sense."[1]

As a general point of view, Royce regarded Spencer's conception of the purpose of nature as an implicit devaluation of human life and enterprise. Spencer's vision of the end of human life, judged Royce, was a tasteless consummation of the human zest for adventure, "as innocent and insipid as in the days of Eden."[2] In consequence Royce rejected theories of the natural world, such as evolution, as keys to the understanding of religion and morality. Royce did not reject evolutionism as a theory of nature. Instead he saw it as a major scientific adventure, illuminating the physical order. Yet the truth of this physical theory, he argued, does not guarantee moral progress, if we mean by moral progress the gradual overcoming of evil. Evil is with us, and this is as much a result of the developmental process as is the good. So what assurance is there he asked, that the future evolutionary process will any more result in the removal of evil?

Proceeding to counter Spencer's central contention, Royce argued that evolutionary process is not identifiable with progress. Since the processes of nature show undeniable aspects of degeneration, there is no assurance that natural growth means improvement.[3] Consequently, he could find no criterion of the good (as would be basic to a notion of inevitable improvement) resident in the facts of nature. Thus the answer of the idealist to the "realistic" positions, he concluded, is to establish a criterion of the good which "shall be independent of his own caprice, without being realistic."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 464. Royce brought the same criticism against the ethical systems of the utilitarians. To reduce the facts to the terms of an imposed system of interpretation does not meet the facts, but is only an exercise in adroit verbiage, Royce maintained.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[4] Ibid., p. 30.

Royce argued that evolutionary optimism is based on a misconception of the nature of moral goodness. Rather than the exclusion of evil, goodness involves conquest of evil, "the organic subordination of the evil will in the good will."

> The only destruction of moral evil that ever takes place or can take place is the transcendence of the evil will by the good will in the very moment of the life of the evil will.[1]

Royce was concerned to recognize the realities of human experience, yet he was not convinced that this is all that can be said about human existence. The central theme of his work is that the particulars of concrete experience are transcended. It can be seen in Royce's "transcendence of the evil will by the good will" that "transcendence" refers to a function which the good will performs in relation to the evil will. The evil will in included as a given historical fact, yet the evil will is transformed by being included and related within a larger moral good. "Transcendence" here means a function of inclusion and transformation.

Royce found the basis for his view of the moral good in his analysis of "moral insight." Insight into the nature of the ethical situation begins for him with a recognition of the validity of conflicting claims for the conception of good, and advances with the ethical skepticism which results from this recognition. Under the mood of skepticism, he suggested, notions of the good seem finally to be reduced to personal preference.[2] Scientific evolutionism does not escape this skepticism, Royce contended, even though the good is defined by identifying the better with the later evolutionary product.

> Why is the last state in an evolution better than the former states? Surely not because it is the last stage, surely not because it is

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[1] Ibid., p. 465. [2] Ibid., p. 133.

> physically more complex, more definite, or even more permanent; but solely because it corresponds to some ideal that we independently form.[1]

Such an ideal, in this case, is just a matter of personal preference. Royce found this divergence of wills expressed in the variety found among proposed ethical aims to be the clue to the solution of the problem and asked, what does it mean to recognize fully the claims of opposing ethical ends as real alternatives. To this he responded that "to realize opposing ends so completely that one feels a genuine doubt which of them to accept, implies, we say, the simultaneous provisional acceptance of both."[2] This provisional acceptance of all moral aims results in a practical moral neutrality. However, Royce continued,

> Absolute ethical skepticism, if it were actually possible without self-destruction, would still pre-suppose an end, namely, the effort to harmonize in one moment all the conflicting aims in the world of life . . . Absolute skepticism would thus be founded on absolute benevolence. *Its own aim would be harmony and unity of conduct.*[3]

In this presupposition of absolute skepticism Royce found the basis for a moral law. The will to harmony indicated a good higher than the good of the individual wills in conflict, an Ideal Higher Good, which is again a will at this higher level; a will related to personal will in that it is "the will to direct my acts *toward* the attainment of universal Harmony."[4] For Royce, this implied for individual moral decision the underlying principle that one ought to "act always in the light of the completest insight into all the aims that thy act is to affect."[5]

This moral principle, he asserted, is the basis of moral insight.

> Moral insight . . . consists in the realization of the true inner nature of certain conflicting wills that are actual in the world.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 27. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 134. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [5] *Ibid.*

It follows that:

> The moral insight involves . . . the will to harmonize, so far as possible, the conflicting wills that there are in this world, and that are realized at the moment of insight.[1]

Moral insight was for Royce an orientation which involves a method of practical ethical action. It recognizes the realities of the is, yet seeks an ought which is relevant to the is and the various value affirmations which are presented in response to experience. The ought is not apparent in the concrete situation, but is to be discovered as a new moral will for that situation. Through the unity which this higher, more inclusive moral will gives to the conflicting of wills, a new moral situation is created, which gives a new meaning to the diverse individual moral assertions. The moral process is initiated by the mutual sharing of points of view. This can start in a single individual, but such growth of insight into the will of the neighbor must be shared by the neighbor for this growth to continue.[2] The next stage is to subordinate one's particular moral aim to the higher will, a will to harmonize the conflicting wills in a more inclusive moral aim.

> If the moral insight be concerned directly with two conflicting wills, my neighbor's and my own, then this insight involves the will to act as if my neighbor and myself were one being that possessed at once the aims of both of us. If the moral insight be concerned with conflicting general aims, such as could express themselves in systems of conduct, then the moral insight involves the will to act, so far as may be, as if one included in one's own being the life of all those whose conflicting aims one realizes.[3]

Moral insight is an organization of life which involves the recognition that "I am an instrument, whose purpose it is to attain, to foster, to extend, and to employ the moral insight."[4] The emergence of this concern for the growth of a community of mutual insight means that life takes on a distinctly new meaning, which stands in striking contrast to the individualism of evolutionary ethics. The individual through moral insight begins to see himself as a part of an encompassing life.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 175. [3] Ibid., p. 169.

[4] Ibid., p. 182.

> Thou and I, neighbor, have in this world no rights as individuals. We are instruments. The insight that begins in me when I find thee, must go further. I find not only thee, but also Life Universal.[1]

The discovery of the Life Universal is the discovery of the Absolute moral insight in human experience. Royce contended that the doctrine of the Absolute is an inevitable postulate of human experience. Just as he argued from diversity of moral judgment to the need for an Absolute Good, he argued from the reality of error to an Absolute Truth.[2] The Absolute is the ultimate transcendence of concrete particulars. However else the Absolute is characterized, whether as Will, or Idea, or Whole, the relation of the Absolute to concrete events is functional and this function is as we have noted in Royce's own expression, the meaning of the attribute of transcendence.[3] As the Transcendent Moral Idea, the Absolute is the function of including the competing wills and transforming them by unifying them into a unity of will and value which they did not individually or collectively possess. The understanding of the Absolute as a function in relation to concrete happenings, enabled Royce to speak of the Absolute Life as including individual lives, yet the Absolute does not absorb and deny the unique individuality of particular lives. The good does not conquer by denying the reality of evil, but by transorming the particular evil in a larger context of relations.

Royce pursued his inquiry with a conscious indebtedness to Hegel, yet with a concern to acknowledge the empirical data of experience as the starting point for philosophy. Royce found in individuality, expressed as a will in a particular context, the basis for insight into the nature of Reality. This theme is pursued in his major work, The World and the Individual. In speaking of the aim of this inquiry, he wrote:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 215-16.   [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 384 ff.   [3] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

> we shall not be looking for mere abstract principles, but we shall be seeking for the most concrete objects in the world, namely for Individual Beings, and for the system that links them in one Individual Whole,--for Individuals viewed as the limits toward which all ideas of universal meanings tend, and for the Absolute as himself simply the highest fulfilment of the very category of Individuality, the Individual of Individuals.[1]

The basic philosophical problem for Royce's system is posed by this recognition of individuality. Royce evidently was sensitive to the criticism commonly leveled against Idealism that it ultimately lost the particular in the universal. Royce's persistent concern was to assert the integrity of the individual and the uniqueness of the particular. But he also held that integrity and uniqueness were meaningless in a conception of individuality that cut the individual off from reality. This was what he saw to happen in the solipsism of the skeptic and the realist's assertion that reality is independent of all purposes.

In answer to the questions "What is an Idea?" and "How can Ideas stand in any relation to Reality?" as central questions for idealism, Royce offered an analysis of the function of ideas. He found two types of "meaning" for an idea: the internal meaning and the external meaning. His general definition of the word "idea" is,

> any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression

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[1] Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), I, 40.

of a single conscious purpose.[1]

An idea is the function of a purpose, or in Royce's words, "An Idea appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will."[2] Royce continued:

> Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the contents and form of the complex state called the idea, constitutes what I . . . hereafter call the Internal Meaning of Idea.[3]

In the development of internal meanings or purposes in personal experience, Royce held, these ideas "get presented as something of universal value, but always in fragments."[4] The internal meaning or purpose arises in experience as of intrinsic worth, yet it does not contain within itself the basis of its worth. It is found in experience that the idea seeks its reference, both as to its ultimate validation as an expression of purpose and a reference to the concrete context in relation to which this purpose is expressed.

The reference of an idea to that which is other than the inner life of the individual is the external meaning of the idea. This aspect of the meaning of an idea involves the recognition of facts "external" to the self. For Royce, a fact in experience is not a mere datum.[5] The recognition of a fact is a recognition of an "otherness," a recognition which also involves a decision of the will to be "compelled by facts."[6] The will acting purposively in regard to external facts expresses itself in an idea of the thing which involves the recognition of the external fact and the purpose of the will in relation to that fact.

Royce stated that the external meaning is the practical reference of an idea.

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[1] Ibid., I, 22-23. [2] Ibid., I, 23. [3] Ibid., I. 25.

[4] Ibid., I, 284. [5] Ibid., II, 32. [6] Ibid., II, 30.

> Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere images of the things, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the things of which you have ideas.[1]

The external meaning of an idea is similar to the pragmatic analysis of an idea as a function of the will. William James, in his notion of the Will to Believe, argued that an idea could become a formative factor functioning in events to realize the purpose embodied in the idea.[2] Royce, however, saw this practical thrust of the idea as a constructive response to a situation in which a need for truth in the judgments by the self must also be met. This need is met, without sacrificing the individual practical nature of personal judgment, by seeing the individual judgment united with other judgments from all points of view "so to unite in one system of truth as to characterize harmoniously the same object."[3] Such a system of judgments meant for Royce,

> That these various points of view . . . and this ought . . . must be conceived as belonging to, and as being included within, a single self, whose partial functions these various selves are, and whose common conscious purpose defines the ought to which each of the various judgments is to conform. Such a self we need to conceive in order to conceive our judgments as true; and we need to conceive it as having the same sort of embodiment in concrete experience that our present judgment now has.[4]

This contrast between internal consciousness and external reference also was developed in Royce's distinction between the World of Appreciation and the World of Description. The two "worlds" refer to two modes of knowing which are correlated with the individual's personal consciousness and social consciousness. The distinction for knowledge is in the contrast between immediacy and abstraction. The world of appreciation might be characterized as a sense of experiential involvement. This world of immediacy is personal, yet it witnesses to a something more than the personal awareness, a sense of reality beyond the immediate, yet involved in the immediate. This distinction is basic in The World and the Individual.

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[1] *Ibid.*, I, 22.

[2] William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 25.

[3] Josiah Royce, "The Eternal and the Practical," in *The Development of American Philosophy*, p. 261.

[4] *Ibid.*

> And nobody among us human beings, as now we are, can verify precisely the whole of what it is that the present moment furnishes to his experience. In other words, the present experience itself, or even the verification of the facts of this present experience, has more Being than I am able now to observe.[1]

In contrast,

> the World of Description is essentially a world of abstractions, valid for the Self only in so far as it conceives itself as at present unable to find how the facts express its own conscious purpose, and, consequently, valid for the Self only in so far as the Self, in its submissiveness, conceives these facts as also valid for an indefinite number of other points of view, which it has not yet made its own.[2]

Ultimately, the internal and external meanings of ideas are found to have a unity. The functions of abstraction, involved in the ordering of the external World of Description, is seen to be a step toward the recognition that the internal meaning includes the external. The solution, in brief, is that the external meaning for the human self is an internal meaning for the Absolute Self. Just at the internal meaning of an idea is an expression of personal will, in some sense a fulfilment of purpose, although incomplete, external meanings are elements of the fulfilment of the divine purpose. In the terms of this inquiry, we find these meanings point to empirical functions of the Absolute.

Royce sought to make clear how a plurality of diverse elements can be incorporated into an absolute Unity by analogy to the human consciousness, which brings many facts into a unity.

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[1] Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 19.

[2] Ibid., II, ix.

> Look within. You may grasp many facts at once; and when you have even the most fragmentary idea, your one purpose is here and now partially embodied in a presented succession of empirical facts.[1]

Also,

> In concrete experience, you find a past, a present, a future, unified even in your own passing moments of consciousness, despite their brief span.[2]

This unifying of pluralistic elements is achieved through the transcending function of the absolute in relation to individuals, just as consciousness transcends presented facts. The Absolute transcends in that it is the ultimate context for all particulars. It is by the vision of human life in this ultimate context that Royce answers the religious question, of how particular experiences, individual acts of free decision, and personal values can be seen to have any real meaning.

> The problem then of my freedom is simply the problem of my individuality . . . I am in so far free just because, as an individual, I express by my existence no will except my own. And that is precisely how my existence expresses, or results from, God's will.[3]

That is, the empirical individual is an expression or function of God's creative will. Royce thus reiterated his theme that real individuality and ultimate unity are inseparable.

> That this same existence of mine also has, besides its individuality, its dependence, its natural relations, its temporal origin, means that I am not only I, but also the Self along with other selves. . . . Simple unity is a mere impossibility. God cannot be One except by being Many. Nor can we various selves be Many, unless in Him we are One. To know just this is to win the deepest truth that religion has been asking to teach humanity.[4]

For Royce, then, the doctrine of the Absolute was the final answer needed to satisfy the claims of pragmatic interest. He contended that individual uniqueness is meaningless and logically impossible outside of an ultimate context in which the unique particular is related within a whole whereby it is somehow an aspect of ultimate reality. The accomplishment of this is, we are contending, the transcending function of the ultimate religious object in relation to empirical particulars.

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[1] *Ibid.*, I, 424-25. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 425. [3] *Ibid.*, II, 331. [4] *Ibid.*

It should become clear, as we proceed to interpret Wieman's own work, that patterns of thought persist from the Roycean framework into Wieman's expression. We will find that Wieman's early expression on the theme of creativity reflects the functions of conflict in the understanding of evolutionary process by the Darwinian naturalists. However, the specific process Wieman envisaged as that which characterizes the emergence of creative good suggests the background of Royce's notion of moral insight.

As we have noted, Wieman has written that an early experience of philosophical importance for him was the study of The World and the Individual under the tutelage of Silas Evans. In American Philosophies of Religion we later find Wieman interpreting the Religious Aspect of Philosophy as a work of undeniable appeal from Royce's perspective.[1] Also Wieman recognized the impact of Royce's thought in his autobiographical remark that identifies, in his own estimate, the direction of his own work with the direction of Royce's late thought.[2] The work which states the central constructive effort of Royce's later thought was The Problem of Christianity, published in 1913.

We will find evidence in Wieman's work that suggest that his key interpretative notions have a continuity with notions central to Royce's work in The Problem of Christianity. Taking Wieman's work as a whole, we can see throughout a concern with the question of the creation of human community, and a persistent inquiry to determine that human activity which serves to advance the creation of community. Also, we find that Wieman's early terminology is in continuity with Royce's expression, especially evident in Wieman's development of the notion of "mutual interpretation." "Interpretation" has a definite technical meaning for Royce. A similar meaning is operative in Wieman's use of the term, a similarity which is enhanced as we see that both Royce and Wieman were responding to and reinterpreting the notion of creativity presented in Bergson's Creative Evolution. It is in this response that we will find a fundamental continuity between Royce's point of view and Wieman's philosophical effort. This we will find in a similar effort to specify a structure in empirical processes which are functions of the Ultimate.

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[1] B. E. Meland and H. N. Wieman, American Philosophies of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1936), pp. 103-104.

[2] Wieman, "Intellectual Biography," p. 8.

In the Problem of Christianity, Josiah Royce in his own estimate continued his movement away from Hegelian idealism. To be sure, Royce restated the doctrine of the Absolute. This doctrine still takes form in a response to experience which sees the Absolute as a necessary postulate of empirical happenings. Functions, such as appeared in the Hegelian dialectical interrelations between ideas, are evident in Royce's thought. However, Royce developed the method of trying to discover fundamental interpretative ideas which are supported by an analysis of the data of experience. For the primary data of this study, Royce turned to the documents of early Christianity, especially the Pauline literature. In giving attention to New Testament literature as the data for his inquiry he applies a method derived from an analysis of experience in contrast to the Idealist method. In his earlier work, the dominant method was that of seeking those ideas which are necessarily presupposed as our ultimate condition for empirical happenings. Here the method seeks more to discern those ideas illustrated in experience, ideas in which is abstractly presented the structure of the events. Now, Royce evidently was the sort of philosophical inquirer that did not close himself off from any sort of philosophical challenge. Throughout his work he displays a response to the claim on the philosopher for recognition of the authenticity of the empirical given. He revealed in autobiographical remarks that his first self understanding as a philosopher was as a pragmatist.[1] But as an idealist he saw the consequences of philosophical empiricism to be skepticism, or an appeal to opinion.[2] However, by pressing radical skepticism for its logical presuppositions, Royce was brought to the metaphysical conclusion that the exercise of any will at all implies a world. By inverting the argument, he contended that the empirical world implies a Will which it expresses, ultimately an Absolute Will. This line of argument was developed and extended in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy and his major systematic work, The World and the Individual. In these works, Royce showed his unflagging concern for the integrity of the concrete individual and his particular world of experience. The persistent theme of this work is the assertion of the integrity both of historical individuals and of the "Individuals of Individuals," the World Self.

This dual concern made Boyce especially sensitive to the claims of the pragmatist, and ready to examine the analysis of experience which Pierce and James were advancing. In The Problems of Christianity Royce specifically acknowledged his indebtedness to the logical studies of C. S. Pierce, and brought Pierce's category of interpretation to bear upon the interpretation of the early Christian experience. Rather than seek among the synoptic gospels, especially the sayings of Jesus, for the fundamental historical data from which to abstract the essence of Christianity, he asked the question: What are the essential ideas by which the early Christians interpreted their lives?

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[1] Josiah Royce, "The Eternal and the Practical," in The Development of American Philosophy, p. 246.

[2] Above, p. 54.

Royce showed an acquaintance with the historical and critical studies of the New Testament literature. However, his response to this study is based upon the recognition of a principle of interpretation as basic to the task reaching any contemporary understanding of a historical event. It is a point of interest that his conclusions on the question of historical studies is in line with the results of Albert Schweitzer's research in The Quest of the Historical Jesus, although Royce's writing does not reflect acquaintance with this work. He did attack Harnack's definition of Christianity, which was centered in the person of its founder, and the correlated emphasis on the study of the sayings of Jesus. Royce's interpretation of the life of Christ is that it is the focal illustration of the community's interpretation of its own life. Now, what is this interpretation of life which Royce found to be the essence of Christianity, and to be presented most directly in Pauline Christianity?

The essence of Christianity Royce defined as an answer to the fundamental religious problem: the problem of individuality in society. Royce held that this problem arises with the advance of human civilization; the higher the cultural achievement of the race, the more acute becomes the tension between the requirements of individual self-expression and social order.

In Royce's analysis of primitive society, "individual" and "community" are not usable distinctions, in that the individual does not have any sense of identity apart from the community. However, the development of the community engenders moral self-consciousness in the individual. Self-consciousness emerges in social conflict involving mutual criticism of the individual and the society. This mutual criticism issues in a sense of self identity through moral self-consciousness.[1] The conflict situation stimulates further effort toward organizing the life of the community. Through the formation of codes which express the will of the community, the community seeks to subordinate the individual will to the will of the community by training the individual to organize his life according to the common discipline. This establishes social order, but at the cost of internalizing conflict within the individual. Since the interests arising in the individual's self-consciousness may not coincide with the common interest defined in the code of the community, a man's action and his ideals may come to diverge. The common discipline orders the actions of men, but it also intensifies the moral self-consciousness of the individual. Moral training, in Royce's judgment, helps inner revolt in the individual against the society as an act of spiritual self-assertion. As the culture advances, the revolt of the individual becomes more vigorous just because the higher (the more organized) the culture becomes, the higher will be the self-consciousness created in the individuals sharing the culture.

Royce summarized the situation as one in which "cultivation (that is: social organization, moral codes, "the law") breeds conscious independence of spirit and deep inner opposition to all mere external authority."[2] This becomes an acute problem because society, in seeking to establish the common good, adds impetus to moral evil, namely, the individual impulse to break with the community. Because his self-consciousness is produced in the process of social cultivation, the individual is powerless to resist this moral evil in himself.

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[1] Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 1913), I, 139.

[2] Ibid., p. 144.

This is the human situation which Royce understood Paul to have depicted in Romans. "Being essentially social animals," Royce interpreted Paul to say, "all our natural moral cultivation, if successful, can only make us aware of our sinfulness."[1] The problem is particularly acute, since the individual cannot escape from this moral situation through any act of his own. His own efforts can only be self defeating.[2] What is the answer to this situation?

> Paul's answer is simple. To his mind a new revelation has been made, from a spiritual realm wholly above our social order and its conflicts. Yet this revelation is, in a new way, social. For it tells us: "there is a certain divinely instituted community. . . . its indwelling spirit is concrete and living, but is also a loving spirit, it is the body of Christ. . . . Love that community; let its spirit, through this love, become your own. . . . You are a new creature. The law has no dominion over you. In the universal community you live in the spirit; and hence for the only self, the only self-consciousness, the only knowledge of your deeds which you possess or tolerate: these are one with the spirit of the Lord and of the community."[3]

What is Royce speaking about when he says that man can be saved from a situation of moral evil through the Universal Community? To get at Royce's meaning we may start with his idea of loyalty. Loyalty is involved in any self-conscious relationship of the individual to the society of which he is a member. Essentially, loyalty is a practical faith that communities, viewed as units, have a value which is superior to all the values and interests of detached individuals."[4] A community is a unity that is a possible object of such practical faith. This unity, Royce argued, is evident in possession by human communities of "a sort of organic life of their own."[5] A community exhibits patterns of growth in its history, it has organs, and a mind of its own which is expressed in language, customs, and religion; i.e., in the ordering of behavior, and the communication and interpretation of experience.

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[1] Ibid., I, 147.

[2] Ibid., I, 150-55.

[3] Ibid., I, 157-58.

[4] Ibid., I, 72.

[5] Ibid., I, 61.

The individual relates himself to the community by personal loyalty. Royce defined loyalty as "the willing and thoroughgoing devotion of the self to a cause."[1] The cause in this case is "the interest of the community." The spirit of loyalty fixes the attention of the individual "upon a life uncomparably vaster than his own individual life."[2]

The spirit of loyalty arises from a practical concern for the relationship of the individual to the particular historical community of which he is a part. But the act of loyalty suggests in itself a larger context for the life of loyalty than the particular historical community.

> The logical development of the loyal spirit is therefore the rise of a consciousness of the ideal of an universal community of the loyal, --a community which, despite all warfare and jealousy, and despite all varieties of goods and laws, is supreme in its value, however remote from the present life of civilization.[3]

It is this sort of community, a universal community of the loyal, that Royce contended is needed to save human life from its original sin, its innate social contentiousness and divisiveness. A natural community can be an object of loyalty, yet the problem of man's moral warfare is only exaggerated by this loyalty and his consciousness of sin becomes all the more acute. A community which can save man must be able to transform the individual. It must do something for human life which man cannot do himself. Royce asserted that this can be accomplished only by the universal community. The universal community can bring the individual into this saving relationship, by giving the individual a new being through the transformation of his constitutive relationships. The transforming relationship of loyalty to the universal community of the loyal is given to the individual as an act of grace.[1]

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[1] Ibid., I, 68. [2] Ibid., I, 69. [3] Ibid., I, 72.

The universal community as the Realm of Grace is the Beloved Community. This is the only community to which the individual can be fully loyal because he is transformed for a life of loyalty by the community. This transformation gives the individual "a new type of self-consciousness,--the consciousness of one who loves the community as a person."[2] Because of what this community can do for human life, this is the only community which is the lovable object. A natural human community, at its best, is a "community of sin."[3] Love for this Beloved Community finds its basis in the value which the individual finds in the life of loyalty to the Beloved Community.

> The beloved community embodies, for its lover, values which no human individual, viewed as a detached being could even remotely approach. And in a corresponding way, the love which inspires the loyal soul has been transformed: and is not such as could be given to a detached human individual.[4]

The reality of the life of loyalty to the Universal Community is not confined to the Christian tradition. However, Royce saw Christianity to be distinguished "by the profoundly significant doctrine and customs to which it has been led in the course of its efforts to identify the being of its ideal community with the being of God."[5]

In this portrayal of the religious dimension of human experience, Royce suggested that the experience in which the relationship of loyalty yields a difference for human life is in the experience of value. A feature of the life of loyalty to the Beloved Community is the "value embodied" which is unavailable to the "detached individual." In other words, levels of value are directly correlated with levels of relationships.[1]

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[1] Ibid., I, 172. [2] Ibid., I, 158. [3] Ibid., I, 176.

[4] Ibid., I, 173. [5] Ibid., I, 195.

Looking at this as a part of the background to Wieman's effort in value theory, we see that the value found in the relationship of loyalty to the Blessed Community is a value for the individual, yet is neither an achievement of the individual nor directly a fulfilment of individual purpose. It is a value for the individual as related in the universal community. A value is a realization of the functioning of the community in particular events.

The Universal Community contrasts with the natural community as contrast of interest. The interest of the universal community with its practical pressure to identify the universal community with the whole of humanity may be in sharp contrast to the actual social situation. It is in creation of new relationships which move toward the goal of universal community that the super-personal value experience of the individual in the universal community emerges.

Also we note that this highest level of value is associated with the activity of grace, of which Royce speaks as "the transformation of the very essence of the individual man," whereby man's innate sinfulness, his propensity toward breaking from the natural community, is overcome.

> This transformation is to save him by making him a dweller in the realm which is at once inaccessible above his merely natural level as an individual, and yet daily near to whatever gives to his otherwise ruined natural existence its entire value. This realm is the realm of the united and lovable community.[2]

The Beloved Community brings to bear upon the individual a complex of relationships which transforms the individual. The new structure of relationships makes him a different individual than he could otherwise be. The Beloved Community so transforms the individual that he is able to enter into relationships not possible on the basis of life in the natural community. Loyalty to the natural community breeds dissention; loyalty to the Beloved Community can heal and enrich the life of the individual and the natural community.

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[1] *Ibid.*, I, 173. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 307.

Royce did not view the Beloved Community as a substantial structure into which the individual is brought. The Beloved Community is created as individuals are brought into this unity of spirit by a love for and devotion to the unity of spirit. But this love for and devotion, which is loyalty, is given by the Community as an act of grace. The only answer to this apparent circularity is that the community is a new creation. Both the community and the love for the community are gifts of grace. Royce recognized a problem in this conception of the source of grace, and commented on the suggestion in this problem that experience of grace implies a superhuman object:

> The origin of the power of grace is psychologically inexplicable, as all transforming love is. The object to which grace directs the convert's mind is above the level of any human individual.[1]

Although psychologically inexplicable, we will see that Royce considered the source of grace is metaphysically explicable.[2]

The Realm of Grace is transcendent as a saving activity in human life. Human life in its natural character is accepted, included, and transformed. This is the function of the realm of grace which transcends human life by doing for human life what it cannot do for itself. Further resources in the realm of grace illustrate this meaning of transcendence.

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[1] Ibid., I, 191-92. [2] Ibid., II, 11.

The initiation of the relationship of love for the Beloved Community is an act of grace "overcoming" the self-conscious individual. It is a relationship into which the individual cannot enter by his own decision and action; the relationship is created for him. But the individual can choose whether or not to remain loyal, to persist in his love for the Beloved Community.[1] This relationship of love, which is loyalty, is in its very nature a free expression of the will. But this freedom is not just the continuation of any freedom we may have exercised in the old state of contentiousness. The freedom in the new life is a new freedom of the spirit, a life in which the limitations of the old life are overcome. From the perspective of the new life the old life is seen to be a life of bondage to the conflict between the interests of individual self-consciousness and the interests of the community. The gift of freedom from this bondage is the meaning Royce saw in Paul's statement that the new man has become dead to the old.[2]

Since the Beloved Community has given new freedom to the individual member, because this is an ingredient of the relationship which constitutes the community of Unity, the possibilities for evil are immeasurably increased over what was possible for men in the natural community. The higher the level of community, the higher is the risk that the community takes.[3]

One way to explain this would be to say that in the Universal community its very universality means that the individual is interrelated with other individuals in the greatest possible community of individuals, greater than any natural community could be. Because of the breadth and depth of the individual relationship any break in this relationship results in a cleavage in the life of the individual and the community in a way heretofore not possible.

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[1] *Ibid.*, I, 181. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 251. [3] *Ibid.*

But this does not account for the full extent of the break in the individual and the community which can occur at this level of life. The very freedom inherent in the individual's loyalty to the Blessed Community gives him the freedom to betray this community. Royce sees betrayal at this level of life to be a possible meaning for the notion of the unforgivable sin against the Holy Spirit. The abundance of grace in the new state means that the individual has new responsibility with his new freedom; there is "a new gravity of life."[1]

It is conceivable in this state of freedom that the individual could break faith with his "own world-wide cause and inspiration."[2] If such a betrayal of the Beloved Community is committed, it means that the traitor has acted to destroy the community in which his life has found its fullest meaning. Because of the depth of his relationship in this community, the act of betrayal is an act against himself; it is a destruction of that relationship in which he has been recreated.

Such an act of treason against both the Beloved Community and the individual self is irrevocable. The traitor cannot cast off the fact of his betrayal; he has to live with the consequences of having broken that in which his ultimate value had been found. The traitor is no longer a whole being. "Our question is not one about one's feelings, but about one's genuine value as a moral agent."[3] The traitor can perform good deeds but these will not repair the breach in himself or in the community. When Royce said that "the guilt of the free act of betrayal is as enduring as time," he was speaking of the constitution of a man's life and of the community of which he was a part. This is more than the matter of self judgment: this is a historical impairment of the individual. How can the traitor be reconciled to his own broken moral world, and with his own broken self? Since he cannot reconcile himself, what can be done now to effect a reconciliation for both the individual and the community to this action of destruction?[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., I, 252. [3] Ibid., I, 265.

Since this action of treason has destroyed bonds of community which are creations of grace, any reconciliation must be a further creative act. "This triumph over treason can only be accomplished by the community, or on behalf of the community, through some steadfastly loyal servant who acts, so to speak, as the incarnation of the very spirit of the community itself."[2]

The reconciling work must be a concretely creative deed which is possible only because of the specific act of betrayal. Effective reconciliation cannot be a response to "treason in general." As a creative response by the community to the treason, new relationships are created in response to the specific treachery. These new relationships actually change the nature of the world, and in this change the specific fact of treason becomes an occasion for new relationships. This achievement in the life of the community is the creation of new value; it is a uniquely novel fulfilment of the community's redemptive interest. "The world as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all."[3] This work is the expression of the creative will of the Beloved Community at the highest level open to human experience.

There is nothing magical about this work of the Blessed Community:

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[1] _Ibid._, I, 266. [2] _Ibid._, I, 307. [3] _Ibid._, I, 308.

it does not and cannot change the past. What it does do is create new meanings for the past in the life of the present and future. This is the creation of a new value for the traitor's own life. This atonement is a "perfectly objective fact, namely, the creation by somebody of a definite individual good on the basis of a definite previous evil"[1]

We have found Royce to distinguish two levels of saving activity in human life. The first level is the saving of man from original sin; saving man from his innate divisiveness through the transforming effect of loyalty to the Universal Community. The second level is the saving of one who has betrayed the community, by transforming the meaning of a particular event of betrayal for the community and for the traitor. At both levels we find the theme of the inclusion of historical particulars in a new unity through a process of transformation.

This is not transformation in general. It is the transformation of the meaning of particular historical events whithin a subsequent historical unity. At the first level of activity by the community, the human individual, through the creation of new relationships between the individual and other individuals in a new community of grace, is enabled to function both as an individual and as a member of a human community through the life of the unifying spirit of the universal community. At the second level, the individual is restored to the universal community, after breaking the life of the community, through a new creative activity of the unifying spirit of the community.

At both levels, a man is saved by the creation of new relationships among men, such that the redemptive interest of the Community of the Loyal is expressed. When pressed to consider the origins of the saving community as a historical event, Royce is halted in his empirical analysis when he holds up together the view of the community as the Realm of Grace giving new saving loyalty to men, with the insight that the community arises as a historical reality in the realization of the new transforming relationships in human life. The Blessed Community is a self-creating reality, and as such is a mystery of grace.

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[1] Ibid., I, 372.

Consequently, it can be seen that the creation of new community which saves human life is an ultimate function yielding the fulfilment of human life. In Royce's view, the redeeming of the act of betrayal, even as achieved through the act of an individual taking the consequences of the act of betrayal on himself, as did Christ, is effective only because the Beloved Community functions through him.

At this point we can find a continuity in the interpretation of Christian themes between Royce and Wieman. When Wieman, in The Source of Human Good, interpreted Christian doctrine, his expression is strikingly reminiscent of Royce's interpretation of Salvation.

> Salvation through Christ Jesus is this transformation in the life of man, which is accomplished not by human intelligence and purpose but by certain happenings in history centering in the man Jesus. . . . the consequence of this transformation is a new kind of existence with enormous and revolutionary possibilities. It opens the gates of history so that creative good can transform the world into a living responsiveness of part to part.[1]

Both men interpret salvation as transformation, and find transformation to be a matter of the creation of new historical relationships.

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[1] H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 270.

Royce saw philosophy to have unavoidably a religious aspect and he was evidently motivated by religious concerns; yet he disclaimed the role of theologian, since, as he said, he was not concerned to defend any sectarian religious interest. However, from the perspective of the study incorporated in this dissertation, and the sub-thesis contending for the discrimination of a type of theological liberalism contrasting in important respects to the dominant Kantian liberalism of the period, we are led to see in Royce's work a major theological expression.

As Royce moved from the interpretation of the experiences of the early Christian church, he noted that it is not enough for the Christian interpretation of experience to be translated into contemporary language. If the Christian interpretation is to be accepted as meaningful it must also answer the needs and questions of modern man. The most pressing contemporary question arises from the radically revised view of the position of man in the physical world resulting from the scientific revolution. Even if the basic Christian interpretation of life expresses a truth about human experience, "what shall it profit us if we seem to be saving our own souls for a time, but actually remain, after all, what we were before, --utterly insignificant incidents in a world process that neither needs men nor heeds them?"[1] To answer this question, Royce suggested, the Christian doctrine of life must "express a truth, not only about men, but about the whole world, and about God."[2] This followed for Royce from his understanding that religion and the articles of religious faith develop in answer to human need.[3]

Royce pointed out that this understanding of the function of religion poses a problem for the modern mind in its effort to understand historic Christian expressions. This problem arises not from the fact that human needs vary since Royce contended that religion arose in answer to universal human need. The problem arises because of the far-reaching changes that have come about in man's understanding of the nature of this need, and the terms by which the need must be met. Royce expressed this fundamental need as that of being meaningfully related to the actuality fundamental to one's world.[1] However, even if we admit the success of the Christian answer to the need of man of the first century, Royce asked, can we find this answer equally meaningful for men whose view of the world has been revolutionized by the advance of science? The success of a religious doctrine in interpreting the experience of one age does not justify the assumption that it will interpret with equal success the concrete experience of later ages.

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[1] Royce, The Problem of Christianity, II, 9.

[2] Ibid., II, 7.

[3] Ibid., II, 6 ff.

Royce pointed out that this problem is not unique to the modern period. He found this problem to lie behind the early Christian use of the Logos doctrine. Royce found in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the central Christian interpretation of experience. Moving into the Greek context, Christians employed the notion of the Logos "viewed in unity with the doctrine of the Spirit" as an interpretation of the life known by the early Christian. On this basis Royce rejected Harnack's criticism that the Logos doctrine is merely a transplantation from Greek metaphysics. For Royce, the genius of the Fourth Gospel was that it "identifies the Logos with the spirit of the community."[2]

In this employment of a notion from Greek metaphysics, Royce saw an example of a necessary movement in religious thought. Each age, contended

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., II, 14.

Royce, must interpret religious doctrine within a total world view in which the concrete experience of that age can be interpreted. Only in this way can Christian doctrine have the concrete reference for modern man that it had for the early Christian. So, for Royce, the "Holy Spirit," the "Logos" and the "spirit of the community" refer to similar aspects of concrete human experience, each within a particular world view.

Consequently, Royce saw the history of Christian doctrine as a history of mutual interpretations. We are given the early Christian interpretation of experience in the New Testament records, as expressed by use of the notions of the Holy Spirit and the Logos. Further interpretation took place in the development of the creeds. These successive interpretations of experience interpret, more or less adequately, the earlier interpretations. Royce found a function of his notion of community in such a chain of interpretations. For Royce, the notion of community was able to interpret contemporary concrete experience and also interpret early Christian experience as viewed in the doctrines of the Holy Spirit, the Church, and the redemptive work of Christ. Ultimately the notion of community interprets the nature of God as a present reality in human experience. The earlier interpretations have also a potential interpretative function for later interpretations. The early interpretations interpret the adequacy of the later formulations by functioning as indicators of the range of concrete experience which must be included if subsequent interpretation is to be at all adequate. We can see this to be a theological method which Royce understands to operate in his constructive metaphysical effort to gain a more complete understanding of the nature of community, and more particularly, to explore the basis on which the Universal Community can be said to be a reality. This metaphysical effort is important for Royce, since he asserted that for Loyalty to the Beloved Community to be a possibility, the Beloved Community must be not just loveable, it must be a reality.[1]

To establish the reality of the Beloved Community required more for Royce than a recognition of the concreteness of the experience which is interpreted by the notion of community. The idealist's perspective required a universal necessary idea as an ultimate ground for the particular concrete, an idea which can give reality to the empirical concrete as a function of the ultimate world concreteness of the world idea. It was Royce's disciple, William Ernest Hocking, who explicitly identified the Absolute as a concrete universal, but we can find implicit in Royce the notion that the empirical concrete is concrete by virtue of being a function in particulars of the Absolute world concreteness. For both Royce and Hocking we can see this attention to the empirical concrete as a response to pragmatist attention to the concrete datum. This response is further shown in Royce's handling of the notion of time in relation to the life of the community. Royce resisted the judgment that the idealist doctrine of time does not admit the full reality of temporal process. He sets forth to refute this in his contention that the reality of human communities is rooted in unambiguously real temporal passage.

Royce began his analysis of the structure of the community with a criticism of William James' notion of the "compounding of consciousness."[2] Royce acknowledged that James did not apply this to the specific problem of the community, but that he did suggest its use as a metaphysical notion. In presenting this notion James was responding to Bergson's view of the interpenetration of selves.[3] The suggestion Royce found in James' view is that community life, in which the individual finds a unity in life with others, can be understood as a compounding of a higher level of consciousness from the experience of many individuals. James meant by the compounding of consciousness a process wherein a common mind emerges in a group of individuals, dissolves, and emerges again in other later events.[1] But, responds Royce, such a pluralism of emergent consciousnesses does not adequately interpret the historical realities of the life of communities, considering the continuity of historical passage evident in the formation of languages and traditions.

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[1] Ibid., I, 179. [2] Ibid, II, 30. [3] Ibid., II, 32.

> But a true community is essentially a product of a time-process. A community has a past and will have a future. Its more or less conscious history, real or ideal, is part of its very essence. A community requires for its existence a history and is greatly aided in its consciousness by a memory.[2]

Royce considered James' interpretation to be limited by its tendency to see the compounded consciousness as just a passing event. The community, argued Royce, is a historical reality constituted by relationships between the present, past, and future. The members of a community are members because they accept common historical facts as belonging to the past of each member individual. In this relation to the past, a community of memory is formed. The community is also a sharing of a common anticipation for the future; a "community of expectation" or a "community of hope."[3]

To gain further understanding of this structure of historical relations in the community, Royce found a guide in C. S. Pierce's logical analysis of cognitive relationships. By the use of this analysis, Royce sought to answer the question of how there can be any empirical joining of minds, sharing of experience, entertainment of a common hope. Pierce's monadic and dyadic relationships, the perception of a datum and conceptual reference, are inadequate to interpret the community structure, Royce contended since to relate past, present, and future in either the individual's personal existence, or in the community, a three term relationship is required. Royce found an applicable logical structure in Pierce's notion of thirdness, the three term relation of "interpretation." This proved fruitful for Royce because "an interpretation is a relation which not only involves three terms, but brings them into a determinate order."[1] Royce found a theoretical power in this logical relationship because of its applicability to successive levels of temporal process. Royce applied the triadic relationship to the definition of the structure of the historical individual, yielding the view of the present self as an interpreter of the past self to the future self. Royce found this structure, or "determinate order" to be the model relationship for the understanding of any historical process, and ultimately of the total world process.[2]

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[1] Ibid., II, 35. [2] Ibid., II, 37. [3] Ibid., II, 52.

> And so, wherever the world's processes are recorded, wherever the records are preserved, and wherever they influence in any way the future course of events, we may say that (at least in these parts of the world) the present potentially interprets the past to the future, and continues so to do ad infinitum.[3]

The "preserving of records" or "memory" in Royce's meaning includes the apprehension of any facts in their character of being the results of past events, such as geological changes, biological development, or cosmic processes. In any of these areas Royce considered the time process itself to be definable according to the triadic structure: "That is, we can define the present as, potentially, the interpretation of the past to the future."[1]

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[1] Ibid., II, 142.

[2] Royce did admit that this application is beyond the scope of Pierce's intent.

[3] Ibid., II, 146.

In this definition of time, we find a critical response to the evolutionism of Henri Bergson which William James had interpreted in his notion of the compounding of consciousness. Royce's definition of time as a structural process is in contrast to Bergson's notion of duration, or "real time," as a pure flux which eludes structural specification. It seems that Royce is responding to Bergson specifically, since this conception of temporal process is basic to Royce's response to Bergson's notion of creativity, which will be considered later in this chapter.

Royce used Pierce's triadic relationship as defining structure for a type of process in events. The process aspect, that which requires the passage of time for its illustration, is the inherently self-perpetuating, or self-generating character of the interpretative process. Royce held that the interpretative process is self-perpetuating since it continually produces new factors needing interpretation. The notion of time itself, Royce contended, is the result of the abstraction of the structure of this process. This temporal structure is not given in the monadic relation of perception or the dyadic relation of perception. The sense of temporal passage can only arise in a three term relationship, as in the case of B seen as a passage from A to C, or in other words, when B interprets A to C. Royce emphasized his view of this relationship as a pattern in a process of happenings in his characterization of this process as a "conversation."[1]

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[1] Ibid. II, 147. Royce continued: "The triadic structure of our interpretations is strictly analogous, both to the psychological and to the metaphysical structure of the world of time. And each of these structures can be stated in terms of the other." Such a statement leads one to speculate that Royce might have had in mind the then new application of the Lorenz transformations in the theory of relativity. We find here a similar image of an individual time perspective for individual processes, but of such a determinate character that the perspective of one event can be transformed into the terms of the perspective of the other.

The pragmatic definition of "idea" as "a more or less active process . . . whereby some set of conceptions and perceptions tend to be brought into desirable connections," Royce found to be similar to the notion of interpretation.[2] Accordingly, interpretative idea cannot be defined as a concept, but is an abstraction referring to an aspect of the data of perception, in that it may predict future perceptions, relate concepts to percepts, and possesses an interest requiring "perceptual fulfilment or conceptual clarification." An idea is a relationship between an abstraction and concrete particulars, which thus refers to actual or possible happenings. Royce saw this notion of an idea as an organized tendency toward activity to find actual expression in a conflict of ideas, in which each idea works for its own fulfilment. Pierce's triadic relationship, Royce found, describes the structure of the resolution of such conflict.

Further, Royce suggested that the relation of interpretation specifies the pattern of activity in an individual's organization of experience. To make his experience his own, Royce contended, an individual must resolve the plurality of impulses and perceptual feelings which seek fulfilment within him. Royce criticized contemporary pragmatism as not offering an adequate philosophical instrument by which to interpret the resolution of this conflict of ideas. Royce asserted that central to the resolution of this conflict in the individual is an act of comparison of the conflicting ideas, and a response to this conflict as "from above."[3] In this response is formed a new idea which seeks fulfilment as the resolute self-expression of the individual, the realization of the individual "will to be self-possessed."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, 148. [2] *Ibid.*, II, 180. [3] *Ibid.*, II, 193. [4] *Ibid.*

Royce found in Pierce's relation of "interpretation" a structure for the process of idea comparison involving the generation of a third mediating idea. The process of interpretation as a process of conflict-resolution involves the introduction into the conflict situation of a novel factor, a new idea which resolves the conflict of ideas, not by harmonization, but by interpretation. Conflict resolution is achieved by the interpretation of the meaning of one idea in terms of the other. This is the meaning for the "compounding of consciousness" which Royce found fruitful.

Royce explicitly rejected the view that a blending of conflicting ideas can resolve the conflict. A blending of all ideas into a single idea, he argued, cannot encompass the diversity and conflict of ideas in our world of experience. The resolution of conflict requires that there be mutual interpretation of ideas. Unity achieved by interpretation produces a community organized by an idea which both defines the community and channels its expression, yet recognizes its constituent individuals. The process of interpretation as a process of individual, community, and world formation achieves a concrete result through the introduction of a novel idea into a conflict situation. Novelty is required by the very nature of the problem, since the factors in the conflict cannot themselves find a resolution.

> This problem, in the case of comparison with which Pierce deals, is solved through a new act. For this act, originality and sometimes even genius may be required. This new act consists in the invention or discovery of some third idea, distinct from both the ideas which are to be compared, etc.[1]

Royce further analyzed the function of interpretation in individual experience with a result suggestive of the function of religious insight developed in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. First, Royce found that the new interpretative idea "shows us ourselves, and also creates in us a new grade of clearness regarding what we are and what we mean."[1] To gain this new self-consciousness is to discover one's relationships to the past, to the body of experience, and the acts which go to make up the history of the individual. A self, Royce held, "needs and is a history."[2] So, in the first phase of the act of interpretation, the self sees itself as a definite history of experience. In the second phase, self-consciousness is focussed and one's past is enriched in the appearance of a new idea which unifies this past. In the third phase one discovers "how to connect what comes to [one] in fragments," so that various ideas originally in conflict become mutually meaningful.[3] The interpretative idea creates a new unity of historic experience and thereby creates new relationships within the individual's present experience. The process of interpretation transcends the perceptions and conceptions which constitute the various conflicting ideas.[4] By "transcendence" Royce referred to a specific process, which is a functioning with a definite aim, the "attainment of a larger unity of consciousness."[5]

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, 183-84.

Royce proceeded to explore the application of the relation of interpretation to social relationships. The interpretative process can result in considerable clarity by unifying an individual's ideas for himself. However, this clarity is not possible when one individual seeks to interpret another individual to a third person.

> The interpreter, the mind to which he addresses his interpretation, the mind which he undertakes to interpret,--all these appear, in our explicitly human and social world, as three distinct selves, --

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[1] Ibid., II, 187. [2] Ibid., II, 40. [3] Ibid., II, 187.

[4] Ibid., II, 163. The term "transcendence" is used here by Royce to indicate a difference in the function of a relationship.

[5] Ibid.

> sundered by chasms which, under human conditions, we never cross, and contrasting in their inner lives in whatever way the motives of men at any moment chance to contrast.[1]

To bring about mutual understanding and appreciation, something must happen which is beyond the capability of any individual. To achieve any unity of several lives involves a will which is more inclusive in its intent than any individual will can be. The three selves, that being interpreted, that which interprets, and that to which the interpretation is made, cannot in themselves overcome the divisions between them. This can only be accomplished by an inclusive will to interpret. "The will to interpret," wrote Royce, "undertakes to make of these three selves a community."[2]

Among these three selves arises a "Community of Interpretation." In this relationship, each individual expresses a particular will, or performs a certain function in the process. The interpretative situation includes an individual will to be interpreted, a will to interpret, and a will to be interpreted to. The interpretation is made, Royce contended, under an ideal which sees the three ideas, or self conceptions, as if they were in one mind. The particular community which is realized in any concrete occasion is created under an "ideal" arising from a perspective at a level higher than the constituent individuals.[3] Royce spoke of this as an "ideal event." This "ideal event" is a concrete achievement in the world; it is an actual process, yet it is "other" than the idea of any individual. The "ideal event" is "the spiritual unity in our community." We may think of this ideal as a possibility for concrete relationships, but a possibility which cannot originate within the limits of the perspective of one individual. The realized ideal of the ideal event is the spiritual unity which characterizes the outcome for that particular concrete community.

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[1] Ibid., II, 207-208. [2] Ibid., II, 211.

[3] Ibid., II, 215. The term "ideal" bears the pragmatist meaning of "idea." The difference between the two seems to be in the super-individual character of Royce's "ideal."

Royce persistently asserted that an "ideal" cannot be conceived as static; rather, "ideal" refers to a kind of happening. Any community is a concrete event, exhibiting a certain definite structure of relationships. This structure of relationship constitutes the unity of the community, and is subject to empirical analysis and definition. The community is not simply the creation of the individuals constituting the community, but must ultimately be defined in super-individual ideal terms. Royce wrote: "I have to define the truth of my interpretation of you in terms of what the ideal observer of all of us would view as the unity which he observed."[1] This view of the ideal observer cannot be pragmatically defined. In the actual community, it is the interpreter, the will to interpret in the triadic relationship that is most completely expressive of the spirit of the community, "dominating the ideal relationship of all three members."[2]

We can see that a tension can arise between the community seen as an "ideal event" and a community interpreted by one of its members. But it is by the interpretative act of one member that other members of a community can come to know the spirit of the community as an ideal event. The member of the community that can perform this interpretative function for other members of the community most effectively becomes a servant of the community. His effectiveness is rooted in his ability to surrender his own individual idea (his own practical self-consciousness) to the task of interpreting to the community the meaning of the life of the community. By such a structure in events, Royce understood human life to be redeemed.

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[1] Ibid., II, 215-16. [2] Ibid., II, 216.

However, the process of interpretation, discerned as a structure of events in Royce's judgment does not, at this level, answer the ultimate religious question. The question which must still be answered is: does the world as a whole fulfil a divine plan; is the world as a whole saved by an act of interpretation?

If there is any such salvation, if there is a "triumph over the universal death whereof every event in time furnishes an illustration, this occurs, in our world of interpretation, not in any one moment of time, but through an insight into the meaning of all that occurs in time."[1] Royce stated that this ultimate salvation of the world is a "final union" of temporal sequence, "the goal of the world process never attained in time," and of the divine spirit of reconciliation. In this final union is expressed "the real community, the true interpretation, the divine interpreter, the plan of salvation."[2] This is the ultimate application of the triadic structure of interpretation, the Absolute as an ultimate world-structure of relations.

Since we have some grounds for assuming that this position, at least in general, represents Wieman's orientation before his concentrated study of Bergson, we are led to ask several questions concerning this metaphysical system. First, what are the general characteristics of this metaphysics, especially in regard to the relationship which is understood to exist between the empirical individual and the religious object? Second, what features of this view become a problem for the empirically-minded? How well has Royce solved the problem of tension between the empirically given pluralities and the notion of the Ultimate absolute world unity? Has the notion of the Absolute changed from the Hegelian prototype to such an extent that a movement out of the idealistic framework of thought, might follow from an effort to clarify the creative function of the community in terms of newer understandings of the processes of nature?

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[1] Ibid., II, 378. [2] Ibid., II, 379-79.

Royce asserted that the Absolute is not a non-temporal static unity, but that it is the unity of an infinite temporal process.[1] He certainly hoped to escape Hegel's image defying conception of an Absolute World-Idea thinking itself. So, can we say that the ultimate unity of the world is the achievement of some sort of process, as a community is a process of individual processes? Royce tried to hold to the analogy of the individual-community relationship for the ultimate world process. However, when Royce's answer is examined, the ultimately unifying process of world interpretation has, at least in one aspect, an ambiguous relationship to the time factor. The Absolute does not in all respects have the same temporal aspect that empirical processes of interpretation display.

Royce conceived the ultimate inclusion of temporal passage, whereby reality is structured as a world according to the relation of interpretation. This means that there is a past, present, and future for the world community analogous to the historical constitution of the individual and human community. If this is the character of the Absolute at the level of the ultimate world community, then the Absolute can be understood as a divine consciousness which is a function of world interpretation contemporary to human life.

In what sense can such a process of world unification be considered to be an Absolute?[2] Royce spoke of the past as absolute, its absoluteness consisting in its factuality. Factuality in turn involves the triadic relationship.[1] But, beyond this, in what sense is this an Absolute within the tradition defined by the Hegelian Absolute Idea? If time is real for this ultimate experience, then there is a future of anticipation, but not enjoyment, which cannot have the irrevocable character of the past. This experience could be understood as absolute in the sense of "most inclusive," in that there is no greater range of experience possible in the world.

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[1] Ibid., II, 270.

[2] Ibid., II, 194. Royce spoke of an absolute aspect of historical events. The past is absolute as a fund of irrevocable facts. The process of interpretation is a process which yields results which become past and become absolute in this sense, not just relative or transient. The results are relative in that they occur in a social matrix. By linking "relative"

A second aspect of this process to which absoluteness could be attributed is the purpose operative in the process of world-interpretation. There is certainly an absolute or constant to be found in Royce's view of the temporal creation of the world. The absolute purpose is to save the past for the future, no matter how conflicting the factors presented for unification within a world may be, according to Royce. "At each moment of time the results of the whole world's history up to that moment are, so to speak, summed up and passed over to the future for its new deeds of creation and interpretation."[2] So the Absolute is a temporal succession of world interpretation. Events in the past of individuals and communities are interpreted as elements in the past of an ultimate community with a unity of meaning.

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to "transient" Royce indicated that for him "relative" has the connotation of being confined entirely within some historical event, and as being trivial for any future. Even admitting Royce's persistent effort to give an empirical specification for his philosophical terms, this suggests that the term "absolute" is losing its meaning of "self-sufficiency" and "non-relative," this meaning being replaced by the meaning "definite." Thus the past is absolute as a definite outcome of a social process. In this meaning, something is an absolute only by being in relation. With this evidence, we can see a similarity between Royce's concern for the function of the Absolute as related to the particulars of experience, and Wieman's "objective relativism."

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 280.

This world unity lives as a "step by step" interpretation of tragedies "through deeds of charity and atonement."[1] The process of world-interpretation is here described in the same terms as the Beloved Community, pointing up Royce's contention that the Beloved Community is the existent universal community.

Human life is accordingly understandable as a part of the adventure of a world interpreter. This was suggested to Royce by Pierce's distinction of two basic types of scientific method. The first proceeds from statistical studies to the induction of probabilities; the second is based on imaginative interpretative activity in hypothesis formation. It is this latter type of scientific inquiry that Pierce and Royce saw to be required for any advance in scientific understanding. Royce could not see this inventive power of the human mind as a product of natural selection, but instead saw in this a type of function which is uniquely available to man as a mode of relationship for participation in the universe. Therefore the emergence of this inventive power in human life, Royce held, can be seen as a "sign that the universe contains its own interpreter."[2] "The very existence of natural science," in its work of discovering relationship, he continued, "is an illustration of our thesis that the universe is endlessly engaged in the spiritual task of interpreting its own life."[3]

However, in the statements in which Royce focussed on the unity of the historical process as the life of the Absolute, the Absolute and its life are distinguished.[4] This distinction becomes clearer when we see that there are two interpretative functions given to the Absolute: one function is the interpretation of history within the passage of time; the second is the interpretive function performed between the temporal passage and an ultimate spiritual unity.[1]

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[1] Ibid., II, 378. [2] Ibid., II, 416. [3] Ibid., II, 418.

[4] Ibid., II, 393. For example: "our philosophy of interpretation teaches that the whole of time is a manifestation of a world-order which contains its own interpreter." The "interpreter" mediates between "the whole of time" and "a world order." The "whole of time" is the life of the world-order self-interpreted (if this is any more intelligible than Royce's statement.)

Royce was concerned with the eschatalogical question of what can be said about the fate of the world process as a whole. Because interpretation is self-perpetuating, the world process is inherently infinite. Consequently, argued Royce, salvation cannot be assured as a temporal achievement. Salvation for the time process as a whole is possible only through "an insight into the meaning of all that occurs in time."[2] This phrase cannot be understood as referring to only the constant interpretative intent of the Absolute. This is a second interpretive function which the Absolute performs. This second function is an interpretation such that "in 'a moment' . . . the whole of time . . . is, by the interpreter of the universe, reconciled, to its own ideal."[3] Here is the Absolute dressed out in its total temporal inclusiveness, the totum simul, suggesting again the problem of relationship of the Absolute to temporal passage. Royce sought to avoid the issue at this point by suggesting that this second function of the Absolute can only be spoken of figuratively.

Nevertheless we can make an effort to understand this second function of the Absolute, by comparing the nature of the ultimate interpretation with interpretation as it applies to empirical processes. In the ultimate case, that which is interpreted is "the whole of time." The whole of time includes everything that can be conceived as a conceivable past, present, and future of human history and experience plus an indefinitely expansive more. So, we are led to conclude both that the object of interpretation is the world which we know and is not a world which we know. The first must be true if the ultimate interpretation is somehow relevant to us, and this Royce asserts. But the second must also be true, since it is not the world as we know it, but a world in which our future is reconciled, that is the object of ultimate interpretation. As the object of ultimate interpretation, the world is viewed supertemporally, i.e. each moment, and moments related to that moment as past and future in history, is apprehended by the Absolute as immediate. This ultimate reconciliation evidently was to Royce's mind somehow basic to the acts of concrete atonement in the temporal process. The Absolute non-temporally interprets its own acts of temporal interpretation, and thus provides the ontological condition for any temporal interpretations.

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[1] By "spiritual unity" Royce evidently refers to a fully integrated relational complex with a unity of value.

[2] Ibid., II, 378. [3] Ibid.

The problem of grasping Royce's meaning here, of of finding a way to set forth this metaphysical notion consistently, is rooted in Royce's effort to combine temporality and non-temporality in the interpretative function of the Absolute. His intent may have been to assert these two interpretative functions in the single act of ultimate interpretation. However, in effect the problem of the world and the individual is not solved in a new way, as Royce had evidently hoped, but moved into the conception of the Absolute itself.

However, the direction of change in this metaphysical system suggests certain possible developments from this social view of reality. One way in which the problems of this point of view might be moved toward resolution would be to consider the first term of the ultimate interpretation to be "the totality of possibility" rather than the whole of actuality. If this reconception were made, the Absolute interpretation in its second function could be identified with the constant purpose of the Absolute in its first function. The resulting conception of the second function would then be similar to that of Whitehead's notion of God as the order of revelance for Eternal Objects.[1] Royce clearly did not have such a notion in mind, however.

Wieman's development of thought suggests that another response to this metaphysics took place in his thinking. The question might be raised that since the second interpretative function of the Absolute does not perform any historical function that is not performed by the first interpretative function, is this second or final aspect of the Absolute interpretation philosophically or religiously necessary? Does the second aspect of the Absolute do anything in the way of saving the world that could not be accomplished by asserting an unwavering purpose in the temporal life of the Absolute? Wieman's sharing of this line of response is further suggested in his later contention that the saving of all historical particulars is neither empirically nor religiously justified.

With the possibility of such a revision of the conception of the Absolute, Royce's development of Absolute Idealism has furthered the possibility of nurturing certain lines of development of philosophy of religion. In what ways can we see this viewpoint to operate as a formative resource and constructive factor in Wieman's development of religious naturalism?

When in the late 1920's, Wieman sought to characterize his position philosophically, he chose the terms "objective relativism." This most immediately linked his thought to the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. However, another source for this perspective, and historically more important in the development of Wieman's thought, is in the meeting of idealism and pragmatism in Royce. In Royce's use of Pierce's logical analysis of the interpretative function in the sign situation (meaning--situation) for metaphysical interpretation, we find a view of reality as fundamentally social. In Pierce's notion of interpretation, Royce found the structure of the relationship of past, present, and future in the experience of the individual in superpersonal world-processes, and finally, as the nature of the all-enfolding process which ultimately must be seen as both the creating and saving of the world as a whole.

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 46.

Now, in anticipation of the conclusion of our argument regarding Wieman's earlier development in value theory and philosophy of religion, I am proposing that the notion of "interpretation," as used by Royce, indicates a point of view regarding the philosophical ultimate which later appears in Wieman's development of the notion of creativity. The process of interpretation as a process of resolution of conflict through the production of a new leading idea arising from a perspective in some sense above the level at which the conflict is taking place, is a pattern of thought which we can see in Wieman's response to Perry's value theory. With Perry, Wieman interpreted the moral problem situation as a conflict of interests seeking fulfilment. This is similar to Royce's use of the pragmatic understanding of "idea" as a "leading" toward a certain fulfilment. But with Royce, Wieman rejected the harmonization of these interests (Royce: blending of ideas) as the method of resolution. We have seen that the process of interpretation involves the production of new "signs" stimulating further interpretation. It is the new sign that forms a unity from antecedent individual ideas, bringing a new meaning into the world process, which was made possible by the very conflict of ideas. For Wieman, it is the functioning of Creative Interest in a conflict situation that resolves a conflict of interests by directing its energies toward the fulfilment of new interest.

The other factor, in addition to the perspective of Royce, which operates in Wieman's response to Perry, is the Creative Evolutionism of Bergson. However, again, it is the structure of Royce's thinking which we find organizing Wieman's response to Bergson.

If this is a defensible judgment, we can see that Wieman never entirely capitulated to the spell of Bergson's world view. After reading Bergson, he could no longer accept the Absolute as the most adequate religious idea. Bergson did communicate to Wieman the feeling that the ultimate is given for awareness in the immediate. This drew Royce's "religious insight" more toward the meaning of a response to a concrete feeling relation. But Wieman evidently could not accept Bergson's contention that structures which are discerned in natural events are degenerate products of the elan vital. For Wieman, the reality of creativity in the emergence of community structure was too obvious to allow the life purpose to be seen to issue in the intuition of participation in unstructured creativity. The sense of the wealth of the given, the experiential continuity of the inner self with the outer world (to use idealist terminology), the sense of a creative world purpose operative in the immediate, and the equation of actuality with activity, seem to be the points at which Bergson made an impact on Wieman. And this is no mean philosophical influence.

Royce saw the process of interpretation as the structure of events characteristic of a wide range of creative occasions. On this linking of "creativity" and "interpretation," Royce explicitly responded to Bergson's understanding of the notion of creativity. In brief, Royce criticized Bergson for reverting to the instinctual relationship of immediacy as the model for his understanding of the relationship of creativity. Royce's contention was that creativity is a notion involving historical change, and therefore inherently involves a three-fold relationship between past, present and future. It is the functioning of this structure of relations, the complex relation of interpretation, which is creative.

Bergson was also attentive to discern the functions of relationships in events. For instance, Bergson's analysis of life processes is brought to the support of his contention that levels of consciousness correspond to types of functions exhibited by various life forms. Bergson saw mobility as functionally basic to the difference between vegetative and animal life forms, and thus fundamental to the emergence of consciousness.[1] However, mobility may be utilized in different types of activities. Two basic types of activities in animal life dependent on mobility are the operation of instinct and intelligence. Instinct is "a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments," whereas intellect is "the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments."[2] Instinctual activity is based on automatic behavior mechanisms, illustrated preeminently for Bergson in insect life with its specialization of biological structures for the performance of specific functions, and the use of materials for the construction of nests, etc. Intelligence is that type of activity which constructs instruments to perform a desired function.

Consciousness has a role, or we might say, performs a function, in relation to intelligence. "Consciousness," Bergson wrote, "is the light that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential activity which surrounds the action already performed by the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice,"[3] The appearance of this aspect of choice from among alternatives is characteristic of the mode of knowledge open to the intellect in contrast to instinctual knowledge. Bergson held that instinctive activity tends toward unconsciousness, whereas intelligence tends toward consciousness.[1] Instinctual knowledge is purely immediate, or in Bergson's phrase, is "knowledge of a matter."[2] By "matter," Bergson evidently meant an immediate particular sensory given. This type of knowledge is a mode of awareness arising in the function of instinct in the eliciting of a particular response to a stimulus. In contrast, the type of knowledge operative in the functioning of the intellect finds its object in relations. Bergson wrote:

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[1] Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 120. [2] Ibid., p. 155. [3] Ibid., p. 159.

> The essential function of intelligence is therefore to see that way out of a difficulty in any circumstances whatever, to find what is most suitable, what answers best the questions asked. Hence it bears essentially on the relations between a given situation and the means of utilizing it. . . . A form, just because it is empty, may be filled at will with any number of things in turn, even with those that are of no use. . . . An intelligent being bears within himself the means to transcend his own nature.[3]

But this self transcendence of the intellect is inherently limited because of the inability of the intellect to form an idea other than on the basis of static immobile discontinuities. Bergson stated the problem resulting from this limited self-transcendence as follows:

> There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find, but it will never seek them.[4]

The intellect seeks to grasp life, but only succeeds in fragmenting it. Another function is required to do what intellect seeks to do. This is intuition, which apprehends the "very inwardness of life." "By intuition," explained Bergson, "I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."[5] Intuition thus recombines the two modes of response which had become differentiated in the life process, and thereby "introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation."[1] Creation is the fundamental character of the life process. It is reality itself. We can see that Bergson had an essentially Kantian view of the intellect, as the giving of relations to experience, even though the relation given grows out of practical requirements placed on the individual by the concrete situation.[2] Similarly to Kant's position, the intellect, by the very nature of its functioning cannot penetrate to reality, the thing in itself. However, Bergson broke through the Kantian restriction on knowledge in his view of intuition as the life of a growing consciousness which immediately participates in the flux of reality, a flux which is apprehendable, yet defies capture by the intellect.

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[1] Ibid., p. 160. [2] Ibid., p. 164. [3] Ibid., pp. 166-67.

[4] Ibid., p. 167. [5] Ibid., p. 194.

The level of consciousness, or growth of consciousness, which is intuition has its own type of knowledge, a knowledge which Bergson suggests is more symbolic than conceptual.[3] This metaphysical knowledge would "superpose" on scientific conceptual knowledge. But the main thrust of Bergson's analysis seems to be directed to illuminate the function of the individual in intuitive involvement. The self is a definite past, but by intuition it plunges back into duration "in which the past, always moving on, is swelling increasingly with a present that is absolutely new."[4] This immediate meeting with the indeterminate novel strains the will of the individual to its limit. "We must," wrote Bergson, "by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather up our past which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, into a present which it will create by entering."[5] This suggests a pattern of creativity in human experience, actually a structure breaking movement of the self, in which freedom is realized.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 195. [2] _Ibid._, pp. 166, 168. [3] _Ibid._, p. 218.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 219. [5] _Ibid._

Royce found in Bergson's threefold typology of instinct, intellect and intuition a set of notions parallel to Pierce's three categories of perception, conception and interpretation. In his use of Pierce's types of relations, Royce explicitly criticized Bergson's notion of intuition as an understanding of the nature of human awareness of and participation in creativity. Royce saw in Bergson's view an unwarranted glorification of instinct as a mode of experience immediately in touch with reality. Royce placed Bergson's instinct at the level corresponding to the relation of perception in Pierce's analysis. Perception, according to Pierce, has a thing or a change as its object.[1] The intellect, or the activity of conception, has as its object a universal. But neither of these functions of apprehension or relationship can give one's neighbor's mind as an object.[2] Perceptions and cognitions, or instinct and intellect produce closed systems, so that these modes of relationship cannot be the relationship by which individual worlds of perception and cognition become related.[3] So we have seen that Royce held this and other social situations require a triadic relationship for their intelligibility. He found Bergson's notion of intuition as inadequate recognition of the structure of this level of relationship in which selves are interpreted to each other, or of the present as creative of the future in its movement from the past. Royce contended that Bergson's intuition does not even accurately indicate the relationship of the past to the present, although he agreed with Bergson that "the world's experience is . . . not merely a flux. For as Bergson rightly asserts, the world of any present moment of time is a summary of the results of all past experience."[1] The failure of intuition is its appeal to simple immediacy as a mode of apprehending this past being thrust into the present. Instead, Royce contended that the immediate summary of the past operative in the present is effected by an interpretive function which draws a plurality of inheritance into a unity for apprehension. What is needed, Royce argued, is not just a higher level of perception, but a new level of relationship, that of interpretation.[2]

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[1] Royce, The Problem of Christianity, II, 127. [2] Ibid

[3] Ibid., II, 133.

Royce saw Bergson's appeal to intuition to involve an implicit derogation of the aspect of relational structures in cognitive processes.[3] Even though experience may be a flux, if the past means anything definite for the future, then, Royce concluded, a definite structure is operative in the temporal passage.[4] Consequently, the notion of "idea" cannot be divorced from the notion of intuition. If intuition is the apprehension of creativity in concrete events then intuition must have an ideal, or "leading," structured aspect, as a functioning whereby a definite novelty emerges from the past. Royce dealt with this in terms of the merging of conflicting ideas in experience. In situation of conflict, Royce contended that the creative relationship must include as well as transcend the intellect, or ideal "leading" function.[5] When the effort is made to unify "all the ideal leading which the philosopher has henceforth to regard as essentially illumination," these diverse illuminating ideas will blend into a single idea which "will be the one idea of winning a pure intuition."[6] If, as Royce argued, all ideas could be welded into a single idea,

> Then this idea could be used to define reality, just as pragmatism has come to define all the endless variety of forms of "truth" in

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, 285. [2] *Ibid.*, II, 163. [3] *Ibid.*, II, 123.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, 156. [5] *Ibid.*, II, 263. [6] *Ibid.*, II, 264.

> terms of the single idea which gets the name "success" or "working" or "expediency" or "cash-value" according to the taste of the individual pragmatist.[1]

As in the pragmatic definition of the nature of truth, the single idea which Royce sought could not be a blending of all the diverse and conflicting ideas in human experience. Unification by one idea can only be effected by bringing the multiplicity of ideas into a new relationship. Royce contended that Bergson **omits from consideration** that the diversities of the past need to be unified if they are to become a body of experience that can be thrust into the present for the creation of the future. Since the past cannot be changed, unification means the creation of a community of diversities. To Royce this is the unification of experience that takes place in empirical events. Also, if there is a real world apart from human experience,

> because of the fragmentary and dissatisfying conflicts, antitheses, and problems of our present ideas, an interpretation of this situation is needed [which] is not now known to us. By the "real world" we mean simply the "true interpretation" of this our problematic situation. No other reason can be given than this for believing that there is any real world at all.[2]

An implicit response of Royce to Bergson is that he seemed to find Bergson's account of reality inadequate to account for the fact of order as well as creativity in events. In short, to Royce's mind, Bergson offered no basis for anything more than solipsism in human experience and chaos as far as world structure is concerned. In effect Royce contended that there must be a structure of creativity if there is to be any flux or duration for apprehension.

Royce's positive response to Bergson is indicated in his resistance to any suggestion that the World of Interpretation was static. The notion of the Absolute in the World of Interpretation is not a finished entity but a function for temporal passage and unity in events. It is not "an Absolute that is divorced from its appearance," "out of time," or a "block universe," to recall William James' characterizing of Absolute Idealism.[1] Royce contended persistently that the unity achieved in a community of interpretation is not just a metaphysical postulate, but is empirically known.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., II, 264-265.

> If then, the real world contains the Community of Interpretation, . . . this community of interpretation expresses its life in an infinite series of individual interpretations, each of which occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time.
>
> If, however, this community of interpretation reaches its goal, this whole time-process is in some fashion spanned by one insight which surveys the unity of its meaning. Such a viewing of the whole time-process by a single synopsis will certainly not be anything "timeless." It will not occur, on the other hand, at any one moment of time. *But its nature is the one empirically known to us at any one moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and find their mediator*. (Italics mine.)[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, II, 270.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 270-71.

CHAPTER IV

WIEMAN'S INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD AS THE ULTIMATE FUNCTION IN EVENTS

In his "Intellectual Autobiography," Wieman has written that the intensive study of Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution during his years at Davis, California, was a turning point for his thought. The impact of Bergson's thought was such that his response to his teachers at Harvard, R. B. Perry and W. E. Hocking was critically molded. Bergson's thought was most explicitly formative for Wieman's effort at Harvard, in that "creativity" became the central notion for his thinking. In his response to the value theory of Perry, which forms the argument of his doctoral dissertation, the notion of "creativity" is the focal concept in his constructive effort, as well as a notion on which he bases his criticism of Perry. However, Wieman's use of the notion of "creativity" is inseparable from another result of the reading of Bergson, namely, the break with idealist metaphysics. This constituted the point of tension between his thought and that of Hocking, since Hocking, developing from the basis of Roycean thought, was also responsive to the theme of creativity as expressed by Bergson.

An aspect of Bergson's thought that contributed to Wieman's reorientation is the primary status given to empirical immediacies. Wieman responded to this in two ways. First, this emphasis on the primacy of the empirical concrete as the data for inquiry dominated all subsequent inquiry. However, Wieman is also concerned to handle the concrete datum critically, especially in cases where strong elements of feeling threaten to overwhelm the individual and impair his practical response. The second aspect of Wieman's method for dealing with the concrete datum is of a piece with the reservations which he evidences in the use of Bergson's notion of creativity, and his qualified assent to the anti-intellectualist polemic. In this response we find restraints inherited from the Roycean viewpoint at work, which were reinforced by his work with Hocking.

Royce, in his resistance to Spencerian naturalism, was concerned to show that value judgments were not at the mercy of particular historical processes, even though they were meaningful in relation to such historical processes. The standard of judgment he agreed cannot be found in the relativities of the immediate, but it is found in the relationship of the particular event within ever widening unities of processes, ultimately within the world as the Unity of the Whole. Accordingly, Royce was concerned to show in historical events the function of a relational structure by which events became related and revalued within an ever more inclusive world whole. So, certain processes in events are seen as functions of the ultimate Whole in historical process. The thrust of this perspective is to accept the immediately given as possessing integrity in its givenness, that is, that in the immediate the ultimate is functional. Yet it is contended that the reality of the given event is its relatedness within a context, which bears possibilities for the enrichment of the particular immediate within a field of growing relationships. It is this viewpoint, in which the concrete particular is seen as possessing its character as a focus of relations within a whole activity, with which Wieman responds to Bergson.

This is not to say that Bergson does not stimulate certain important reconceptions which draw Wieman out of absolute voluntarism. The notion of the Absolute of Idealism was one notion which fell before Bergson's criticism. Yet Wieman's response at this point does not allow us to judge that the Idealist notion was swept from Wieman's thought.

We are led to suggest that Wieman's break with the thought patterns of Idealism was not as clear cut as he would lead us to suppose, both from his criticisms of idealism and his statement of the importance of Bergson in his development of thought. Indirect evidence for this is found by comparing his response to the notion of the absolute with that of John Dewey, who also broke away from the Hegelian Absolutist pattern of thought. Dewey's rebellion took the form of a ruthless cutting away of every vestige of things absolute. Wieman's initial constructive effort does not show this concern, and even retains the use of the term "Absolute" in a restricted meaning. Although Wieman later relinquished the term "Absolute" because of its idealist connotation, when he came under the sway of Dewey's thought at a later date, he was still concerned to discover an ultimate operative in human experience, and elicited Dewey's vigorous rejoinder on this point.

Wieman's own remarks about the reconstruction of this thought through the central employment of the notion of creativity leads us to raise a question concerning the source of the definition of creativity in this reconstruction. He stated that although he was deeply influenced by Bergson's idea of creativity, his interpretation of the notion was different from Bergson's.[1]

Considering this to be the case, what then is the source of the defining characteristics of Wieman's notion of Creativity? The most immediate response to this reconstruction of thought is in his doctoral dissertation on theory of value, "The Organization of Interests." Here we clearly recognize the impact of Bergson, yet we find a structure of thought which is not consonant with the Bergsonian thesis. Accordingly we turn to examine Wieman's constructive effort to define the highest good as "creative good."

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[1] Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 7.

The problem which engaged Wieman in his doctoral study was "to discover that organization of human interests which is most conducive to their maximum fulfilment."[1] He offered the notion of "creative interest" as that organization of interests which yields the greatest good.

> The principle of organization, which we propose, we shall call creativity. Our thesis is that all interests should be so organized as to function as one; and that one should be creative interest.[2]

In this initial statement of his problem and thesis contention, we find three philosophical factors operative. First, we find in R. B. Perry's theory of value as interest-fulfilment the basic philosophical analysis of the nature of value from which Wieman worked. A second element is indicated by his use of Bergson's term "creativity." However, in contrast to Bergson, creativity is identified by Wieman as a principle of organization. This concern for a structural definition of creativity is of a piece with a third factor which is basic to Wieman's effort. This third factor is Wieman's Roycean background. In the definition of the structure of the creative organization of interests we will find various strands of thought drawn together, indicating something of the "creative event" in which Wieman's point of view was opened up.

In accordance with the general evolutionary perspective on the emergence of life processes and functions, Wieman saw human intelligence to have been born in the struggle of life. "Intelligence" is defined not as a fundamentally rational function, but identified as "attentive consciousness" or "creative attention." Wieman raises a question concerning the understanding of the function of human intelligence in the life process.

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[1] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1917), p. 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 1. On p. 256 the statement of the thesis is expanded: "The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate that the largest measure of satisfaction is realized when all the interests of human life are subordinated to the function of developing the most intense, complex and comprehensive consciousness."

> Is it the purpose of intelligence to diminish the sufferings and doings of men that their lives may be more easeful; or is it the purpose of these sufferings and doings to magnify the range and intensity of attentive consciousness? Which is the end and which the means?[1]

In response to this question Wieman stated that his purpose "is to defend the latter of these two alternatives by showing that it leads to the largest measure of good."[2] The emergence of human intelligence, or creative attention, is a good which fulfills an interest arising from conflict in nature.[3] Wieman asserted that intelligence, so understood, is a good in itself, rather than having value primarily as an instrumental function. This statement is one form of Wieman's thesis contention regarding the nature of the highest good. The defense of this contention opens with a study of the nature of good.

R. B. Perry's definition of value as "the fulfilment of any interest whatsoever" provided the philosophical definition of value which Wieman accepted as basic for his inquiry.[4] Wieman wrote:

> the ultimate unit of good . . . is satisfaction of interest. . . . The term interest includes all the activities of a physical organism. Activity is taken to include all "readiness to act" or "motor attitude." . . . It is the tendency of the organism to act in a specific manner; to produce a definite result; to create or sustain a certain situation.[5]

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[1] *Ibid.* [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Note the similarity to Royce's view that intelligence is an imaginative function.

[4] R. B. Perry, "The Definition of Value," *The Journal of Philosophy* XI (March, 1914), 156.

[5] Wieman, *ibid.*, pp. 2,3.

For Perry, interest-fulfilment, or value, is a relational attribute "possessed by the objedt-interest complex."[1] Value is an aspect of real relations which constitute concrete human situations. The notion of "interest" does not allow value to take on a subjective meaning, since interest-fulfilment occurs only within some real relationship. This objectivity of value was for Perry a part of the general perspective of realism. He saw realism as a means in which human activities are brought into one context, such that the conceptions of philosophy, religion, and science find new expression.

In Present Philosophical Tendencies Perry wrote of a general change which he saw taking place regarding the grounds for religious belief. The change he found was in the changing understanding of the relations of religion and science. Under the Ritschlian point of view, it had been held that the world of science would ultimately be subordinated to the moral will, such that the realm of nature would be permeated by spirit. With the rise of philosophical realism, Perry saw a move to understand science as an experimental and instrumental method. Science thus can be considered an instrument of moral possibility. The important feature of this change of thought for Perry was in the understanding of the nature and role of value. Instead of a division between the realm of fact and value, Perry held that "the good is both objectively real and actually operative."[2] For philosophy of religion this meant that the good with which religion is concerned is pursued in the same context of events in which scientific method is operative. For Perry this new realism gave promise of opening a new perspective on the life of the human spirit as a human response in concrete events, which was not subject to the limitations of either idealism or evolutionary naturalism.

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[1] Perry, ibid.

[2] R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: George Braziller, 1955), p. 344.

> There is nothing dispiriting in realism. It involves the acceptance of the given situation as it is, with no attempt to think or imagine it already good. But it involves no less the conception of the reality and power of life. It is opposed equally to an idealistic anticipation of the victory of the spirit, and to a naturalistic confession of the impotence of spirit. In this sense all bold and forward living is realistic. It involves a sense for things as they are, an ideal for things as they should be, and a determination that, through enlightened action, things shall in time come to be what they should be.[1]

This pragmatic realism is integral to his value theory. Perry understood value to be rooted in a structure of relations in those particular situations in which satisfactions are found. Value is a real factor in the events of human life, not something brought into events from a realm of spirit, a subjective feature of an experience, or a pointing to a super temporal ideal consummation of events. Value is a feature inherent in the life process. The basis for the emergence of value relations is in the fact that "the mark of life is partiality for itself."[2] Perry held that this partiality, or interest, is a "unit of life" which "is essentially an organization which consistently acts for its own preservation."[3] The definition of good as the fulfilment of interest points to the good as a primitive non-moral notion. "The moral drama opens only when interest meets interest."[4] Accordingly, for Perry

> morality is that procedure in which several interests, whether they involve one or more physical organisms, are to adjusted as to function as one interest, more massive in its support, and more coherent and united in the common task of fulfilment.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 347.

[2] R. B. Perry, The Moral Economy (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 11. [4] Ibid., p. 13. [5] Ibid., p. 14.

We find pragmatist sources for this theory of value in James' expression of the view that morality is the effort to answer the question of how to satisfy the many conflicting demands and interests arising in society. What must be done, James proposed, is to "invent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien demands."[1] New conceptions of order must be found, continued James, which will satisfy an ever increasing range of demands. These new conflict-resolving orders for James were to be discovered and proven in the actual conflict of claims. Perry followed James in an effort to break through the generality of the Kantian moral criterion by showing how specific moral judgments arise within and are relevant to specific situations.

However, Wieman contended that Perry's criterion of the moral does not fully accomplish this end. Implicit in Wieman's thesis contention is the judgment that Perry did not succeed in breaking away from idealist forms of thought at this point. Perry does present his criterion of moral good as the form for the realization of a variety of interests under one coordinating interest, rather than a form for the motivation of action. In Perry we have a realistic contextualism which finds the data for any moral judgment concretely given, but his form of judgment is determined by an idealistic formal criterion. This criterion is harmony, or "coordination," as Wieman expressed it.

Perry's use of the principle of harmony for the organization of the highest good issued in his contention that a moral combination of interests cannot result in the non-fulfilment of any of the interests combined in the moral interest. At this point Wieman attacked Perry in the name of realism, and argued for an alternative to Perry's judgment that "when interests war against one another they render the project of life, at best a hard adventure, futile and abortive."[1] Wieman contended that it is this very "war of interests" which can be creative of greater value. He agreed with Perry's judgment concerning conflict only in regard to one type of conflict. This type, which Wieman called "external" conflict, is not the only form of conflict. Another type of conflict, no less real, which may take place alongside external conflict, is conflict in which those holding to conflicting interests seek to achieve an appreciation of the interests of others in the conflict situation. Wieman called this "internal" conflict.

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[1] William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 205.

When two individuals are engaged in internal conflict,

> each mind comprehends the total purpose of the other although the two purposes are antagonistic. To do this each person must reproduce in imagination the mind of the other; he must be able to imagine himself in the other man's place.[2]

This is what Wieman understood to take place in intelligent conversation and discussion. He wrote of this imaginative reproduction of the mind of the other as "mutual interpretation."

With the imaginative reproduction in each of the mind of the other, the individual also maintains his own system of interests. In the resulting conflict within each individual, "each is stimulated to develop new lines of activity in opposition to the other, and to take over something from the other."[3]

> So we say that internal conflict is creative of new experience; it brings new horizons into view; it increases the range and multiplicity of

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[1] Perry, *ibid*.

[2] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 85.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 86.

> interests in which the individual engages. Hence in so far as growth of experience is valued for its own sake, internal conflict has intrinsic value as being the process of that growth.[1]

So, rather than the moral standard of harmonization of interests, Wieman found the ultimate fulfilment of moral interest to be the enlargement of consciousness. The interest here fulfilled Wieman calls "creative interest." External conflict, in contrast, lacks the imaginative reproduction of the purpose of each by the other. It does not enlarge the consciousness and thus has no intrinsic moral value. Intrinsic moral value Wieman understood to result from the fulfilment of the fundamental interest of human life, namely, interest in the enlargement of consciousness.[2] External conflict can also take place within the individual. This is the case when conflicting impulses do not occasion an "active play of the imagination," as when the individual resolves the conflicts according to habit patterns.[3] The resolution of internal conflict issues in the emergence of a new unity of experience, an individual field of experience larger than that of any of the particular interests in conflict. Creative interest functioning in enlarging a field of diverse experience may well deny fulfilment to some of the particular interests participating in the conflict. What fulfilment is then made available to the former interests is in the transformation of these interests in their organization by creative interest. Fulfilment is in the process which moves toward the determination of a purpose for the total range of experience. Therefore, Wieman asserted, the highest good is an activity, not a static achievement. Wieman contended that the evidence of experience does not support the position that the highest good is the organization of values according to an ideal conception of the good.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 91. The human drive toward the extension of consciousness Wieman found to be supported by such a wide range of studies, from the play of children to neurological theory, that he was willing to postulate a virtual "instinct of creativity" in human life. However, it should be recognized that this appeal to a universal principle is evidently rooted in Royce's inquiry into the functional manifestation of the ultimate in events, rather than a strictly empirical method.

[3] Ibid., p. 87.

The static character of Perry's notion of the highest good is especially evident in his book Moral Economy, in which he starkly revealed some of his basic philosophical attitude when he wrote that "morality is the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos."[1] Accordingly, value has the status of a human achievement in man's struggle against the cosmos, and the highest good is then the achievement of a definite harmony of conflicting human interests. Moral value is the human contribution to the "war of life on the routine of the mechanical cosmos and its forces of dissolution."

So we see that the differences in value theory between Perry and Wieman reflect a basic difference in the outlooks of the two men on the relations of man and the cosmos. For Perry, the war of life on the cosmos is the center of the meaning of life. The fundamental view of the physical world is as an inanimate mechanism, and the moral aim of life is to overcome this mechanism. In contrast, Wieman held that the values and meanings in human life refer to man's relatedness in events as participants in the world process. This difference of point of view is evident in the way in which Wieman analyzed the basis of value in human life. Value is not only the realization of the basic urges of human life, but value is a feature intrinsic to the basic experience relation as such. Consciousness is to be valued for its own sake. Sub-moral and moral values are based on the continuity of life structures with the natural world, not in their contrast to the natural order. The basic life-interest is in experience. From this value of experience for its own sake Wieman pressed on to elaborate his notion of creative value, based on his understanding of internal conflict as a movement toward a wider range of experience of intrinsically growing value.

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[1] Perry, The Moral Economy, p. 14.

There are aspects of Perry's thought which do suggest a notion of intrinsic value which could be pressed in the direction Wieman pursued. This can be seen in Perry's distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. Perry wrote that

> value, like other relational attributes, may be predicated in two ways. The subject of the judgment may stand in the relation, or contain the relation. Thus the predicate parallel may be predicated of one line in the sense of being parallel to another, or of both lines in the sense of possessing parallelism. When this peculiarity of relational predicates is observed the difficulty concerning intrinsic values is, I think, removed. Intrinsic value is possessed by the object-interest complex; extrinsic value is possessed by the object itself or by any other factor or condition of the complex. Value may be predicated in either sense, as possessed internally by the complex or relationship, and externally by the object-term of the relationship.[1]

Wieman assumed this basic analysis when he wrote in the Wrestle of Religion with Truth that, the good being any fulfilment of interest, "interest, then, is the whole made up of stimulus and response. An interest is a total process of interaction between organism and environment."[2] Wieman concluded from this that value is not subjective, but "inheres in the totality of all being."[3] The view of an interest and its fulfilment as occurring in a process is given some support in Perry's notion of intrinsic value.

The tendency toward objectivity in Perry's value theory was advanced when he made the distinction between values of ideality and values of reality. An ideal value is "an imaginative representation of the object of interest."[1] "By real value objects, on the other hand, I mean objects which fulfil interest and exist independently of the interested subjects' consciousness of them."[2] The creation of ideal-objects is a function of the creative imagination. Real value-objects can all be considered goods in the non-moral sense. But this is not true of ideal values. The goodness of ideal value is dependent on whether such values indicate real possibilities in the actual situation.

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[1] Perry, "The Definition of Value," pp. 155-56.

[2] Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 161.

[3] Ibid.

But the humanistic orientation of Perry's thought persists in his appeal to high ideals for the ultimate standard of value. Perry admitted the need of criticism of ideals, yet in his realistic philosophy of religion he held that this criticism of ideals is a method to aid man in achieving a future consummation of high ideals.[3]

Despite the suggestions of support for a view which Wieman was later to characterize as objective relativism, we can see that Perry's realism was not a fundamental resource for Wieman. For Perry, the higher good is a matter of how human life can organize individual values. For Wieman we find that the increase of value is the result of something happening to human life. The creation of greater good results from an activity which is other than human will and interest. A basis for defense of this judgment we find prepared as Wieman used the language of voluntarism to define the difference between good and evil. The bad thing, wrote Wieman,

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[1] Perry, "Religious Values," The American Journal of Theology, XIX (January, 1915), 3.

[2] Ibid.

[3] R. B. Perry, "Contemporary Philosophies of Religion," The Harvard Theological Review, VIII (July, 1914), passim.

> is bad because it conflicts with the larger will of the individual or the social group or humanity or God. But it is always the fulfilment of some will which constitutes the good: and the will is always some organization of interests. So we always come back again in the end to this ultimate unit of the good.[1]

Good and evil may both apply to the same interest-fulfilment. A good which fulfils a certain interest, may also be evil in that it obstructs the fulfilment of an interest inclusive of a wider complex of relations.

The imagery of this passage, presenting a picture of increasingly inclusive areas of interest organized as levels of will, recalls the language of Roycean voluntarism. Wieman admitted many possible organizations of human interests as individual goods; but he contended that there is one system of inter-relationships of human activities (interests) "which gives us the most constant and ample fulfilment of purpose."[2] This organization of interests which yields the greatest good is not a harmonization of all interests. Such harmony is not characteristic of the realities of human life.

Wieman's criticism of the coordination theory reflects the type of analysis which Royce made of the natural community. According to Royce, the natural community, i.e. the human social order, seeks to harmonize all interests under a common discipline. This is not successful, since it only accentuates the sense of divergence of interests within the individual. Wieman found support for a similar judgment in regard to individual experience on the basis of Freudian psychology.

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[1] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," pp. 3 - 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

> The more compact and perfect the system of coordinated interest becomes, and the more completely we surrender ourselves to it, the more aggravated will be the dissatisfaction of the suppressed interests. The constant pressure they exert, even though it be altogether subconscious, will eventually turn the beautiful harmony we have fashioned into gall and wormwood. This is the inevitable working of suppressed tendencies.[1]

The fruitful organization is an "organization of the conflict of interests," rather than a harmonizing organization.[2] At the interpersonal level "friction between persons is necessary in order that there be any mutual interpretation of minds. This friction is an integral part of the interpretation.[3] Interpersonal friction provides one of the fundamental conditions for creativity, since as Wieman pointed out, individual consciousness rises to the level of self-consciousness only when such friction generates feelings of contrast.

Wieman's thesis that value grows through the conflict resolving process of mutual interpretation both utilized the language of Royce's philosophy of community creation by interpretation, and restated important aspects of its main themes. Wieman and Royce both objected to harmonistic theories of value as unrealistic. For both the increase of good does not deny the uniqueness of individual value or disvalue, but produces an increase of value by creating a new value which relates the various particular values. Further, for both, the highest good is not in the achievements of this growth of good, but in the growth itself. The value achieved or the satisfaction of an interest is not "any status quo of objects; it is always some process of action on the part of the organism itself which affords satisfaction."[4] For Wieman, this growth is value since it fulfils creative interest; for Royce this creative process of interpretation is the life of the absolute.

Wieman presented his notion of creative interests within a classification of interests "according to the different ways in which they may be brought into relation with one another."[1] The way in which interests are interrelated, Wieman pointed out, will determine the degree of satisfaction possible to the several interests, and thus the value possibilities. Wieman proposed three types of interests: The adaptive, the instrumental, and the creative. These three categories are "the three ways in which interests may be so organized as to function as one."[2] Wieman found that these three types of organization of interest indicate levels of increasing comprehensiveness in the organization of interests.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 6. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 7. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 8. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The adaptive organization of interests is illustrated by the instinctual adaptation of organisms to the environment. Wieman saw this activity as an immediate functioning without regard to some specific aim for the future. He cited the activity of walking as an example of the organization of activities (interests) of the organism within an activity such that there is an immediate satisfaction of all the various activities (muscular and neural) in the one total physical activity, or system of adaptive activities.[3] But then there are other interests of the individual which may be fulfilled by the activity of walking. Walking may be part of an economic activity, which in turn is a means of serving a diversity of interests, such as the support of children, and supplying clothing and nourishment for a family. The walking to work is then instrumental to the organization of these various interests for their harmonious fulfilment. By instrumental organization, Wieman wrote,

> I want to reduce [these interests] to a system in which each interest will find complete fulfilment in cooperating with the others, very much as the component activities in walking sustain and fulfil each other.[4]

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[1] __Ibid.__ [2] __Ibid.__, p. 12. [3] __Ibid.__, p. 14. [4] __Ibid.__, p. 15.

The success of this tendency would tend to reduce human instrumental activities to the level of automatic instinctual behavior. But this same activity can be understood to be a part of a third type of organization of interests. The walking may be a part of an activity which is a response to the uncoordinated state of all the interests pressing upon the individual. This response in human activity is creative activity.

> In a word, it is precisely the uncoordinated state of his interests, and his efforts to bring them into some kind of system which gives to his consciousness that vividness, variety, rapid interplay of idea and feeling which makes it distinctively human.[1]

This more distinctively human interest is directed to the formation of a system of interests and to the application of "every such system of coordinated activity as soon as attained to some wider problem and thus increase the range and intensity of antagonistic interests, instead of diminishing the conflict, just so far he is actuated by creative interest."[2]

It is a conflict of interests that creates a problem, giving rise to a process which "brings the whole situation more or less vividly to consciousness."[3] "The world of experience becomes vastly more concrete by reason of this antagonism of impulses. Creative interest . . . is interest in sustaining and increasing the number of different elements or aspects of the world which enter into consciousness."[4] Accordingly,

> coordination has no value for creative interest except as it enters in to magnify the conflict of systems, and thereby make consciousness more vivid and complicated. For it is the increasing concreteness of the idea of reality which is the sole satisfaction of creative interest.[5]

To illustrate his point, Wieman indicated that creative interest is operative in the solution of problems in the sciences. The satisfaction of interest is in the process of solving the problem, rather than in the solution reached.[6]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[6] *Ibid.*

> Creativity is the development of ideas and the elaboration of emotions for their own sake. It is the interest which sustains any process because of the growing experience involved.[1]

This threefold typology was evidently suggested to Wieman from his study of Bergson. Bergson found his analysis of life processes as instinctive, intelligent, and intuitive to correlate to three functions in life patterns and three theories of evolutionary process. Instinctive behavior is adaptive in function, and intelligent behavior operates under the presupposition that some order can increasingly be impressed on events. Bergson remarked that the mechanistic and finalist views of life process imply that there should be increased order with evolutionary advance. This theory clearly does not meet the facts, Bergson noted.[2] Unity in the life process, he concluded is not above or at the end of the process, but it is "in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time."[3] This criticism of finalism in Bergson is essentially the criticism which Wieman applied to Perry's coordination theory.

Further, we find Bergson's notion of creativity evident in Wieman's recognition of the disruptive character of creative interest.

> While instrumental interest always tends to restore and preserve the coordination of adaptive response, creativity is ever breaking away from the smooth running routine and disrupting the coordinated system or proving it inadequate by applying it to situations too wide and new for it.[4]

An instrumental interest is satisfied by the situation produced by an activity when the results fulfil the harmonizing purpose for which the activity is undertaken.[5] The result may be the development of habitual responses. However, it may be that a new zest is discovered in the "interplay of feelings and ideas," which then seeks ever widening ranges of experiences. In this drive toward the growth of experience, Wieman saw the operation of creative interest.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 21. [2] Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 114.

[3] *Ibid.* [4] Wieman, *ibid.*, p. 28. [5] *Ibid.*

However, we find another possible line of influence in this classification of interests into adaptive, instrumental, and creative.[1] Wieman presented an analysis which bears some similarities to Royce's use of Pierce's logical analysis to differentiate the relationships of perception, conception, and interpretation.[2] Perception is the relationship in intuitive immediacy, the experience of pure givenness. Conception involves ideas which organize immediate experience according to unifying cognitive abstractions.[3] Royce sought to acknowledge fully the pragmatist notion of ideas as instruments or "plans of action."[4] Perception and conception clearly are distinguished in much the same way as adaptive and instrumental interest. As with Wieman's creative interest, Royce's relation of interpretation is a process issuing in the resolution of conflict and we might say for Royce that the immediate satisfaction in interpretation is in the *process* of mediation between the conflicting pluralities of a past and the future. Royce consequently understood the process of interpretation to be inherently self-perpetuating. Similarly, Wieman's creative interest never finds fulfilment in some one satisfying achievement. Wieman assented to Bergson's contention that it is in the immediate awareness of the richness of experience that one shares in the creativity of the flux of events. We will find that Wieman's description of participation in creativity shows an indebtedness to Royce's criticism of Bergson.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 21. This threefold interpretative scheme is used throughout "The Organization of Interests" as a framework for the interpretation of the data of various fields of inquiry. The basic ideas in this inquiry into value theory and philosophy of religion are defined within this interpretative scheme, and illustrated by application to the various topics.

[2] Royce, *ibid*., II, 180 ff. See above, pp. 84,85.

[3] *Ibid*., II, 123. [4] *Ibid*., II, 122.

The theme of creative conflict is noted in Royce's earliest work in philosophy of religion. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy Royce developed the notion of moral insight as a creative response of will which resolves the aims of conflicting wills.[2] Royce saw moral insight, when pressed to an ever more inclusive function, to point to an ultimate value function in the world.

However, we have seen above that when Wieman sought to define creative interest early in his discussion, he employed expressions which appear in neither Perry, Bergson or Royce. The condition in which he saw creative interest to find its fertile expression in human experience he described as the "rapid interplay of idea and feeling."[3] Again, he spoke of the satisfaction of creative interest as being in "the increasing concreteness of the idea of reality."[4] These expressions appear in W. E. Hocking's work, and indicate the extent to which Hocking kept alive the appeal of the idealistic perspective in Wieman's thought during his studies at Harvard. So we must turn to Hocking's work to determine what Wieman meant in using these phrases from the language of Hocking's pragmatic idealism.

W. E. Hocking, following a major theme in the development of idealism, found consciousness to be the fundamental datum, or condition for any datum in human experience. Within consciousness different factors are to be distinguished which have different functions in human life. The two basic functional factors distinguished by Hocking in consciousness are feelings and ideas. In The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Hocking had explored the meaning of religion in terms of the interplay between these two factors in human experience, and found in this analysis a basis for the defense of an idealistic world view. In this philosophical effort one can find a response to pragmaticism which develops notions functionally similar to Royce's use of the notion of interpretation. Also in similarity to Royce's constructive effort, is Hocking's sensitive response to Bergson's creative evolutionism.

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[1] Above, pp. 101 ff.

[2] Above, pp. 55,56.

[3] William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913), p. 16.

[4] Ibid., p. 18.

Feeling and idea, according to Hocking, although functionally distinct, actually never appear isolated from one another, although one or the other might predominate in different phases of consciousness. On one hand, "idea is an integral part of all feeling," and on the other, Hocking contended that the "destiny of feeling is to terminate in knowledge of an object."[1] Or, as he restated the latter point: "The destiny of feeling is to fund itself in idea."[2]

By the "feeling" aspect of consciousness Hocking meant to refer to "whatever in consciousness, deeper than explicit thought, is able to give a bent to conduct."[3] Feeling is thus found associated with activities in experience. Consequently Hocking ventured the assertion that "feeling is itself activity."[4] As an aspect of consciousness, feeling appears as "a kind of instability in consciousness." This instability-feeling-activity is a movement outward from the conscious self, and as such is a form of desire for or interest in that which is other than self.[1] So, feeling, Hocking understood, seeks an end or fulfilment in that which will terminate the feeling as feeling, specifically, in the "consciousness of an object."[2] Consciousness of feeling moves toward consciousness of an object, and thus, Hocking agreed, "cognizance and feeling are but different stages of the same thing."[3] Since consciousness of an object involves idea, knowledge being the meeting of an idea and an object, Hocking saw feeling and idea to be inextricably coupled together in the actual movement of consciousness.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 72.

[3] Ibid., p. 33.

[4] Ibid., p. 65.

"Idea" is functional at the level of initiation of the activity which is called consciousness. The development of consciousness is structured by an evolution of ideas. Hocking said that the evolution of ideas is in the "balancing of instincts."[5] In this process having the thesis-antithesis-synthesis structure, instincts are balanced by counter-instincts, the two in turn giving rise in consciousness to an idea of greater scope than that possessed by the separate instincts. Among ideas the same sort of happening takes place in the emergence of general notions from the tension and conflict of ideas.

Hocking saw a physical and biological counterpart of ideas in potential energy. Potential energy is released in definite relations, and thus is functionally equivalent to "idea." The expenditure of energy in the initiation of feeling functions equivalently to idea in the first stage of a process moving toward the employment of an idea of an object in consciousness. Hocking understood an idea in consciousness to be "a product of function and hesitation in conduct: a token of failure in spontaneous reaction . . . Hence, an idea stands for a pause between perception and action."[1] We can accordingly see Hocking's idea to have the function of defining or deciding in an occasion of indecision or indetermination. Although idea has the function of definition of feeling, of giving feeling effectiveness, Hocking was concerned that idea be not understood as a static notion. He noted that the usual understandings of an idea are spatial. Spatial symbols of the idea are useful in being suggestive of the inclusive and exclusive function of the idea and its changeless identity.[2] But Hocking responded critically to Bergson's derogation of ideas as static and thus inadequate to the function of apprehending the flux of reality. Hocking contended that there are ideas of change and development. The employment of ideas is not avoided, Hocking answered Bergson, by turning to immediate experience for knowledge. Anything of interest will involve ideas.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 65-66. [2] Ibid., p. 66. [3] Ibid., p. 68.

[4] Ibid., p. 69. [5] Ibid., p. 545.

> But whatever can interest in experience is already caught in idea: There is nothing in experience which cannot become content of idea, for what else is the (empirical) idea but selected experience, in shape for memory and communication?[3]

Counter to Bergson's position, Hocking asserted that ideas can "store change in memory." In summary, Hocking stated that his basic objection to Bergson is to his "too physical idea of idea," but he welcomed his work in pointing to the non-mechanical nature of reality.[4]

We noted that Hocking wrote of feeling as a form of desire, or interest, to which idea gave effectiveness. To the question of what is the ultimate rootage of ideas, Hocking answered that fundamental to all particular human interests is our interest in reality, and that ideas have their rootage in this fundamental interest, this "passion for objectivity."[5] This contention also embodies the point which Hocking felt was lacking in the pragmatic notion of idea. An idea, for Hocking, is not just a plan of action, a pragmatic leading, but in its fundamental meaning has reference to substance. By substance Hocking meant a "passionless ground of things" which is a pre-practical reference.[1] For Hocking this was not the postulation of some ground prior to consciousness, but, as he expressed his position, the "feeling-free anchorage of the meanings of ideas" is found in the aboriginal fact of consciousness.[2] The aboriginal idea of reality, the fundamental reference to other than self is basic to any particular idea in consciousness.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

> Every idea, however rich in practical association, is attached in its ultimate "external meaning" to the idea of reality, the center of all this free, dispassionate interest.[3]

The fundamental idea of reality which is basic to any idea, structuring an interest at the root of any practical interest, is one's world-idea.[4]

To interpret Hocking, we can see that the immediate function of reality external to human experience is in consciousness, in both its idea and feeling aspects. But in so far as there is any knowledge, the idea aspect predominates, since, assuming a monistic presupposition of ultimate unity, it is idea that points to the structured unity in experience.

> Ideas, we say, do by aboriginal instinct fix their meaning in the ultimate non-impulsive substance of the world; and idea-outlining tends to follow the hints which perception gives of the unities belonging to that reality-not-ourselves.[5]

In this idea-outlining in experience is expressed an activity of human life as a part of nature. This is the activity of aim or purpose which Hocking saw as a part of nature's lure for life. It is the fulfilment of this lure for life that constitutes value. Our particular interests we may accept as self justifying, but Hocking saw a correlation between one's range of interests and the intensity of one's interest in life or in reality itself. The interest in reality is an interest which is creative of "the very fabric of value."[1] So, in line with the thesis of Hocking's pragmatic idealism, he stated that "the value of any object depends as well upon the thinker as upon the thing."[2] On one side, "pleasure is evidently a mode of being aware of the world." Yet the depth of appreciation in this experience is dependent on the idea-resources which the mind brings to experience, relating this experience to a wider range of reality. Hocking enunciated these notions concisely in this thesis regarding the nature of value.

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[1] Ibid., p. 119. [2] Ibid., pp. 118-20. [3] Ibid., p. 124.

[4] Ibid., p. 126. [5] Ibid., p. 121.

> These considerations all but compel the simple hypothesis which I have here to offer. It is that all valuing (and so all feeling) is a way of knowing objects with one's whole-idea. In some way, in valuing, appreciating, enjoying, we are using this idea-mass; yet not in the effortful way of deliberate thinking; an object of value is an object in which my whole-idea finds some peculiar ease and sufficiency of application. The worth which any object or end can have for me depends on mutual fitness between my mass-idea and that object--the fitness of my idea to comprehend the object; the fitness of the object to engage the idea.[3]

Value arises in an experience relationship between the self with its whole-idea and reality. The objects in reality are revealed according to the resources of the whole-idea of the experiencing self. So value and faith arise in the human experience-relation to reality. Value arises as the focus of feeling in an object, and faith operates in the relating of idea and object. Both are a commitment of the self, in feeling and idea, to reality. Both faith and value involve a commitment of the self to an activity of interaction with reality which can issue in an intensity and variety of value experience and the growth of one's whole-idea such that one's understanding of life in the world includes a greater range of experience and becomes a resource for more fruitful and creative living.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 127. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Employing Hocking's mode of expression, Wieman wrote that:

> In [adaptive and instrumental interest] feeling and idea tend to fund themselves in automatic response; but in creativity the overt action tends to fund itself in idea and feeling.[1]

We can see that Wieman took the position with Hocking that creative response is going on in human life constantly. Creativity will be found wherever the interplay between feeling and idea occurs. Hocking had contended that there is some creativity in all action.[2] Consciousness displays certain features in the rise of creativity to dominance. "In creativity," wrote Hocking, "the old is more intensely present to consciousness."[3] The intense presence of the past in the present is the result of reflection in experience. The past becomes unified for the self in an idea. In this reflective activity, Hocking saw a function of the absolute. With the absolute, the whole-idea, the idea of reality, functional in all particular ideas, Hocking contended that "the power to reflect depends upon the power to find your absolute."[4] Thus individuality, freedom, and creativity are functions of the absolute, but these features of individual life are thereby no less real. An individual's creative activity, Hocking eloquently contended,

> is still his own, and bears the stamp of his individuality. His relation to his absolute has not obliterated him, not overmastered him: enabling him to reflect, it has given him himself; enabling him to create, it has given to him a freedom which might well be called freedom in the concrete.[5]

The absolute is the ultimate functional ground for human creativity. Without this ultimate character in the world, for Hocking there could not be creativity in any definite sense. The notion of creativity is integral to his conception of the world process.

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[1] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 32-33.

[2] Hocking, *ibid.*, p. 465.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 466. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 472. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 483.

> The world that shall be emerges from the world that is by the appearance of the purely new; yet that emergence is subject to some control and consent of the world that is: unless the present in some fashion loves and desires the future, the future will bear no progeny.[1]

This means that the emergence of the novel "has its method and logic."[2] Creativity is not pure chance or capriciousness; it involves a definite order. The future bears true novelty, but it is related to the past as a possible consequence issuing from present action.

Hocking's response to pragmatism is formative of his expression. He criticized the pragmatist attentiveness to novelty as the dominant fact in the world as a neglect of both the Ultimate Unity of the world, and of the fact of empirical unities. He held that the historical continuity of the novel with that from which it emerges testifies to its dependence on some sort of unity to give it birth. He found this especially evident in changes initiated by mind.[3] Hocking made the point that creativity involves a purpose, orientation, direction, as well as a breaking away from past structures. Purpose and orientation cannot be had without some strand of identity in the creative event. He understood creativity as a movement from unity to unity in response to the ultimate world unity, the world-idea. The unity which Hocking found in the creative event proved to be in a structure of happenings. The initial phase is in the "sub-event" of reflexion.

> I wish then, in the first place, to connect the event of creation with the event of reflexion, that is, with the emergence of a self-consciousness out of a consciousness that is pursuing in all smoothness the lines of the empirical object-world.[4]

The self becomes conscious of itself in its empirical relationships. This self-knowledge, as we have seen, is for Hocking ultimately a reflexion upon an Absolute. The event of reflexion arises from a blockage of the activity of the mind, and a looking for something new. In reflexion on the Absolute human creativity is initiated.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 462-63. [2] Ibid., p. 462. [3] Ibid., p. 167.

[4] Ibid., p. 471.

> It is through alliance with the Absolute that man is able to reflect: it is through his reflexion that he becomes creative of novelty, system-destroying novelty.[1]

It is this activity in the self which Hocking found to be at the heart of the "cognitive side of mystic experience.[2]

In the event of reflexion Hocking saw the basis for another response by the self. This response is an action of the self directed toward the object-world. In this response the self acts in accordance with his newly emerged self-consciousness. Consequently we find in this analysis of the creative event that Hocking identified a pattern of alternation between self-knowledge and object-knowledge.[3] Hocking saw this alternation as a fundamental pattern in human creative experience, and identified this as the principle of alternation.

Basic to the principle of alternation Hocking asserted the metaphysical doctrine of the "concrete universal." God and the world are inseparable, he asserted, but they cannot be "best known or won together."[4] He argued that in practical life we find it necessary to make the distinction between technique and spirit. "Spirit" represents the whole in relation to particular experience, whereas "technique" attends to particulars in themselves. Both cannot be given the attention they require at once, so there must be an alternation between attention to the parts and the whole.

This process of alternation between the parts and the whole functions in the pursuit of knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge must be more than an accumulation of facts (i.e., parts).

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 472. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 473. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 474. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

> . . . beside the extending of knowledge, there must be a deepening of knowledge, an attempt to grasp the 'spirit' of things, their principle, formula, essence,--in brief, their one, their whole.[1]

The necessity for this principle in Hocking's judgment arises in large part because of the nature of the human inquirer.

> Herewith we come upon the principle of alternation in its full meaning, which is best seen in the history of the will. In all our practical living we human beings are pursuing some total good under shapes and by means which are inadequate to it, and so partly false to it. We are obliged from time to time to reject what we have done, to withdraw our forward-moving efforts, and revert to the whole: not because of the fact of error (for there are errors which may be remedied on the spot without change of direction), but because of the type of error, --it is an error which involves not only our tools, but our selves, the operators. We begin to get in our own way and so to defeat our own work. We can find no radical remedy except in getting rid of that self; and no radical way of abandoning that self except by reverting to the whole.[2]

The principle of alternation points to functions in that process whereby the individual can pursue knowledge without becoming enmeshed in the structure which this pursuit of knowledge builds up when it is taken in as a part of the self.

The principle of alternation has a further application as an approach to the problem of value: the question of the nature and source of human good. Both the basis for the human appreciation of value and the basis for the problem arising from the limited apprehension and acknowledgement of value is in the distinctive human capacity for "voluntary attention." Voluntary attention is the term Hocking used to designate the good-making activity of practical living. It is a selectivity in attention which is basic to any particular value affirmation. This is the capacity which he saw basic to human freedom since it is exercised as a response in the experience of selection from among a range of possibilities. But it is a freedom exercised at the price of setting up artificial constructions which separate human life from nature. This separation from nature is a loss of consciousness resulting from the abstracting and limiting aspect of constructive human activity.

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[1] Ibid., p. 409. [2] Ibid., pp. 410-11.

> We gain firmness in the saddle of practical self-possession only by condemning to death a certain margin of our consciousness.
>
> This inherent defect in the operation of voluntary attention becomes more pronounced and radical as effort continues; simply because every voluntary effort, assuming as it must that its standards are adequate, that it knows what it wants, strengthens the assumption by acting upon it, and so deepens the breach between the artificial self and the natural self.[1]

This "loss of margin," is a progressive loss of that whole-idea, "whose use . . . gives all objects what value they have."[2]

How is this natural tendency of voluntary attention toward spiritual deprivation (loss of whole-idea) and the loss of values, to be overcome? Hocking said that the beginning of a reversal of this movement in the self is in the emergence of a sense of the aimlessness of activity directed toward objects which are not obviously of value in themselves. In reaction to this valueless activity the self turns to some object "whose value is convincing without any effort, toward enjoyment in some form or other."

> Pleasure, recreation, friendship, the companionship of man and woman, beauty--all these recall the outgoings of ambition and moral effort, and reunite a man with his natural appreciation. Something in common these all have with the quest of the mystic, and with the mystic experience itself. And worship is the whole which includes them all.[3]

Worship is the movement back toward a whole-idea, toward the recovery of values lost in human value-seeking activity. This does not mean that there is a reversal of constructive activity, but it does indicate a compensating movement of the mind. The mind is active in the recovery of values in a conscious ideational process. Hocking asserted that

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[1] Ibid., pp. 413-14. [2] Ibid., pp. 414-15. [3] Ibid., p. 418.

> In fact there can be no such thing as a recovery of value which is essentially physiological or subconscious; the idea must be recovered *as an idea*, that is to say, consciously and intentionally. Worship, *we may say*, *is the self-conscious part of the natural recovery of value*; it is that part, therefore, which assigns all other parts their place and meaning.[1]

Worship involves a commitment or sacrifice of all our partial value achievements.

> This final sacrificial aspect of worship--the negation, or rather subordination, of all partial loves--is the act which alone can make these loves immortal: it is the conscious possessing of their necessary condition.[2]

Through this analysis of the rhythm of life between the polarities of work and worship Hocking offered a re-evaluation of mysticism. He substantiated the mystic's contention that the concern of the mystic is not with the vague, but with the "overt, the definite, the literal in religion."[3] He interpreted the mystic as one who seeks in worship that object which can be an object of "effortless appreciation." The possibility of "effortless appreciation" of the religious object is the sign of its genuineness, objectivity, givenness.

But the principle of alternation indicates that the worshiper cannot achieve the end of worship by an attempt to maintain himself in this relation of effortless appreciation of God. Continued attentiveness results in an "automatism," leading to the degeneration of life to a mechanism aware only of present immediacy.

> Thus each aspect of life apart from its alternate becomes a mechanism. And the whole of human existence falls into two phases, work and worship; the domain of duty and the domain of love, respectively.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 420. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 421. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 422. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 426.

> Any given moment of life must choose between two goods, psychologically incompatible. On the one hand, the peace of the hermit, the silence of the forest, the exaltation of sacrifice, the mightiness of simplification and unity, the joy of self-abandonment, the calm of absolute contemplation, the vision of God. On the one hand, the variety and stress of life, the zest of common ends, the mastery of means, the glory of infinite enterprise, the pride of creativity and self-possession. The modern world as a whole has made its choice. But there is a better choice: Namely, the choice of both. For the life of each is that it may lose itself, from time to time, in the life of the other. And this, which is obvious in things partial, is true--and even chiefly true--in things total.[1]

With this background of Hocking's thinking in mind we may again turn to Wieman's presentation of his notion of creative value. We can now see that when he characterized the process of creativity as a growth of consciousness, he applied the insights of Hocking to the task of responding critically to Perry's interest theory of value. Hocking's perspective can be seen to feinforce Wieman's rejection of Perry's criterion of harmony and to substantiate his own insistence that the growth of value involves a deepening of awareness such that the self becomes aware of a wider context of experience in which particular practical interests are revalued.

Further, we can see a line of thinking from Hocking's "effortless appreciation" through Wieman's "creative interest" and "attentive consciousness" to his notion of "appreciative awareness." Each of these notions is linked to the understanding of value. This succession of thought further indicates that Wieman's "appreciative awareness" has sources other than instrumentalism as an expression of the theme of receptivity to the concrete datum.

Wieman is explicit in his indebtedness to Hocking, but his thought indicates that Hocking does not mediate the full impact of late Absolute Idealism for Wieman. We find that Wieman's appreciative awareness is an attentiveness to happenings with a stronger structural ingredient than evidently envisioned by Hocking.[1] Hocking's identification of the principle of alternation as the functional structure of the creative event has a continuity of emphasis with Royce's specification of interpretation as the functional immediacy of the Absolute. Both Hocking and Royce saw these structures in events as the order by which novelty emerges in the world as an expression of both human creativity and ultimate world creativity. However, the importance which Wieman gave to the theme of conflict in creative happenings suggests a source for his view of creative interest in the Royce-Bergson dialogue.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 427.

Wieman, using the language of Hocking, stated that creative interest is "interest in the elaboration of consciousness by multiplying the integrated elements involved in activity," such that creativity is the growth of awareness of one's relatedness in the world; the deepening of the individual's appreciation of the concrete world in experience.[2]

Wieman elaborated his meaning when he wrote of the role of attentive consciousness in the process of the fulfilment of creative interest. Attentive consciousness itself is not a routine response in experience, but a consciousness that arises from the frustration of a whole range of responses. The response which Wieman saw to issue from this frustration has an aspect of novelty, in that a new range of interests finds satisfaction.

So Wieman concluded that the purpose of creativity is the compounding of consciousness. Further, the compounding of consciousness is found only in a creative conflict of interests, not in their harmonization. For this he found a physiological basis in that "consciousness is not something which enters in to resolve the conflict; it is the conflict of motor attitudes, and it is nothing else."[1] Just as consciousness is the conflict of motor attitudes, attentive consciousness is the creative conflict of interests, the novel combination of motor attitudes, which is "a process of forming a coordinated and specific response." The aim of forming a "coordinated and specific response . . . is not the fulfilment of old interests so much as to use them in the progressive multiplication of the total range of interest comprised by any given consciousness.[2] The moral response to the conflict of competing interests issues in a coordinated response, but not response which is the harmonization or coordination of all the interests in conflict, as Perry had contended.

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[1] Below, ch. V and VI, passim.

[2] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 38.

With Hocking, Wieman saw fundamental human interest to have its object in reality in all its given fullness. This interest in the given in all its multiplicity is the root of creative interest in the growth of consciousness. This fundamental human interest is expressed in the many different types and stages of human activity. For instance, Wieman found creative interest operative in human play:

> The function of play according to our thesis, is to bring to consciousness an ever greater number of the qualities of the objects of our experience, not because of any utility which apprehension of these qualities may serve, but because reality is somehow its self the Beloved of human nature. Merely to experience the objective world in ever greater fullness, whether that objective world be the minds of our fellow men or the facts of impersonal nature is an absorbing interest for man.[3]

The interest in reality was defined by Wieman in Hocking's terms as a drive toward increasing concreteness. Hocking had seen immediate experience to possess potential satisfactions which would be realized in the immediate enjoyment of the meeting between idea and object.[4] But this involved the function of the abstract universal in human practical action, as opposed to the concrete universal of the world-idea.[1] We will find Wieman also considering the world as a concrete whole, but world concreteness is evidently "mediated" to the experiencing individual through the concreteness of the immediately given rather than one's Whole Idea. This contention that immediate concrete particulars are the focus of the interest in reality indicates the impact of Bergson's contention that ultimate reality is in the immediate concrete. But we must see a difference from Bergson's notion of intuitive immediacy in the flux of reality in Wieman's equal attention to the relational character of an individual's consciousness of the concrete. Bergson had seen the notion of relation as a product of the intellect. In contrast, Wieman wrote:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 109. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 107. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 51

[4] Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 130.

> This greater number and diversity of contacts between the organism and its environment is precisely that increase in the qualities of the object as apprehended in consciousness, which it is the endeavor of creative interest to bring about. Greater number of contacts is another way of saying that the idea of reality is more concrete, that the consciousness of the world is more vivid and complex.[2]

Consciousness is most intense with the functioning of creative interest, and is less vivid under conditions dominated by subordinate interests. On this point Wieman followed Bergson's lead, seeing consciousness as dependent on a more fundamental activity. Adaptive interest is expressed, according to Wieman, by an automatic tendency in activities, and is characterized by a minimal consciousness. "As long as response continues to be purely adaptive, consciousness remains at the minimum." Although feeling predominates, following Hocking's analysis, idea is present if any consciousness emerges. Wieman explained that adaptive response "is predominantly feeling rather than idea.[3] This is the primordial level of consciousness from which all higher levels develop. Development proceeds with the introduction of concern regarding future consequences, and thus a sense of time. The result of this expansion of interest is the instrumental consciousness. In the instrumental consciousness "future time is represented to consciousness as a successive series of distinct and concatenated activities. Time appears as a succession of situations causally related.[1] This characterization of the instrumental consciousness reflects Bergson's association of intellect and mechanism. For both Bergson and Wieman an instrumental consciousness is not a growing consciousness.

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 418-19. [2] Wieman, _ibid._, p. 67. [3] _Ibid._, p. 68.

Reflecting Bergson's judgment that mechanism is a degenerative response to the life process, Wieman contended that no evidence can be found for an automatic growth of human value. The subordination of life to any mechanism tends to diminish consciousness, not to increase it. Mechanisms of behavior may satisfy basic needs through more or less automatic activities, and thus release the mind for attention to wider areas of experience. But for Wieman, any advance in the good which can take place within evolutionary processes can only be found in the drive in human life toward the amplification of consciousness of the world. Amplification of consciousness is the fundamental interest seeking fulfilment in human life. Growth of consciousness does not come from causal determination of the future, but in the recognition of the future as a growth from the present. Accordingly, the creative consciousness treats "the present . . . not . . . as the cause of the future but as the germ of the future."[2]

Wieman's notion of creative consciousness reflects Bergson's notion of the "supra-consciousness."[1] Bergson saw life as the expression of a vital impetus which functions in events in the production of multiplicities and unities, "in the double function of individuality and association." This ontological supra-consciousness Bergson defined further as "a need of creation," which we might venture to translate as a primordial creative interest in events.[2] The empirical consciousness Bergson then found to correspond to, if not to be equivalent to the functioning of this need in life.

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[1] Ibid., p. 69. [2] Ibid.

> For consciousness corresponds exactly to the living being's power of choice; it is coextensive with the fringe of possible action that surrounds the real action: consciousness is synonymous with invention and with freedom."[3]

Wieman's creative interest, which we will find to be an ultimate world function identifiable in events, performs the function of Bergson's vital impulse or super-consciousness. "Creative interest" and the "vital impulse" are both ultimate functions and found functional as empirical consciousness in the matter of choice from among alternatives.

Instrumental and creative consciousness also contrast in their perspective on interest fulfilment or satisfaction. In the instrumental consciousness space and time have a segmented character. This is the consequence of the division which the instrumental consciousness makes between the present unsatisfying situation and some future satisfying situation, for which the present may be instrumental.[4] "The creative mind, in contrast with the instrumental enjoys the present process for its own sake."[5] One consequence for Wieman was that "for the creative mind, the future is the continuation of the present, more fully evolved perhaps, but not essentially altered."[6]

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[1] Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 284.

[2] Ibid., p. 285.

[3] Ibid., p. 287.

[4] Wieman, ibid., p. 69.

[5] Ibid., p. 70.

[6] Ibid., p. 90.

He saw this view to be a consequence of the finding of satisfaction in the present which will not impel one to envisage a change for the sake of satisfaction.

If we take his assertion that the future can only be seen as a "fuller measure of the present" at face value, we are left with an implicit contradiction of his contention that creative interest is an enlargement of consciousness. Wieman's statement suggests that the future holds on to the present achievement in its continuity with the present. However, Wieman also said that "the future [is] an interpretative fulfilment of the present."[1] The future is not only continuous with the present, but by virtue of its continuity, the passage of time is a "growth," not an "accretion."[2] Consequently, the satisfaction which creative interest finds in the present, unlike instrumental interest, "comprehends a vast futurity," rather than a determinate future.

Behind Wieman's view of time we find Bergson's notion of time as duration. Time as a continuity, a growth, is contrasted by Wieman to "accretion" as Bergson contrasts intuition and intellect. But Wieman does not assent to Bergson's rejection of structure in the creative consciousness. Wieman's notion of "interpretative fulfilment," with its theme of growing relationships, points to a structural aspect of creativity recalling Royce's contention that creative activity involves an interpretative structure of relations. This view of creativity as a type of structure of activity was given expression in Hocking's language when Wieman wrote that

> in creative behavior . . . feeling continuously tends to fund itself in idea, and the idea tends to grow more rich in connotation and more comprehensive in denotation. Also, as old feeling tends to become

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 71. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 72. Also see above, p. 140.

> cognitive, new feeling is progressively generated by reason of the greater number and diversity of response to environment involved in the growing complexity of the ideas.[1]

We noted some ambiguity in Wieman's conception of time which again appears in his statement that for the creative consciousness "the future is the continuation of the present, more fully evolved perhaps, but not essentially altered."[2] This is one way of saying with Bergson that the past persists in the present for the creative consciousness. The creative consciousness brings together the present and any possible future in a community of experience. In this sense the future is a growth from the present field of consciousness. The key to Wieman's notion of creativity is growth rather than sheer novelty, the future being "the fuller growth of this community or mutuality."[3] Novelty is real, but the novelty of creativity is relevant to a past and the structuring activity of the present. In this view of creativity as a growth of a structure of relations Wieman stands definitely with Royce and Hocking as against the anti-structural intuitionism of Bergson.

The philosophical argument which Wieman presented in "The Organization of Interests" is based on his criticism of harmony or coordination as a criterion of the highest good, or "the mediator of maximum satisfaction."[4] Wieman stated, in agreement with Perry, that "fulfilment of isolated interest is good; but only the fulfilment of an organization of interests is morally good."[5] He followed Perry's definition of morality as "that procedure in which several interests, whether they involve one or more physical organisms, are so adjusted as to function as one interest."[6] Wieman accepted this definition with the reservation that the adjustment or organization of interests to function as one need not necessarily mean a harmonization of interests, "it may be a certain status of sustained antagonism or balanced interplay of motor attitudes.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 74. Note Hocking's theme of the interplay of feeling and idea.

[2] Ibid., p. 90. [3] Ibid., p. 70. [4] Ibid., p. 80.

[5] Perry, The Moral Economy, p. 12. [6] Ibid., p. 14.

Accordingly, creative interest finds satisfaction, its realization of value, in a problem situation. The satisfaction of creative interest does not occur unless the occasion is a conflict situation, and creative consciousness is present. Only in creative consciousness is found the enjoyment of the immediate situation for its own sake.[2] Since this enjoyment is a fulfilment of the fundamental life interest, the conditions of creative interest are the conditions for the fundamental fulfilment of human life. Accordingly "the supreme moral achievement would be the establishment of such a state of mind, since . . . it is this creative mood which realizes the greatest wealth of good."[3] This attention on Wieman's part to the structural conditions of creative good is a characteristic we find persisting throughout his later work. This characteristic, we are contending, is rooted in his structural conception of the ultimate good. The value experience, Wieman contended, arises in the experience of the given in its fullness. Wieman asserted that "it is possible to respond to an object as the concretion of all its qualities, i.e. as an individual, only when all its qualities stimulate the subject simultaneously."[4] To Wieman, such a response involves a definite type of structure. Such a response to an object in its undiscriminated givenness cannot be harmonistic; instead, in this response many mutually arresting qualities are "held in a state of static equilibrium."[1] The coordinating response, on the other hand, can value only those selected qualities of an object which can be harmonized.[2]

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[1] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 80.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

But the moral supremacy of creative consciousness over the instrumental consciousness does not deny that the latter can contribute to the moral good. Instrumental consciousness functions to organize subordinated interests so that they can function instrumentally as one interest within a larger context of interests. Human life organizes masses of detailed activities into a harmony, so that the individual may more effectively engage in wider conflicts "which such coordination makes possible and fruitful of keener consciousness."[3] So, interest in harmony does not exclude interest in conflict. "Just so long as creative interest is operative, just so long as the solution of new problems gives zest and joy," Wieman wrote, processes of coordination and conflict go on side by side.[4] This is illustrated both in any process involving continuous reorganization in the conduct of business and in philosophical speculation.[5]

Wieman indicated a metaphysical bias for a view of reality as structured process when he stated that "with the complete absence of [coordination] there would be nothing but chaos, a confused jumble."[6] Coordination of interests he saw to be a necessary instrumental function enabling significant conflict to take place. The coordination of activities by each member of a conflict situation takes on an added instrumental value "in as much as it is integrated in the higher value of conflict."[1] The coordination of each individual actually makes it possible for each to engage in the conflict, freeing one's consciousness from domination by a conflict at a lower or less inclusive level of interests. Coordinating interest functions to provide unities among activities within a limited scope and thus provides a unity of interest to engage in a larger field of conflicting interests in which creative interest is functional.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 97. [3] Ibid., p. 99. [4] Ibid.

[5] Note that in the "Organization of Interests" we do not have the strong anti-speculative bias in Wieman's later work. Speculative work in philosophy is accepted as a legitimate imaginative enterprise, if recognized to be limited to this function.

[6] Ibid., p. 107.

Wieman does not use the term transcendence in this discussion, but we find a contrast in functions between these two interests which suggests a meaning similar to that which we found in Royce's notion of transcendence.[2] "Transcendence" would accordingly apply to the relation between the functions of the instrumental and creative organizations of interests, such that creative interest could be said to "transcend" coordinating interest. Creative interest would be functionally transcendent in creatively relating coordinating interests as instruments of creative interest. Values which are instrumentally organized become through creative interest ingredient to intrinsic value.

Wieman found the organizing principles of coordination and conflict expressed in two types of morality: the conservative and the creative. The aim of the coordinating, conservative morality is the conservation of value by the elimination of conflict. Creative morality seeks an equilibrium and mutual understanding between conflicting factors.[3]

> Creativity is the moral criterion which we would apply to conduct. That way of life is best which is most fruitful of more life. The greater the progeny of interests, the better the conduct. Since conflict in many circumstances is more fertile than harmony, we accord it greater moral value under such conditions.[4]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 101. [2] Above, p. 86.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 105. [4] _Ibid._, p. 104.

Wieman found creative consciousness to be equivalent to attentive consciousness. In both is involved attentiveness to the full uniqueness of the given. That which is given in attention consciousness is the highest good for human life, in that through attentive consciousness, one becomes aware of the full individuality of a presented object or individual.[1] From J. A. Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, Wieman found in the notion of contemplation an illustration of the attentive consciousness. When the various qualities of an object are discriminated, the object becomes instrumental, in that this discrimination is fundamentally made for the use of the object. But "when we regard a thing as the concretion of all (or most) of its qualities it becomes something 'to be merely gazed at for the sake of its own individuality.'" Contemplation is the open attention to the object in its full immediate individuality.[2] Openness to the full individuality of the given involves a unique interplay of antagonistic impulses in each occasion of attentive awareness, such that new ideas and feelings arise. In contrast, Wieman wrote,

> Coordinated response brings forth nothing new. It is the habitual attitude maintained in a given set of circumstances. Contemplation, although immediate action is arrested, generates the accumulation of neural discharge whereby the mind is stimulated to form new combinations of motor units which are ideally presented in consciousness in the form of imagery and emotion. These are actually new creations and may later, in whole or part, be put into the form of overt action.[3]

Novel response arises from the awareness of the given, and may issue in some action which will introduce a novel factor into events. In the appreciation of the arts Wieman saw an illustration of attentive consciousness in which such a mass of qualities is given that a clearly patterned organization of the presented qualities and evoked meanings is not possible.

> The sense of mystery which one experiences in the presence of a work of art is not due to the absense of meaning, but to the fulness of

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[1] Ibid., p. 110. [2] Ibid., p. 116. [3] Ibid., pp. 117-18.

> meaning, which is so abundant and concrete that it cannot be presented in consciousness as a single motor attitude or idea.[1]

Attentive consciousness thus fulfils creative interest in the growth of the concrete idea of reality.[2] Reacting to only discriminated qualities in the given is not response to reality. Such selectivity, for the sake of harmonization, directs interests to a set of abstractions, not to reality. "But this can never completely satisfy human nature. There is a zest in the concrete fulness of reality which alone can lift life to the fulness of value."[3]

Wieman applied his value conception to the area of social value, writing that "social values can only be those human interests which are satisfied by society."[4] Using his tripartite typology, Wieman distinguished three types of social interest: adaptive interest, instrument interest, and the interest of sociability, which is creative interest operative in social relationships. To these three types of social interest Wieman correlated three types of social theory: organic social theory, as the Social Statics of Herbert Spencer; instrumental social theory, as the theories of the social contract; and ideological theory, of which C. H. Cooley offered an example, and for which Wieman found roots in Hegel.[5]

According to Wieman's analysis, organic social theory emphasizes the adjustment of the individual to automatic processes and in the final analysis is repressive of individual freedom. The implicit point Wieman made against Spencerianism is that the freedom for which the Social Darwinists contended was actually only a freedom to submit to the evolutionary process. For Wieman, organic theory involves a devaluing of the individual, since adaptive social interest leaves consciousness a purely secondary and degenerating feature of life. With the degeneration of consciousness, individuality is lost.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 120.
[2] _Ibid._, p. 121.
[3] _Ibid._, p. 127.
[4] _Ibid._, p. 157.
[5] _Ibid._, pp. 161-63.

Wieman criticized instrumental social theory for its subordination of all individual and social functions to an overall social ideal. He saw this illustrated in any interpretation of art as an expression subordinate to social aim. Wieman responded to this position with the suggestion that society might better be subordinated to art.[1] He also saw in the instrumentally organized society a tendency to degenerate to the level of automatic activity "grinding out its course without thought or sentiment."[2] Further, Wieman contended that instrumental social order tends to fragment the individual among the various institutions in which he participates.[3] The weakness of such social organization is that it provides no situation which involves an interaction of the individual as a whole.[4] Therefore, Wieman found harmony to be an inadequate criterion of social value. Social value should be self-proliferating, and fulfil the highest interest of human individuality as well as community. The interest which seeks more than coordinated social relationships, asserted Wieman, is the interest in sociability, which demands more than cooperation. Social interest should answer the demand for interpersonal communion. "We demand the right and the opportunity to understand, and to be understood," wrote Wieman, "in all the concrete individuality of our own selfhood."[5]

Interpersonal relationships can only rise above the level of the mechanical to that of sympathy and mutual understanding as uncoordination or conflict between individuals takes place.[6] In creative conflict there is a "reciprocal creation of purpose" such that one individual becomes creative of the purpose in another.[1] This process of conflict "is nothing more or less than that give and take by which purposes modify one another and minds grow in consciousness of one another."[2] "This process of mutual interpretation (imaginative consciousness) and reciprocal creation constitutes sociability."[3] Self-consciousness and consciousness of the other are both dependent for their vividness upon "this interaction [which] is a process of mutual creativity of consciousness."[4] Creative conflict is the functional source of community: this community being mutually in two modes, a "mutually appreciative community," and a "mutually creative community."[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 168. [2] Ibid., p. 134. [3] Ibid., p. 135.

[4] Ibid., p. 136. [5] Ibid., pp. 156-57. [6] Ibid., p. 136.

Wieman's application of his typology of interests to social relationships indicates with increasing clarity the resources which he brought to play in this analysis. As we have pointed out, the typology itself is Bergson's, but applied as a typology of functional interests. The analysis of adaptive and instrumental interests reflects Bergson's analysis of life activities into the instinctive and the intellectual. Both tend toward automatic behavior; adaptive relationships being based in automatic response to an immediate situation; and instrumental relationships being based in activities ordered according to an imposed social aim or pattern. However, Wieman's third category of "sociability" is similar to Bergson's notion of creativity with the qualification that Wieman also envisaged an "interpenetration of selves," although without using this terminology. Wieman's language again is suggestive of Royce's view that community is created by a process of interpretation. For Bergson, community ultimately is one's participation in novelty-creating duration. For Royce and Wieman the community is a creation which is emergent from the function of a structure of relations in activities. Wieman emphasized the structural aspect of community creation in his specification of the empirical functioning of creative interest in sociability. However, we must note that in Wieman's notion of sociability the pattern of Hocking's principle of alternation appears. Sociability for Wieman is a process of alternation between mutual interpretation and mutual creativity. This process constitutes community. Community accordingly is not a finished achievement but a process with a particular type of structure in which creative interest is functional. Creativity is a complex function as envisaged here by Wieman including subfunctions of conflict, appreciation, interpretation, and purpose formation. This complex functioning in events is the community of mutual interpretation and creation.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 148.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 149.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 148.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 155.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 159.

In defending his social analysis, Wieman found C. H. Cooley's distinction between primary and secondary social groups to be valuable. Cooley built upon the pragmatist distinction between immediacy and conception, characterizing the primary group as dominated by immediately felt relationships and the secondary group as dominated by formal organization. Wieman understood his levels of adaptation and instrumentality to correspond to these two levels of the pragmatist's analysis. Wieman agreed with Cooley that in the primary group the imaginative reproduction of one another's experience occurs and that it is in a group where mutual appreciation takes place that the highest social good is found. Wieman assented to Cooley's verdict that social formalism is "psychically cheap . . . in that it substitutes the outer for the inner as more tangible."[1]

However, Wieman could not concur with Cooley's assertion that there is a law of social evolution "by which society tends to realize these delightful relations." Such a view for Wieman tended toward the automatic-organic conception of social process with its denial of real human freedom. Wieman argued that the ideological theory of society with its aim toward creative mutuality presupposes that real individual freedom is required for the realization of social good. He could envision no automatic or coordinated organization of society to lead to "the development of ideas, increase in mutual understanding or community, and the freedom of each individual to develop his idea of purpose to the utmost concrete fulness."[1] He contended that there is nothing in instrumental interest which drives toward fulfilment in terms of creative interest. If instrumental order is operative in occasions of fulfilment of creative social interest, he found it in organizing of instrumental orders so that the intrinsic values of immediate experience in the growth of consciousness are realized.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

However, when Wieman looked at the realities of society, with the practical needs for instrumental organization, and the dominance of formalized relationships, he was led

> to doubt the reality of a free society [in which mutual creativity can be fully operative], or even its possibility. First because of those restraints imposed upon the individual which he is incapable of integrating with any purpose; second because of that mass of suggestion which tends to destroy all purpose whatsoever.[2]

This scepticism about the prospect of realizing the freedom of mutual creativity in a society ruled by law is reminiscent of Royce's attention to the problem of freedom in human society. According to Royce, society seeks to balance individual interests by the rule of law, and thereby leads to the revolt of the human spirit. The freedom which the individual seeks, then, can only be realized within a structure of relationships which gives him the freedom he cannot gain for himself, and is thereby the object of absolute loyalty.

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 162-63. [2] _Ibid._, pp. 194-95.

Similarly, Wieman's analysis found the principles of sociability and instrumental efficiency to be mutually frustrating.

> This then is the reason why the free society is impossible so far as any known principles of organization apply. These two principles cannot be reconciled, yet they are both indispensable to social organization. . . . We must look beyond society for that organization of interests which will yield the largest measure of good."[1]

Wieman saw in religion the function of looking beyond society for the creative organization of human interests. With the organization "which will yield the largest measure of good" found to be other than human social instrumentalities, Wieman ventured to say that religion thereby "has a cosmic reference." By this he meant that "religion represents the utmost reach of human interest far surpassing its application to human society.[2]

For Wieman the term "sociability" designated creativity as a function in the interrelationships between individuals. Religion having a cosmic reference, creative religion Wieman conceived as the function of creativity in the relationships between the individual and the universe. Creative religion is one of several types of religion. Religion in general, Wieman defined as "a certain mode of life which is determined by the manner in which the individual apprehends his total environment."[3] An individual's apprehension of his relationship to the universe is not necessarily to be identified with his stated beliefs. For instance, Wieman pointed out it may be a man's bank account and not his affirmations about Christ or Buddha which constitutes his religion. The object of a man's religious faith, Wieman held, is whatever is the ultimate determinant of his life.[4] "Hence the ultimate subject of my religion is self, while the ultimate object is that upon which I believe all (or most) of my interests to be dependent."[1] Religion so conceived does not have to do with man's fragmented relations, as do social institutions. It is the whole man which is the religious subject.

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[1] Ibid., p. 206.

[2] Ibid., p. 207.

[3] Ibid., p. 211.

[4] Ibid., p. 212.

Wieman recognized that his definition of religion ruled out many nominally "religious" assertions as not actually religious. Wieman contended this to be the case whenever an individual's belief and action are unrelated. Accordingly, a man who honestly asserts that his bankroll is his ultimate object of total interest is religious although this is an impoverished religion. On the other hand, the man who confesses faith in Christ but puts his faith in his bank balance is not religious.

"Faith and practice, idea and action, purpose and procedure," are for Wieman "inseparable in religion."[2] The pairing of idea and action is central to Wieman's understanding of the nature of religious belief. In religious belief there is first expressed an aspiration, a "belief in a good which lies beyond the range of given experience."[3] Secondly, he held that religious belief involves belief in the existence of some fact external to the individual self upon which this greater good is dependent.

> It is the belief that this greater good can be attained provided a certain relation is established between self and that external fact. The greater good may be precisely this relation itself and nothing else.[4]

In actuality, there are many objects of religious belief for different men, even for those who do not profess to be religious. If a man believes and acts on the belief that some object is the source of fulfilment of all his interests, this is his religious object, no matter how idolatrous. Religious belief, Wieman concluded, is the organizing principle in any particular religion.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 215. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

God, or the religious object, Wieman suggested, may be conceived as an instrumental value or as intrinsic value. The religious object as intrinsic value would satisfy interest in God for God's own sake.[1] Wieman distinguished three interests which can be satisfied in God. Intrinsic value is in "God" as the satisfaction of cognitive interest, aesthetic interest (harmony), and social interest. He asserted that these three aspects of immediate value found in religion cannot in practice be separated one from the other without rendering the total interest non-religious. We can see that religious interest is a definite structure of interests responsive to the structure of the religious object.

The object which Wieman found to satisfy this religious interest is an individual. "By that we mean that it is the fusion of all the qualities which any given human being may experience in it."[2] Consequently, there is a relativism in individual apprehension of the religious object; a uniqueness of apprehension in each concrete situation. This is rooted in a relativism of individual interests pressing for fulfilment and a uniqueness of relationship between each individual and the ultimate relatum, the universe.

> Hence the object as a concrete individual is somewhat different for every different subject. All this applies to the religious object which is the universe as a concrete individual. The universe in this sense is never exactly the same for any two persons and is always changing for the same person.[3]

Here, in a striking way, we see the confluence of Absolute Idealist and Bergsonian streams of thought in Wieman's work. Wieman's notion of world individuality is a response to Hocking's concrete universal. It is for Wieman the ultimate concreteness and an individual or unity in its own right. However, it is an individual relative to the experience of each particular human individual. This assertion of relativity of the ultimate concrete individual is a statement of Bergson's theme of ultimacy in immediacy and an ultimacy that is in no wise just a function of some more ultimate unity and concreteness behind or above the empirical.

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[1] Ibid., p. 220. [2] Ibid., p. 229.

[3] Ibid., p. 222. Cf. Royce's Absolute as the "Individual of Individuals." Above, p. 57.

This recognition of the relativity, or uniqueness of each individual's situation, was for Wieman a fundamental difference between interest in apprehension of the religious object and scientific interest in the world. Science and religion he understood to be developments of two tendencies natural to the human mind. Science he understood to seek objects as objects of knowledge for all minds, involving a procedure wherein "it is necessary to abstract certain elements from the Chameleon process of experience and establish these elements in fixed relations to each other and hold them fast by means of unchanging symbols."[1] With scientific interest seeking satisfaction in the development of "unchanging symbols" or concepts, "the idea of the universe developed by science is an abstract idea." The scientific idea of the universe "stands cold and indifferent to the needs and purposes of the (individual) human being."[2]

In contrast to the scientific idea, "the idea of the universe developed in religion is a concrete idea. It is the universe as merged and integrated with the subject's unique and concrete totality of experience.[3] But science of some sort is basic to the concrete idea of the universe as a religious object. Wieman suggested that both primitive and advanced forms of science provide a basis for the concrete idea by bringing the universe before the mind as an Other independent of the self, but as that upon which the self is dependent. However, in seeking to understand relationships abstractly, Wieman argued, scientific interest develops a mechanistic view of the world as objectively indifferent to the individual. This view finally reduces "the human subject to a cog in the vast mechanism of the universe."[1]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 224. [2] _Ibid._ [3] _Ibid._, p. 225.

This conception of the scientific world view reflects Bergson's view of science as the product of the intellect: a view of the world which accounts for all data according to the patterns of matter. The view of religion as concerned with the concrete reflects Bergson's notion of the function of philosophy, but structured by contributions from Hocking. In contrast to the use of abstract ideas by the sciences, religion develops the concrete idea or the awareness of the concrete reality of the world in which the individual is living.

This contrast between the world of science and the world of religious faith also finds roots in Royce's contrast between the world of appreciation and the world of description, the world of the determinate and exact in contrast to the world of feeling and will. Further, Wieman saw these worlds as mutually interdependent, as did Royce. Science, in Wieman's view, yields the sense of the Other to religious interest, and religion functions for the integration of data with individual human purposes. In this religion functions as a scientific and cultural stimulus. Science reinterprets interests in the light of data, and religion reinterprets data by means of its interests.[2]

> Such a process of continuous reinterpretation of purpose, and ever more ample interpretation because of the integration of new data, is what we have called creativity. Creative interest is interest not

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

> in the fulfilment of any specific purpose, but interest in the progressive reinterpretation and amplification of purpose by means of the data of experience. When the totality of experience is subordinated to this function of progressive interpretation, creative interest becomes creative religion.[1]

> Hence the concrete idea is purpose and will as much as it is knowledge. It embodies all the emotion and all the action as much as all the intellect of the person concerned. It is, moreover, his unique idea of the universe.[2]

Wieman defended the uniqueness of religious interest and its object against identification with art, morality, and society. Whereas the art object is an object complete in itself, "a little ideal universe of its own, the religious object is the whole of reality."[3] Moral economy, or the harmonization and conservation of all values has no interpretive function, and thus effects no unification of the universe into an object. Creative morality finds "maximum satisfaction in the continuous process of progressively creating a total purpose."[4] Creative morality needs creative religion to be fully operative, to define the ultimate terminus of its creative response for feeling, idea and action. Also, the mutual creativity of sociability cannot be equated with religion since sociability is a relationship between individuals which excludes nature from this relationship. Wieman found in Hocking the suggestion that religion takes in sociability and "our total experience of nature."[5] Wieman conceived nature to be the total context or medium in which sociability takes place.

> No doubt a great deal of nature is nothing more or less than community with other human persons. Nature in the form of the human body, in the form of all the common sights and sounds etc., which we share with others, is precisely that community of mind of which we have been speaking. Nature in these forms, is the medium in which we discern, understand and interpret one another. Without this medium of nature, we would be absolutely ignorant of one another's existence, supposing

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 228. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 229. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 234. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

> consciousness were possible in any sense. Sociability includes nature and is impossible without nature. But it does not include our whole experience of nature by any means.[1]

In writing of nature as a "community of mind" and as the condition for any sort of human experience, Wieman seems to mean the general structure of order in events such that we are given experience in and of a world. With Bergson, nature is reality, the creative movement of events.[2] But Wieman added to this the notion of nature, suggested in the forms of nature he found required for sociability, as possessing definite concrete structure in its very creativity.

Another point in continuity with Bergson is that for Weiman religion does not mean a retreat from the concreteness of nature, to get behind or above the vagaries of nature. Religion is the recognition of the most inclusive interrelationship in nature.

> Religion, as over against sociability, not only brings our experience of other persons into the process of creating a will, but it also takes in our total experience of nature. It leaves no skeleton in the closet of the universe. It bids us face everything and use everything as data for the construction of this purpose.[3]

Participation in the construction of this purpose yields ultimate fulfilment.

> When the cosmic purpose is my purpose, nay more, when I participate in the progressive creation of that purpose, and participate with such concentration that it absorbs every impulse and tendency of my nature, then I am thoroughly happy. Then I experience continuous and complete satisfaction. This is that organization of interests for which we have been seeking throughout this investigation."[4]

This ultimate satisfaction is both fulfilment for the individual and for the ultimate cosmic drive, or creative interest as the ultimate world impetus. For the individual this satisfaction is participation in the ultimate purpose forming function. In this ultimate participation Wieman again used the imagery of Absolute Idealism to portray the ultimate function as that of creating a will which takes in the total experience of nature. Wieman's rootage in idealism is further indicated in the notion of an ultimate merging of individual and cosmic purposes. However, we should not be misled into reading Wieman as proposing a concrete monism of Royce's type. Wieman envisages a real world unity, but it is a historical unity, a view of the world suggestive of the Roycean world of interpretation without the supratemporal function of the Absolute which we found completing Royce's metaphysical superstructure.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 236. Cf. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 218.

[2] Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 111.

[3] Wieman, *ibid.*, p. 237. [4] *Ibid.*

Creative religion yields for Wieman the ultimate fulfilment of human life in that it is participation in the unfathomed depths of the natural process through mutual creativity with the world process. The most intimate experience of this creative activity Wieman found in worship, when the individual seeks to entertain the totality of his experience.

> This upsurging of a great mass of antagonist responses means that no single clear-cut idea and no definite specific notion can take place. But there is an emotional tension and a more or less vivid play of the imagination, out of which new projects, new combinations of idea and action may arise, undreamed of before.[2]

Wieman held that "the teleology of all creative processes is the development of consciousness." This development of consciousness in human experience means that more than the accumulation of experience is taking place; there is a process going on in and with that body of experience which yields a unity of experience. This is not something that the mind brings to experience, but is produced by a process in which the mind participates. Participation in this process is the enjoyment of the highest good.

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[1] Above, p. 93.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

Although Wieman shows an indebtedness to Absolute Idealism, he explicitly rejected two versions of philosophical absolutism as inadequate interpretations of the religious object and human relations to that object. One unacceptable type is that in which God is presented as an "all-engulfing Absolute." This view amounts to the assertion that "Everything is God and God is everything."[1] Wieman held this notion of God as a collective totality to be religiously useless since in effect it offers no distinction between the universe and God. The second view he rejected is that which postulates the universe as a coordinated or harmonized whole. The problem he found with this view is that the world of individual experience loses its reality. Again Wieman brought his criticism of Perry's notion of the highest good to bear, arguing that this world conception reduces the world to mechanism and makes unaccountable the creative consciousness. In this criticism, Wieman was in accord with Bergson's suggestion that the notion of the Absolute as a "self-sufficient reality" does not need to be conceived according to logical or mathematical forms of thought. It is such patterns of thought, according to Bergson, which gave the Absolute its static non-temporal meaning, wherein "everything appears given once for all, in eternity."[2] In idealism Bergson saw that "duration and becoming are supposed to be only the degradation" of "forms in the eternal."[3] Against this view Bergson held that the Absolute is duration itself, the self-sufficiently real.

This sets up the problem of how to conceive adequately religion and the religious object. The world as we experience it must be accepted for what it is, that is, the experiences of the individual cannot be deprived of its integrity and reality. The requirement of realism stands along with the need to reconcile the reality of individuality with the reality of the universe as an individual unity.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 243-44.

[2] Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 324. [3] Ibid., p. 346.

Wieman's developing naturalism held that instead of understanding God as an encompassing unity of nature, God is found operative within nature. As such, God is "the individuality and teleology of the universe."[1] God as the "individuality" of the universe is that ultimate object upon which all of one's interests are dependent.[2] God as the "teleology" of the universe is a unity of character in the universe, which is functional in the creation of a purpose which in some way is inclusive of and responsive to all other purposes in the world. God's purpose, Wieman wrote, is "progressively created by the changing purposes of men."[3] All interests in the universe are ultimately incorporated into the self-hood of God. An individual interest "may not be concordant with His will . . . But it is that in relation to which his will is created; it is that which shapes his individuality; it is that which constitutes his self-consciousness."[4] God's purpose is a creation with an integrity which stands apart from human purposes, but a purpose to which human lives may respond. In this we have the ultimate application of Wieman's notion of mutual creativity. God is a reality which functions to relate all other individuals in the world. God is the function of mutual creativity of will in conflict. This function is found wherever there is some mutual interpretation of purpose and creation of community. A second function of God relates those individuals who do not recognize God's purpose within the world. In relation to these individuals, God "preserves His individuality through the principle of suffering or atonement."[5] In suffering, an underlying unity is expressed in the face of the disruption in the relations of the individual in the world, i.e., in the face of man's rejection of God. By suffering God maintains the possibility of future repentance for the individual and the possibility of restoration of the relationship of mutual creativity.[1] This function of suffering atonement recalls the function of atonement in Royce's notion of the Beloved Community.

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[1] Wieman, "The Organization of Interests," p. 239.

[2] Ibid., p. 212. [3] Ibid., p. 246. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 250.

These two principles answer the question for Wieman of how both the individual and the ultimate may be in relationship yet retain their individuality. However, it is the process of mutual creativity which functions for ultimate fulfilment for the universe and for the human individual. This mutual creativity which constitutes creative religion is that ultimate organization of interests which answers the quest of Wieman's inquiry for that organization of interests which yields the largest measure of satisfaction.

Religious faith, wrote Wieman, is "the actual and continuous reaction of the believer to what he thinks is the meaning of the universe."[2] Through this faith there is effected a "transmutation of values." Faith is that mode of participation in the universe wherein this transmuting function becomes operative in the life of the individual. The nature of this transmutation is indicated when Wieman wrote that the experience enjoyed by the individual is not to be considered simply as personal experience. There is a superpersonal response to our experience which is recognized in worship. "That state of mind called worship," Wieman wrote,

> consists in apprehending the totality of one's own experience as being the very life of God with whom one comes into immediate contact and discerns as a living Presence. Every interest which one has ever experienced, either as that of 'self' or as that which one has discerned in some other self, is now apprehended as being somehow also the experience of God.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 248-50. [2] Ibid., p. 240. [3] Ibid., p. 242.

One discerns in experience a happening which proves to be an experiential response by another within one's ultimate relationship to the universe. In this experience of a creativity not one's own, one recognizes the activity of God. The process designated is the coming into being of a novel character in the world as the growing concreteness of the world. The divine is in events and knowable to varying degrees in human experience, especially in human value experience. Wieman saw the individuality or personal character of God as a reality which is socially related, whereby the focal interest of the divine purpose grows in response to the multitude of individual interests.

Consequently religious faith involves more than an individual purpose or orientation.

> The individual cannot realize fulfilment of purpose by any independent efforts of his own, but only by casting himself upon this relation between self and God which we have called that of mutual creativity.[1]

The persistance of the image of the Absolute in Wieman's reconstructive effort is most apparent in his assertion that fulfilment is found in "casting himself upon this relation between self and God which we have called that of mutual creativity."[2] This is similar to the relationship suggested by Royce as that between the individual and the ultimate world unity. In the Problem of Christianity the individual relationship to the ultimate world interpretation was through a mediating historical process of interpretation, which was a part of the life of the Absolute. Although, for Wieman the supra-historical character of the world ultimate is denied, God is an actual unity of world experience achieved as an interpretation of the experience of this multiplicity of individuals. God is accordingly the life of the world as a universe, or in Wieman's words, as an individual.

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[1] *Ibid.* [2] *Ibid.*

Wieman distinguished God the world individuality from the process by which concrete individuality emerges. If we pressed this view to its metaphysical conclusion, we would have to say that God is not the ultimate, but is himself a creation of the process of mutual creativity which is a structure of relations in any activity which fulfils creative interest. In this structure of relations we find the world ultimate, rather than in the notion which Wieman here formally identified as God. This structure of relations is the ultimate function in events for the creation of human individuality, social community and divine purpose, and is also a function which in itself is the fulfilment of human life.

In the event of mutual creativity we find a three-fold structure which recalls Royce's relation of interpretation. For Wieman creativity involves the recognition of the past, the interpretation of the other to one's own past, and the incorporation of this past of the self and the interpretation of the other for a creative act for the future. Aside from the notion of interpretation, the similarity of this structure of creativity in events to the structure of Royce's notion of interpretation may not be an inheritance in detail from Royce, but it further substantiates Wieman's own judgment that Royce's late work and his own work shared the common direction of movement toward a philosophy of interpersonal relations. We find another indication of a continuity with the religious feeling of Royce in Wieman's discernment of an ultimate fulfilment of life that does not wait on the passage of time.

> If our satisfaction lingers across the slow moving centuries, then it is a case of hope deferred of the most excruciating sort. Our satisfaction must be found in the present if it is truly found at all. It must be realized in this creative interaction of wills which is even now our lot if we accept it according to the religion we are considering.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

Creative interaction as the continual creation of community and history is a present fulfilment yielded to participants in this activity. The highest good is given by creative interaction working to create divine community, the ultimate cosmic community.

> God's triumph, as we have described it, is not a future event. It is the continuous present process. It is the progressive creation of cosmic history through the mutual determination of wills. When I participate in this community I create and I triumph, in my small way, even as God.[1]

Accordingly, man finds fulfilment in opening his consciousness to an awareness of the response of God to his interest and thus to the event in which the individual contributes to the growth of a divine interest. This is the creation of value that enriches and transforms the particular goods in human life.

In this pattern of ultimate notions we can see a frame of thought receptive to certain definite lines of development. We see in the notion of creativity as the ultimate the basis for a view of the world as constituted by emergent structures. In such a view, events are recognized as the fundamental realities, and the question of value is a matter of relations and structures of relations in events. Further, one can see the ultimate function in events in mutual creativity rather than the world individuality. Consequently, mutual creativity is made ready for identification as the religious object, or God. A third point of importance in this early work for Wieman's later movement of thought is the notion that mutual creativity is a functional structure of relations. Implicit in this direction of thought is the development of the theme of inquiry which seeks to determine what humanly controllable condition can best elicit the creative function. We do find in this early work indications of Wieman's interest in this line of inquiry.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

At several points in "The Organization of Interests," Wieman's inquiry moved from the question of what is highest good to determining the conditions for the highest good. In regard to creative conflict he asked, "what are the conditions which render possible this creative function of conflict?"[1] In seeking an answer to this, he found the values created by internal conflict to be newly generated mental activities arising in the conflict experience. Turning to neurology for assistance, Wieman identified the condition for this mental activity to be "a certain plasticity and heightened tonus of the cortex as a whole."[2] Further, perhaps on suggestion from Bergson, Wieman contended that this broad range of mental sensitivity and responsiveness was characteristic of human mentality. Accordingly, whatever can contribute to the production of such a mental condition is a condition of creative conflict and thus instrumentally good. Wieman's attention to the conditions for creative consciousness has its parallel at the level of morality in the concern to discover a procedure by which the good may be enlarged. Wieman expressed the judgment that,

> If morality is the quantitative enlargement of the total good of human life, I can imagine no moral achievement more promising than that procedure which would make maladjustment and discord as such a form of positive value. As we shall hope to show later, this is what religion does; and this is its peculiar function so far as it applies to morals.[3]

In "The Organization of Interests" Wieman did not make the same appeal to scientific method in religious inquiry as appears in his early published writing although aspects of this interest in inquiry are evident. Wieman acknowledged the role of Perry in introducing him to the philosophical use of the scientific method of inquiry; and Perry's conception of scientific theory as descriptive abstraction is evident in Wieman's account of the function of science. Perry indicated the function of science to be the description of its subject matter, with scientific description functioning first to reduce variety and change to as few terms as possible, and secondly, to achieve an exact analytical formulation which is descriptive of phenomena and verified by observation.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 89. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 98.

Wieman stated that the universe is discernible as an object for both religious and scientific interest. These two interests are fulfilled in different ways, the scientific interest being cognitive, and functioning abstractly, whereas the religious interest is in the immediacy of participation in concrete relationships. However, the conditions of this participation are assumed to be features of events discernible by scientific interest, and describable as procedures and conditions of a definite and determinate sort. So, two levels of functions are to be distinguished. The abstractive instrumental functions can organize human life so as to become subject to a second type of function. This function is creativity which is not in itself instrumentally controllable.

In his discussion of the nature of a free society Wieman listed three requisites for freedom. These are conditions which he sees to be necessary for the realization of a process of mutual creativity in interpersonal relationships. The first condition of mutual creativity is that the purposes of an individual must be frustrated by other purposes. The fundamental condition is one of incipient conflict. The second condition is that imaginative reproductions must take place. One's purposes can be frustrated only by the purposes of another person or persons, and the comprehension of these other purposes can take place only by imaginative reproduction of the purpose of the other. Thirdly, one's own purposes must also be comprehended by the other or others in imaginative reproduction. Wieman saw these to be the three conditions of sociability.[1] At a higher level of relationship Wieman found these conditions are also determinative conditions for mutual creativity in the relationship of man and God.

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[1] R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 54 ff.

Along with this tendency to specify the conditions which can elicit the creative good, Wieman saw this creative process as ultimately not under human control. The concrete working of creative mutuality Wieman saw to be a relationship in which the specific character of human participation made a difference, yet the concrete working was other than the working of human individuality. Creativity functions to fulfill human interest most completely and transcends human functions both by doing what man cannot do and as a process which spatially transcends any human range of experience and interest.

There is that which man can do to foster this human divine creativity, but in the final analysis, the ultimate good is found in events as a new good beyond man's ability to do or anticipate, which is realized when man casts himself upon the relation of mutual creativity.[2] For Wieman this is religious faith at its fullest. He summarized the import of this faith with the words of Hocking: "In whatever sense God is to triumph in history, in that same sense must I triumph."[3] This triumph is a continuous present process, which transmutes our achievements and relates it in significance "beyond our subjective disposition."[4]

In this final statement of the most inclusive function of the creative process, Wieman again showed his indebtedness to idealism. In the function of transmutation and the notion of a significance which inheres in a world structure of relations we find two aspects of a conception of the ultimate which has roots in Absolute Idealism. The function of Royce's absolute is an ultimate interpretation in which the plurality of activities in the world are given unity to form a world. The world is given not only a historical unity, but a unity by being related to an ultimate meaning. For Idealism the ultimate is supra-spatial and supra-temporal as the condition for all space and time and the ultimate inclusion of spaces and times. Wieman rejected this aspect of the Absolute, but retained the notion of world Individuality as a spatio-temporal, or ultimate historical unity which emerges in the activity of creativity at the level of widest inclusiveness.

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[1] Wieman, Ibid., pp. 182-83. [2] Ibid., p. 254.

[3] Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 302.

[4] Wieman, "Organization of Interests," p. 254.

As we have noted, Wieman's inquiry issued in two notions which have characteristics of an ultimate religious object. The two notions "mutual creativity" and the "world individuality" respectively emphasize two aspects of the ultimate as envisioned by Absolute Idealism, namely ultimate function and ultimate image. The ultimate function is retained in the process of mutual creativity, and the image of the ultimate is retained in the notion of the concrete individual, the world individuality.

This separation of function and image in two types of ultimate objects is reminiscent also of Royce's distinction between the historical and trans-historical interpretative functions of the absolute. However, on this point the difference between Royce and Wieman is the most important. Wieman is concerned to avoid an appeal to some ultimate which is somehow inclusive of all temporal process. But he is concerned to discern the full range of creativity in events creative of individualities. In the idealist pattern he accepted the assumption that the religious object is also the ultimate individuality, but also attended to the Bergsonian theme of discerning the ultimate in the immediate. This two-pronged thrust of inquiry, in effect, produced two ultimate notions.

In his subsequent movement of thought Wieman relinquished the standard of explicit individuality for the religious object and turned to function as the criterion of ultimacy. This direction for inquiry regarding the religious object was indicated when he defined God as that fact which is of greatest importance for human life. Importance here was understood as creative function. However, the aspect of individuality was not lost. This was retained in the structure of the creative function most immediately suggested by the notion derived from Whitehead of God as the significance of the Total Event. In this appeal to Whitehead, Wieman drew together the aspects of function and image in the ultimate notion.

CHAPTER V

WIEMAN'S APPEAL TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD AS A METAPHYSICS FOR FUNCTIONAL THEISM

H. N. Wieman's thought emerged from the interplay of Absolute Idealism and creative evolutionism with the view that the fundamental focus of both philosophical and religious inquiry is properly in empirical events. The theme of ultimacy in immediacy, although not neglected by the idealists who saw events having a mediated order expressing the Absolute, was evidently presented most forcefully to Wieman's mind by Henri Bergson. Continuing the idealist attention to relations and structures of relations, Wieman looked for the ultimate in discernible structures of relations. This attention to structures in events in effect came to require a general orientation that would consider "event" as a fundamental philosophical notion. Such an orientation was coming to the fore in Wieman's "Organization of Interests" as is shown in his contention that interest is itself activity, and that the ultimate interest fulfilment is a particular type of organization in activities. The attention to structures is further evident in Wieman's contention that the fulfilment of interest is a function of a structure of relations in concrete events.

This view point grew out of the continuation of the dialogue between Bergson's evolutionism and Absolute Idealism which we first saw in Royce's response to Bergson's Creative Evolution.

With these movements in Wieman's thought, we can see him at the close of his graduate studies as a philosopher of religion probing for a more adequate metaphysics. With his underlying contention for the centrality of events and their relational structures this probing took the form of a search for an adequate philosophy of nature. At the time Wieman was studying at Harvard, the work of A. N. Whitehead was receiving increasing attention. W. E. Hocking has recalled how Royce, in his last lectures at Harvard, responded to Whitehead's early work as possessing great promise.[1] Consequently, it is not surprising that Wieman gave attention to Whitehead's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and The Concept of Nature as these appeared. In these works, Whitehead sought to spell out the import of the revolution in physical theory which had been taking place through the work of Einstein and others.

It was the special theory of relativity, as envisioned and formulated by Albert Einstein, that overturned the edifice of Newtonian physical theory. Einstein did not administer this blow single-handed, but in his insight the work of many men came together for a single momentous result: the reconstruction of the theoretical basis of physical science, including the understanding of the nature of what is known in scientific observation, and the displacement of material objects as ultimates in nature. The power of Einstein's work was its effectiveness in bringing together the work of many different men, including Maxwell, Lorenz, Michelson, Morley, and others and effectively accounting for anomalies in nature uncovered in their theoretical and experimental work.

In brief, this theoretical reconstruction was accomplished by providing a different set of fundamental assumptions than those which operated in the Newtonian physics. The Newtonian system rested on the presupposition of a uniform space and a uniform cosmic time as physical absolutes. This assumption of Absolute Space and Time coupled with the notion of a transmitting ether had led to certain expectations regarding the measurement of the velocity of light. It was concluded that the movement of the earth through the ether could be measured if sufficiently refined apparatus were employed. However, such expectation was not confirmed. The Michelson-Morley experiments demonstrated a uniformity in the measured speed of light regardless of which axis in relation to the movements of the earth the light followed. Another problem for physical theory had arisen when the Maxwell equations proved much more accurate than anticipated for describing electromagnetic field phenomena in an earth-bound laboratory. Maxwell had developed his equations to describe a field at rest. Since the earth is obviously not at rest, it was unaccountable that these equations proved accurate under laboratory conditions.

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[1] William Ernest Hocking, preface to Royce's Metaphysics, by Gabriel Marcel, (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. v.

What Einstein did was to take the results of these experiments at their face value and devise a theory which would admit these data. The result was the Special Theory of Relativity based on an inversion of the assumptions regarding absolutes and relatives in the Newtonian mechanics. Instead of assuming that the velocity of light is relative to the motion of the observer, Einstein accepted the experimental fact of observed uniformity of the velocity of light for all observers as basic to his theory. Secondly, instead of assuming an Absolute Space and Time for all observers, Einstein considered space and time measurements relative to the observer. Although times and lengths differ according to the relative motion of observers, there is a definite relation between observed events and observers. This definite relation between events, called an "interval" by Minkowski, was found to be expressible by the Lorentz transformation formula. Lorentz had mathematically described hypothetical dimensional changes corresponding to direction of motion, in an effort to account for the results of the Michelson-Morley experiments without a change in the basic Newtonian assumptions. Within the new set of assumptions, the Lorentz formula was found usable to transform the time and space observations of one observer into the coordinates of another observer moving at a different uniform relative velocity. The "middle term" of this transformation is the mathematically derived "interval" which Einstein held to represent the fundamental physical relationship between events. The interval between events is not itself a directly measurable relation but is a four dimensional relation from which the time dimension cannot be abstracted.

A major consequence for philosophy in this revolution in physical thought was the view of nature as a complex of events. The emphasis on the event or happening was of major importance for consolidating a trend in philosophy. The notion of event had been gradually coming to the fore in Idealistic thinking, rooted in the Hegelian view of the world as a dialectical process. Evolutionary thinking with its dominant biological imagery, supported a similar change in the view of the human person and social processes. So while the advance of the sciences appeared to reinforce positivistic reductionism in the thinking of many devotees of scientism, it also supported a tendency to see nature as a field of events in passage. This emphasis on dynamics was philosophically expressed in the evolutionism of Bergson, Hobhouse, Morgan and Smuts. But for Wieman none of these displayed the philosophical power to equal Whitehead's response to the theory of relativity.

Whitehead sought to "lay the basis of a natural philosophy which is the necessary presuppositions of a reorganized speculative physics."[1] In this effort he presupposed that "a unifying philosophy of natural science" is possible.[2] Such a philosophy will "exhibit all sciences as one science."[3] Natural science being the science of nature, he proposed that the unity exhibited by philosophy of science, will be shown in the concept of nature.[4] This assumption of a unity in the subject matter of the sciences, Whitehead saw to have consequences for the theory of nature. Whitehead argued that this means that no theories involving the bifurcation of nature can be admitted into a philosophy of natural science. The presupposed unity of nature basic to the conception of natural science cannot be broken by making a distinction between nature and the mental experience of nature. To speak of nature, Whitehead contended, is to speak of a closed system which is not broken by the consideration of relationships to mental factors not included in nature. This means that the "mutual relations [of nature] do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about."[5]

This rejection of theories of bifurcation can be seen to have a consequence for philosophy which again finds support in relativity physics. Perception, or in the physicists' terms, observations of events are actual relations in nature. Stated according to the relativity physics, any particular observation or perception would be considered a function of an actual physical relation. The consequence of this for a theory of human relationships is that in experience the experiencing subject and the experienced object are both included in one event in nature. The event is the inclusive fact, a fact not dependent upon its being thought about. Consequently, Whitehead stated,

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[1] Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: University Press, 1955), pp. vii-viii.

[2] Ibid., p. 2. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 3. [5] Ibid.

"nature is not thought," and in a sense "is independent of thought."[1]

Wieman picked up this point as the major import of the rejection of theories of bifurcation, and stated that the meaning of Whitehead's criticism is,

> that the object or event observed must not be confused with the mind that does the observing. Because the mind describes nature, the nature thus described must not therefore be thought to partake of the nature of mind.[2]

While Whitehead's argument pressed for a unity in the view of nature, seeing sense-perception as a relational feature within events, Wieman interpreted the point to mean a rejection of a view of nature as fundamentally akin to mind. Also he found in this a defense against an interpretation of experience as a world of mental constructions by the self in which "everything we know partakes of the nature of self."[3]

The appeal to Whitehead on this point is evidently a part of Wieman's self definition against idealism. Whitehead's criticism of theories of bifurcation proved an effective basis for consolidating his rejection of the idealistic metaphysics and offered a constructive response positively evaluating functions of relation of structures in events. Wieman reconceived the notion of consciousness as a function in natural relations rather than as a mental event in contrast to nature. The basis of this reconception is in Wieman's acceptance of "events and "relations" rather than "consciousness" and "ideas" as fundamental notions.

In *Religious Experience and Scientific Method* Wieman recognized that the theory of relativity was forcing an inversion in the understanding of basic notions, not only in the physical sciences, but in the understanding of the operative functions in life processes. Wieman noted this change specifically in the concepts of purpose and mind. The older substantive notions of mind, purpose and consciousness, understood as factors effecting changes in natural processes, but in themselves fundamentally unformed by natural processes, were expressed in different ways in both the Kantian and the Hegelian philosophical traditions. The Kantian division between nature and spirit led to a view of the human spirit, a ding-an-sich, as inviolate from determinate natural processes. Hegelian idealism held that the ultimate substance is Reason itself. So that human consciousness, a play of ideas, participates in a particularly intimate way in the ultimate world process. However, it should be recognized that the Hegelian Idealistic attention to empirical processes as ultimately expressive of the World-Idea turned philosophical attention to functions in natural processes. This fostered a type of inquiry which we found to be particularly responsive to the issues raised by pragmatism, furthering attention to the functional character of ideas. Royce responded to this insistence on a pragmatic criterion for meaningfulness and truth by specifying an empirical function of the World Idea. We find this in the voluntarism of The World and the Individual. But it is in The Problem of Christianity that Royce displayed the extent to which the conversation with the pragmatists had invaded his metaphysical thinking. This recognition of the empirical function of ideas pushed him to reconstruct the notion of the Absolute itself. In this restatement of the major tenet of Absolute Idealism, Royce sought to delineate the empirical grounds for the doctrine of the Absolute and found this in a certain functional structure of relations in events.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 3. [2] RESM, pp. 178-79. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

We found that this attention to functional structure was the basis of Wieman's critique of Bergson. This response to Bergson proved Wieman ready to respond to the philosophy of the new physics which understood the basic data of science to be events in relation to other events. For his own thought an important result of relativity theory was the reconception of mind, purpose and spirit as functions in events.[1] He saw these functions to be based on "mnemonic accumulations." Following Hocking's analysis, Wieman found love and worship to share a process which "gathers up the past, contemplates it in the present, and by means of it foresees the future."[2] Therefore, he concluded that spirit and purpose may be reconceived as "the preservation of the past as operative in the present and as shaping the future."[3] This notion had its roots for Wieman's thought in both Royce's relation of interpretation by the present of the past to the future, as well as in Bergson's view of concrete duration as bearing the past in the present. Consequently, Wieman was ready to follow Whitehead's speculative assertion that "the whole passage of nature involves in its operative present all the past."[4]

William James had proposed a functional reconception of consciousness in "Does Consciousness Exist?"[5] This reconception was supported by the pragmatist's insistence that anything is what it does. Although Wieman studied under the pragmatic-realist Perry, it was evidently the work of A. N. Whitehead, in interpretation of the philosophical impact of the revolution in physics, that consolidated for Wieman a world view in which happenings and functions have the status formerly accredited to substantial ideas in philosophy or substantial matter in physical science.

The notion of "consciousness" had long been associated with the philosophical effort of Absolute Idealism, and so was freighted with the perspective and associations of that point of view. The idealists made a type of appeal to experience, holding that consciousness was the key to philosophical inquiry. Consciousness was understood by Hocking to be the interplay of idea and feeling, the creative element in events, the will pressing for the fulfilment of its purpose. In the "Organization of Interests," Wieman had inverted these notions in developing a theory of creativity as the elaboration of consciousness. However, it was not consciousness as such that was a key to the view of the ultimate in "The Organization of Interests," it was a process basic to consciousness. Consequently, the key terms became process and growth in relationships.

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[1] RESM, pp. 154-55. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 157. [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[5] William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 1 ff.

Further, the view of the world for Wieman had developed so that religious relationships were not understood to be between the individual and an enigmatic world unity expressed in or behind events, but was a mutuality between the individual as a subject in nature and the world as creative of a purposive unity in the passage of time. This "other" in Wieman's earlier view is not just one's idea of the world as an individual, although one responds to the world on the basis of one's own idea; it is an individual "other" creative of human individual will just as human individuality contributes to the universe in its growth in purpose.

Whitehead did not use the term "consciousness" in the Concept of Nature. Later, Whitehead suggested that "consciousness" refers to a high level of complex experience and is not a usable notion in a basic analysis of experience.[1] For an analysis of experience he suggested that more primitive notions than consciousness must be employed. "Sense awareness" is a notion which does not bear in its meaning an implicit bifurcation.[2] In answering the question of what is nature, defined as the subject matter of natural science, Whitehead responded:

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 226.

[2] A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 3.

> Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses. In this sense-perception we are aware of something which is not thought and which is self-contained for thought.[1]

Nature, for Whitehead, is not a conceptually derived notion, but is rooted in the fact of immediate givenness in experience. As Whitehead summarized, "Nature is nothing else than the deliverance of sense-awareness."[2] The view of nature as given, as "the deliverance of sense-awareness," involves the notion that there is an aspect of experience which is other than the percipient. So, as an object for thought, nature may be dealt with as a closed system, independent of thought. Science is concerned with thought about nature apart from the consideration that nature is being thought about.[3]

Thought is involved in sense perception, at least in its most usual modes. In sense perception, thought contributes the factor of the sense of the otherness of the given, or in Whitehead's expression, the factor of thought provides for sense-perception the notion of a terminus of sense awareness which is beyond the sense awareness.

The distinction Whitehead made between sense-awareness and sense-perception is based on this understanding of the function of thought. Sense-awareness is an aspect of sense-perception which does not involve thought. Sense-awareness is pure givenness prior to any sense of relation or reference. Thought is required for yielding a sense of entities or objects in the given. But both have a terminus other than the percipient. As Whitehead stated in summary:

> The termini for thought are entities, primarily with bare individuality,

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[1] Ibid., p. 30. [2] Ibid., p. 185. [3] Ibid., p. 3.

> secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the procedure of thought; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only secondarily descriminated as distinct individualities.[1]

related?

The termini for sense-awareness and thought are discriminations in fact. The fact which is presented for awareness and thought is what Whitehead meant by nature. The notion is enlarged in his statement that "the immediate fact for awareness is the whole occurrence of nature."[2] The image suggested by the phrase "the whole occurrence of nature" is reminiscent of the late idealistic notion of the temporal process of the world, as in Royce's view of historical process as an interpretive unity. Does the idealistic notion of "the Whole" apply to Whitehead's meaning for "whole occurrence?" We find the terms "whole occurrence," "total event," and "total fact" used virtually interchangeably by Whitehead. "Total fact" is the "total undifferentiated terminus of sense-awareness."[3] Thus the totality or whole referred to is a whole for the percipient, in a particular occasion, rather than a totality or whole of all events. But there is an amplified meaning for these terms suggested when they are seen in the context of Whitehead's response to relativity theory in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and his later theory of prehensions.[4] This is the meaning that a percipient event is in a happening which is the converging of many relations in the unity of the present event. The converging relations extend beyond the range of immediate awareness. In awareness, then, is given a wholeness as a particular bringing together of relations from a complex of events.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 12-13. [2] Ibid., p. 14. [3] Ibid., p. 13.

[4] A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: New American Library, 1948), pp. 70, 151.

So we have two possible meanings for "wholeness" within Whitehead's analysis, although these meanings prove complementary. The first meaning emphasizes attention to the pure empirical given apart from consideration of the modes of composition of the given. In the latter meaning of a "whole," the percipient event is a unity of a world for that individual, such that the analysis of the event related the fact of that event to other facts which are not immediately given for the particular percipient. This is one result of Whitehead's recognition of the philosophical importance of the physical theory of relativity.

Whichever meaning-emphasis may be given, for Whitehead the "whole occurence of nature" as a fact for awareness refers to the presented immediacy of nature in awareness. What is presented is a complex happening or event which the mind discriminates into subevents and entities in relation. Abstraction of the individuality of an entity from its position "as a factor in fact" given in sense-perception involves thought. Discrimination may be made without abstraction of the factors or entities from the fact such that "emotion and purposeful action [are evoked] without further cognition."[1]

> In such a case the terminus of the sense-awareness is something for mind, but nothing for thought. The sense perception of some lower forms of life may be conjectured to approximate to this character habitually. Also occasionally our own sense-perception in moments when thought-activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the attainment of this ideal limit.[2]

Wieman charged that Whitehead undervalued this type of awareness in ascribing it to lower forms of life. It should be noted that Wieman makes use of direct quotations from this passage in Religious Experience and Scientific Method, but sufficiently out of context so that Whitehead's meaning is not retained. This leads us to ask if there is something in the background which Wieman brings to his reading of Whitehead that might tend to lead him to misread a passage to establish a certain point?

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 14. [2] *Ibid.*

For Wieman "event" was accepted as a fundamental notion. In his theory of value, Wieman had found the fulfilment of the fundamental interest of human life in a certain type of process in natural events. Wieman's view of nature as a process of structured interrelations reflects the late view of Royce, who found the explanation of historical passage in specifying the process of interpretation as a function of the world ultimate.

Also Wieman understood with Whitehead, that in an event entities are discriminated by the percipient. But there are many sorts of entities which may be discriminated. Factors in fact may be discriminated as entities, as relations, objects, or qualities. The range of possible discriminations is inexhaustible, either as factors for awareness or as structural relations in the given event for thought.[1] Wieman pressed on to say that at times "this whole occurrence of nature, this total event, may engage attention."[2] This type of awareness which is receptive to this total given, or total event, Wieman called "attentive awareness." This notion of the apprehension of the total event interpreted for him "the mystic awareness of the total datum in which all data are merged."[3]

But awareness of the total datum as "religious experience" is not equated by Wieman with awareness of God. The awareness of the total event may "signify" God as an ingredient in the total event.[1] "That is to say," wrote Wieman, that the total event "can be correctly defined as that which, when made the object of attentive awareness, yields the values of religious experience."[2] God, accordingly, is identified as a functional ingredient in events, signified in awareness of the total event.

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[1] Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 14.

[2] RESM, p. 177.

[3] Ibid., p. 176. Whitehead wrote of nature as a whole, as an object for thought, "as a complex of related entities." But fact in its totality is not an entity for cognition since it lacks contrast with other entities. (Concept of Nature, pp. 13-15).

In discussing the notion of attentive awareness Wieman charged that Whitehead ascribed an awareness of the total event to lower orders of life.[3] However, this quite clearly is not Whitehead's intent. The context of this passage is a discussion of the perception of entities. Wieman read this to refer to awareness of the total undiscriminated event, whereas Whitehead meant awareness of factors in fact discriminated without thought. Whitehead's assertion accordingly does not rule out Wieman's judgment that "the awareness of the lower animals is very rigidly determined by certain automatisms and that these constantly hold the attention upon certain individual data."[4] Wieman made this response to Whitehead evidently because of his contention that God is a factor signified by awareness of the total event. Wieman admitted that this notion of the divine significance is not developed by Whitehead. Wieman saw this supportable by a possible metaphysical development from the Enquiry and the Concept of Nature. However, this is not the way in which Whitehead later identifies God, and this difference suggests a reason for the way in which Wieman appropriated Whitehead's thinking.

In the notion of God as a total factor (to interpret Wieman's use of Whitehead) we can see a similarity in imagery to the notion of God developed in "Organization of Interests." In the latter, God was the "individuality" of the growth of a world purpose in the universe. The world individual is in a relation of mutual creativity to other individualities in the universe. So, God is known in human experience in the functioning of a structure of relations relating the individual within the world.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 178. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, p. 177. [4] *Ibid.*

This divine function is "the production of value." Underlying Wieman's development is the notion of the ultimate as a structure in the total event, which may be discriminated as objects of practical and theoretical interest can be discriminated.[1]

When we compare Wieman's notion of God with Whitehead's later development, we find contrasting imagery at work in the expression of the two men. Wieman's notion of God as ingredient in the total event, signified by the total event as contrasted to the significance of any subevents, points to the retention of an image of deity as a total spatial structure operative in empirical events. Whitehead's later analysis of "events," supporting his concept of God as "The Principle of Concretion" or the "ultimate limitation," led to his assertion that God is a peculiarly non-spatial ultimate activity.[2] God, he wrote,

> is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. There is nothing with which to compare it: it is Spinoza's one infinite substance.[3]

If Wieman's God were to be identified with any aspect of Whitehead's analysis of the event, it would be with the "particular mode" in which the "general metaphysical character" underlies each occasion. The critical difference is indicated by the fact that Wieman would say that the religious object is an entity ingredient in the total event, whereas Whitehead spoke of this underlying event, as a preconditional structure of possibility. Further, the spatial aspect of Wieman's notion is emphasized by his appeal to the total event in contrast to subevents. For Whitehead, "God" referred to the ultimate limitation imposed on any event.[1]

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[1] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 176.

[2] Ibid., pp. 177-79. [3] Ibid., 177.

Consequently, we can see that in Religious Experience and Scientific Method a transition had taken place in Wieman's thought from the position developed in the "Organization of Interests." In finding God as that value producing reality which is signified by the Total Event, Wieman sought to reunite the function and image of the Ultimate. The bringing together of the function of creativity and a unity of structure in spatio-temporal events is further pointed to in a difference in the meaning of "total" for Whitehead and Wieman.

I contend that there is a difference in the meaning of "total" in these two uses. In Wieman's use of "total event" we have Whitehead's meaning. However, a second meaning which does not become explicit is operative in Wieman's notion of what is signified by the "total event." The "whole" or "total" in this meaning refers to a unity which is more than the given unity of the presently experienced event. This unity is in the functional factor which may be discriminated as a whole structure creative of the totality in events presented for sense awareness. The assumption is that there is a functional wholeness which transcends particular events and any wholeness presented to sense awareness. God is signified in a total event because God is the datum as a factor in a happening in which such awareness takes place. God is functional in the event as a structure in the event pointed to by the total character of the concrete datum. In this character, God is a factor in events which is distinguishable from the character of other factors in events since God is a functional unity operative in all events. Unlike Whitehead,

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[1] Ibid., p. 179.

Wieman understood God to be an object among objects.

Wieman found Whitehead to have performed a valuable philosophical task in having broken through "the net of self" either in the form of the net of solipsism or the net of a world seen as enfolded by "a universal idealizing personality like unto ourselves."[1] In his statement of Whitehead's point in the criticism of philosophical conceptions of nature involving bifurcation, Wieman found central the rejection of an imputation of subjective mental characters to nature. Whitehead rejected the notion that the percipient sees nature with psychic additions, such as "subjective" qualities. Whitehead held that bifurcation theories assert this in varying ways, utilizing notions of absolute space and time to establish the non-psychic actuality of the object in nature. Wieman read this to say that "the bifurcation of nature applies to the confusion of self with objects observed."[2] It would have been more in accordance with Whitehead's meaning if Wieman had found a warning against the confusion of observed data with self. The fallacy of reading into nature some abstracted characteristic or structure that one brings to the experience is discussed later by Whitehead as involving the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.[3] The bifurcation of nature, on the other hand, involves a reduction of qualities given in awareness to mental states.

In rejecting this type of thinking, Whitehead held that the basic fact of nature is an event with the character of "creative advance."[4] With Whitehead, Wieman saw "event" and "creative advance" to "mean precisely that in nature the past does not drop out of existence with each successive instant, as materialism would declare, but that the past continues operative with the present to shape the future."[1] Wieman identified this functional character as mind. In apparent contradiction of Whitehead he stated that mind or purpose as this sort of operative feature is not in all events. However, it becomes clear he meant that mind is not to be found in what he calls the point-moment conception of events utilized in the sciences.[2] For Whitehead such a notion did not designate an event, but is rather a complex logical conception which he terms "instantaneousness." Instantaneousness is not posited by sense awareness and so is not an event but an abstraction.[3] Wieman used his notion of the limitation of mentality to certain types of events as a basis for considering the possibility of an all embracing mental character inherent in the whole of nature.

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[1] RESM., p. 179. [2] Ibid., p. 180.

[3] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 52-54.

[4] Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 178. "We experience and know [creative advance] as the perpetual transition of nature into novelty."

> There is, above all, one all-inclusive event including all other events, and having as its ingredients all objects. Not all events involve mind, but some do; and it may be that which gives the character and creative advance to the whole of nature and every part of nature is that there is operative throughout the whole of nature a Mind.[4]

In this suggestion of a distinctive total mind in the all inclusive event, we see Wieman's earlier view of God as the teleology of the world.

This indicates that the notion of "total event" for Wieman would suggest the notion of a totality of events as well as a whole character of immediately presented fact. In this aspect of totality, particularly as associated with the notion of a world Mind or God, we see the inheritance of the image of the idealist's Absolute as ingredient in the world which is its life. With the ultimate a structural ingredient in events, then the ultimate is knowable as other structural aspects of nature are known. The importance of this structural aspect in Wieman's notion of the divine in events is evident in his approach to the question of how God is known.

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[1] RESM, p. 181. [2] Ibid.

[3] Whitehead, Concept of Nature, pp. 56-57. Note that "instantaneousness," the logical notion of nature at an instant "deprived of all temporal extension," must be distinguished from "simultaneity" which is "the unity of this general present fact." The former is a complex abstraction, the latter a concrete character.

[4] RESM, p. 181.

In answer to this question, Wieman made a distinction between two types of knowledge, which he distinguished by the use of William James' terms "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description."[1] The meanings he gave to these terms expressed a distinction between what is and what is not knowledge. The basis of this distinction was gained from Dewey's polemic against the philosophical appeal to contemplation as a means to knowledge.[2] Accordingly, Wieman contended against James that the awareness of pure immediacy cannot be properly considered knowledge at all. It is to be valued, but not as knowledge. Cognition is of relationships, and relationships are known by abstraction from experience. As a result, James' meanings for the two types of knowledge are rejected, not as irrelevant notions, but as indicating the difference between awareness and knowledge. Knowledge will always have an abstract formal character, Wieman argued, which makes it possible for one experience to be applied to another.

However, Wieman used James' terms to indicate a different type of distinction. "Knowledge by acquaintance" wrote Wieman,

> is of that which has been experienced by someone, or presumptively could be if the right kind of organism could be placed in the right situation. Knowledge by description, on the other hand, is that

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[1] RESM, pp. 25 ff.

[2] John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: New American Library, 1950), pp. 99 ff.

> which could not be experienced by any organism or mind whatsoever, because it does not refer to any of the data of experience. Mathematical points and lines are such objects of knowledge.[1]

With this distinction, Wieman reassessed the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Wieman contended that the traditional arguments approached God as a logical object, a "system of objects, and that only."[2] In other words, Wieman held that God has been traditionally considered to be an object of knowledge by description, a purely logical construct. However, Wieman continued, this is not the only possibility since God may be approached as an object of knowledge by acquaintance, i.e., "an object of sensuous experience."[3]

In this characterization of the objectivity of God Wieman established a position which was to prove in sharp contrast to Whitehead's conception of God. In his insistent pointing to a structure in events which is an object of knowledge by acquaintance, Wieman was implicitly prepared to reject Whitehead's notion of God as the ultimate limiting condition for events. Such a notion, derived from analysis of the logical preconditions for any event, would for Wieman be an object of knowledge by description.

In _Religious Experience and Scientific Method_, Wieman defined religion as "man's endeavor to find that adjustment to God which will yield most abundant life."[4] The aim of abundance, or the increase of the good of human life, is the ultimate religious aim. Consequently, God is whatever is most important for the enrichment of human life. The specific function of religion in regard to this aim, which, as in the "Organization of Interests," is the fundamental aim of human life, "is our response to some significance of the total datum of experience, or what Whitehead calls the undiscriminated event which may enter awareness under favorable conditions."[1] So the function of religion is (1) to enable one to become aware of the total event, and (2) find a significance of the total event.[2] Wieman considered these to have been the function of traditional religion in (1) ceremonies and religious disciplines, and (2) religious beliefs.

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[1] RESM, pp. 25-26.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 27.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 28.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 381.

In this twofold function we can see a tension working in Wieman's thought in the notion of God as an object of religious experience. To speak of God as the "object of sensuous experience" is not the same as God signified by the total datum. The notion of God as a given which can be discriminated as an object presses the emphasis in religious inquiry toward a responsive awareness to the particular creativity manifested in concrete experience. The notion of God as the religious object which is signified by the total event given for awareness presses religious inquiry in the direction of determining the structure of the significance of a type of datum given in experience. In this we can see the tension between the themes of Bergson and Royce; the tension between the claims that the ultimate is immediately given and that the ultimate is a functional structure in events.

To help determine what Wieman meant by "some significance of the total datum," we find in Whitehead's Enquiry the definition: "'Significance' is the relatedness of things."[3] Knowledge is empirically based in an awareness of the significance, or relatedness of things. This is true of a discriminated sub-event or entity, or of a total event. But for Whitehead there is a difference between these two cases in that the total fact cannot be an entity for for thought. The total fact cannot be discriminated in its relations to a field of fact, just because it is the totality of presented fact.

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[1] Ibid., p. 372. [2] Ibid., p. 373.

[3] A. N. Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: University Press, 1919), p. 14. Cited in following footnotes as An Enquiry.

> Fact in its totality is not an entity for cogitation, since it has no individuality by its reference to anything other than itself. It is not a relatum in the relationship of contrast. . . . It is not the sum of factors; it is rather the concreteness (or embeddedness) of factors, and the concreteness of an inexhaustible relatedness among inexhaustible relata.[1]

A property of a thing is the relation between that thing and other things. In the case of qualities the other term of the relationship is unspecified, but this does not detract from the status of the quality as a factor in fact. The occasion of awareness in which a quality appears is itself a factor in fact.[2] "In fact perceptual knowledge," continued Whitehead, "is always a knowledge of the relationship of the percipient event to something else in nature."[3] Knowledge of an entity always involves a sense of some definite relationship within nature and the awareness of a relationship involves a sense of contrasting individuality between entities. So an experience in which a pure sense of immediacy is the mode of awareness cannot be an occasion for knowledge of entities.

Whitehead expressed this point by writing that "the conception of knowledge as passive contemplation is too inadequate to meet the facts."[4] This seems similar to Dewey's rejection of contemplation, but we can find a difference in the intent of Whitehead's argument. Whitehead criticized the notion of contemplation itself as inadequate for the understanding of cognitive experience, in that knowing is not a matter of pure receptivity. Rather, (and here Whitehead acknowledged a contention of the pragmatists) knowing is an activity in nature, which contributes relationships to the constitution of the event.

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, The Principle of Relativity (Cambridge: University Press, 1922), p. 15.

[2] Ibid., p. 14. [3] Whitehead, An Enquiry, p. 14. [4] Ibid.

> Nature is ever originating its own development, and the sense of action is the direct knowledge of the percipient event as having its very being in the formation of its natural relations.[1]

In this empirical reference to a creative function of the individual in events, we find restated the notion expressed by Wieman in "The Organization of Interests" as "mutual creativity." Wieman and Whitehead developed these parallel notions from analyses of different areas of experience. Wieman appealed to socio-psychological relationships as sources of data pertinent to the understanding of the nature of value. Whitehead began with an effort to undergird philosophically the theory of relativity, which in turn was a theoretical response to the data of physical investigation. Wieman extended notions developed in the analysis of interpersonal relations, and applied these notions for interpretation of the ultimate relationship between the individual and the world. In this effort, we can see that Wieman was seeking to answer the central question posed by Royce for philosophy. Whitehead developed his philosophical notions in an effort to characterize abstractly those general features of the world which are fundamental to any experience at all. Both men saw human experience to bear the possibility of awareness of creative happenings in experienced relationships. For Wieman the immediate enjoyment of creativity was found in the growth of consciousness. In a similar mood, Whitehead stated in relation to the question of knowledge:

> Knowledge issues from this reciprocal insistence between this event and the rest of nature, namely relations are perceived in the making and because of the making. For this reason perception is always at the utmost point of creation.[2]

But rather than emphasize the sense of participation in the particular creative activity, Wieman's structural conception of creative process impelled him to define the religious quest in terms of adapting the individual to an ultimate character in all events. This thrust is fully evident in Wieman's response to Whitehead's suggestions regarding the meaning of God in human experience in Religion in the Making, as when Wieman wrote,

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

> Religion is man's endeavor to adapt himself to the facts of existence. It differs from other such endeavors in that it seeks adaptation of the whole of life to ultimate facts. Professor Whitehead has made two very significant statements on this point. He has said: "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things. . . . It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion."[1]

The three stages of religious growth are illustrated by Wieman in ways reminiscent of his analysis of the religious situation according to the three types of value in "The Organization of Interests." By "God the void" Wieman characterized the initial stage of religious experience, a stage in which the individual is painfully aware of the fragmented character of his life. The dominant feature of experience, Wieman saw at this stage, is the pluralism of goods and evils, giving life as a whole an aspect of irreconcilable conflict. The problem for this stage of religious experience is the organization of this confusion. Wieman wrote that man at this stage of experience

> . . . feels the need of organizing his responses in such a way as to carry on. But to do that he must be able to detect some character underlying these diverse situations and conflicting demands and through adapting himself to it find some way of dealing with what is otherwise a baffling confusion.[2]

This need for an adaptive organization can only be met by relating the individual to the facts of his actual situation. Since the facts may militate against a man's cherished illusions, his own self organization gives rise to a sense of contrast to the factual situation. As a result, man may see God, "the ultimate factual character of events to which adaptation must be made," as the enemy. God is thus seen in this relationship as an actual individual Otherness with a definite contrasting character. Consequently Wieman warned that if the illusion of idealization is allowed to rule in religion so that the contrast between the self and God is obscured, the reality of God will not be apprehended, making it impossible to reach this stage of religious experience.

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[1] H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion With Truth (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 3. Hereafter referred to in footnotes as WRT.

[2] Ibid., pp. 4,5.

The third stage of religious growth Wieman defined as that of fullest adaptation "to the ultimately determining character of events."[1] This level involves a "reconstruction of habits and valuations" so that which is most important for life can sustain and transform life.

In Wieman's characterizations of these three stages in religious life, the threefold typology of "The Organization of Interests" is recalled to mind. Comparing these two typologies of development, we can identify awareness of "God the Void" as awareness of one's sheer adaptive behavior and the lack of an integrating organization. Awareness of "God the Enemy" is identifiable as the level of life wherein the self is organized according to the principle of harmony and God is seen as a contrasting if not antagonistic harmony. The third level, organization under the principle of creativity, interprets the experience of "God the Companion" as a mutuality of relationship to the divine companion which functions to transform the specific organization of the human individual, breaking through his self-harmonization and giving an ever growing meaning context to the pluralities of his experience.

In his interpretation of Whitehead's view of religion as solitariness Wieman emphasized that this definition is an assertion of the fundamentally social character of the individual. Also this meant to him that the religious life of the individual involves the realization of the nature of one's unique individuality as a focus of social relationships, and sensitive response to the meanings in these relationships.[1] Whitehead pointed out, this is a matter of recognizing one's place in the world. Echoing a sentiment of his predecessor in the department of philosophy at Harvard, Whitehead stated that "Religion is World-Loyalty."[2]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 6.

For Wieman this emphasis on solitariness was in effect an assertion of the relation of religious method to the understanding of the process of the creation of individuality. Solitariness is a necessary response to one's social origins for the emergence of a definite individual organization. But the resulting organization, as Wieman indicated in relation to his notion of creative interest, is for the sake of fuller participation in the concreteness of life religionships. Solitariness is not to be compared to the mode of organization which Wieman earlier called the "coordination of interests." Such a mode of individuation results from an act of abstraction which cuts the individual off from the full range of concreteness available in immediate experience.

Consequently, we can see that the definition of religion as solitariness means in its fuller development that the individual lives within a process which transcends him. This transcendence is the pattern of creativity which functions to admit the fullest possible range of actuality to experience. By this creative activity the individual is given concrete individuality as a unique creative emergence and as a factor related to the creation of other goods and possibilities.

In developing the theme that religion is solitariness, in Methods of Private Religious Living Wieman distinguished two levels of community, or social structures within which an individual lives. What Wieman called the first level of community "consists of the established patterns of social behavior."[1] This is the level of community at which individuals are united into a society by the organizing functions of cultural institutions. But there is a second level of community, a level of "common need and interdependence which is suppressed and concealed by the mores."[2] The basic characteristic of participation in this community is the sharing of the "common need to integrate our experience progressively by the discovery or development of an ever more inclusive unifying purpose."[3] Although the first level community of the mores is the immediately apparent social context of the individual, the second level is far more intimate in the life of the individual. Wieman contended that it is by participation in this second level of community that one receives one's humanity. In this level of interrelationships one finds the sources of one's creation and the enrichment of life.

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[1] WRT, p. 208.

[2] A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 60.

> Therefore this interdependence is one of the most direct and intimate manifestations of God which a human being can experience. To discern this deep organic community of need and interdependence by which all men are bound together, is to discern the subtle and intricate weaving of the world process by which a web of ever-increasing interdependence is woven silently, secretly, pervasively, through all the doings of men and the workings of the universe.[4]

God is this integrating process at work. Accordingly, Wieman understood society to be an achievement of God, but God is not to be equated with society. God includes a fund of possibility for actuality which "far exceeds the most complex society thus far developed."[5] In further delineating the notion of God, Wieman made use of Whitehead's definition of God. Wieman pointed out that God, understood as such a reality, transcends society in two ways. First,

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[1] H. N. Wieman, Methods of Private Religious Living (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 67.

[2] Ibid., p. 68. [3] Ibid., p. 70. [4] Ibid., p. 178. [5] Ibid., p. 79.

"God in the form of possibility far transcends society."[1] Secondly, He transcends society in that "this process of integration has in it a cosmic past which stretches back far beyond the earliest human society."[2] God is both the memory of the achieved cosmic community, and the fundamental fact by which cosmic history is operative in the present. Accordingly, the reality of God must be distinguished from society at any level, Wieman contended, including "the great community of indiscriminated interdependence."[3]

We should take care to note the distinctions between God, the great community, and the community of the mores, and how these notions are interrelated. God as the ultimate world forming process, the "process of progressive integration," Wieman conceived to be cosmic in scope, but discoverable in human society.[4] He understood that this is fundamentally what was intended by a variety of terms in various philosophies, such as Smuts' "Holism," Hobhouse's "cooperation," Whitehead's "principle of concretion," Pupin's "creative coordination," Hocking's "Whole idea," and S. Alexander's and Lloyd Morgan's "nisus toward ever higher creative syntheses."[5] So designated, God is fundamental to the actuality of any world at all.[6] This cosmic divine activity is that which forms the ultimate context of human life; this activity can be discovered by man as a function for the release of untapped stores of human energy.[7] God is a function transcending any concrete event basic to the actuality of the world and human life. This cosmic function, whereby man is created in a universal community, is not tied to the achievement of human good although God is that which actualizes human good. If man should block the movement toward richer and more intensive integrations, then, Wieman warns, man may have to be destroyed for the sake of higher integrations. This is implicit for Wieman in the integrity of this creative function in events. God is a fundamental integrity in events as a world creating function. This view stands in continuity with the Idealist's notion of God as a fundamental unity of purpose expressing itself in the world. But Wieman does not view God as the concrete universal. It is in the function of God in events for concretion that we find continuity with Idealism.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 79. [2] _Ibid._, pp. 79, 80. [3] _Ibid._, p. 80. [4] Ibid., p. 52. [5] _Ibid._, pp. 52, 53. [6] _Ibid._, p. 54. [7] _Ibid._, p. 60.

The most complete integration possible for concrete events is the community of interdependence. This community is not coextensive with the totality of reality. However, Wieman conceived it to be of cosmic dimensions, since it is that integration whereby reality has unity as a world. There are integrations of limited scope which block wider ranging and more intensive integrations, Wieman pointed out, but this is not the type of integration Wieman identifies with God. God is the most inclusive integration as a structured process functional within ever growing ranges of events.

An assumption working here is that although the world may be a pluriverse at any historical time, it continually moves toward unity as a universe. This is in the nature of the order of alternative possibilities which God presents to the world. This movement in the world toward a universe is the great community of interdependence. Participation in this great community yields that most immediate manifestation of the work of God. Any particular event is transcended by God, but it is this transcendence which gives actuality to the individual, and is that reality through which the present individual is related to the past and the rest of reality. It is in this relation of being transcended that the individual becomes a part of the community of common need and interdependence.

The institutional communities, or the "community of the mores," Wieman saw to be based upon the reality of the fundamental cosmic community and the functional character of God. However, he pointed out, the basic community of need and interdependence is likely to be found in conflict with the community of the mores by those who are able to discern the deeper community.[1] The community of the mores is rooted in human effort to provide patterns of customs and institutions for meeting common needs. But the resulting modes of interrelationship may prove inadequate in meeting actual needs and in eliciting the full wealth of interrelationships discerned as possible within the cosmic community.

This conflict can be resolved by interrelating the two levels of community in the life of the individual through the function of worship. Wieman suggested that the symbolism of worship can redirect attention from the overt community to the great community. Although symbols tend to be culture-bound, some symbols preserved in the community of the mores may serve to direct man's worship to the ultimate community.[2] Wieman stated that because the social context of human life, including the community of interdependence, is "the fullest expression of God in the realm of actualized historic achievement accessible to human experience," the community of interdependence is properly an object of religious devotion.[3] This is properly the object of religious devotion because, even though the range of actual and possible interrelatedness in this ultimate community is undiscerned, this is the community in which one is able to function to the fullest capacity of human life.[4] Devotion to the ultimate community does not constitute devotion to the undiscriminated totality of actuality. The object of devotion is the divine community, which is a groping toward unrealized and unimagined possibilities and values. This community which is the source of human life is the context in which the individual can give his "personal allegiance to the process of progressive integration."[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 68 ff. [2] Ibid., p. 77. [3] Ibid., p. 80. [4] Ibid.

In this discrimination of meanings in his philosophy of religion we see again certain striking evidences of a continuity with the analysis of the human situation made by Royce in his portrayal of the nature and function of the Beloved Community. The community of need and interdependence represents life at the level of mutual creativity in "The Organization of Interests." The community of interdependence is a structure of relations in which human functions are united by the ultimate creative function in events.

In this view of the growth of religion, Wieman insisted that conceptual knowledge can only play a subordinate instrumental role. "By seeking through worship and the experimental processes of living that way of life which God sustains we can attain the most practicable kind of knowledge or wisdom about God."[2] Practical wisdom is of primary importance, but conceptual knowledge is important in its function of giving practical wisdom accuracy and communicability. But for Wieman, accuracy and communicability are of utmost importance to the religious quest. Awareness of the religious datum is not enough for a fruitful religious method. A total significance of the event must be grasped if awareness can in any way be fruitful.[3] This significance is a structure discerned in the event, not something put into religious experience by the subject. Again this points to the contrast between Wieman's notion of religious experience and that of liberals such as Smith and Bixler.[4] The significance of religious experience is a discernible structure in events which is not dependent on the human subject, but is an order of relationships of the greatest importance for the human subject.

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[1] Ibid., p. 216. [2] WRT, p. 180. [3] RESM, p. 373. [4] Above, pp. 3-6.

Intelligent abstraction is accordingly a subordinate but indispensible response to the religious datum for efficient religious living.

Wieman found value in Whitehead's effort to define the concept of God within the context of a philosophy of nature, because in his judgment this definition could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of religious living. Wieman remarked that Whitehead's work is a return to an ancient effort to base metaphysics on a physical understanding of the world, but, in his estimate, unlike earlier efforts in that Whitehead's views are "far more hospitable to the implications of religious experience."[1] Wieman found Whitehead's notions of "concretion" and "prehension" to contribute to the refinement of religious understanding. "The principle of concretion," wrote Wieman, "means that everything that exists . . . involves in its existence the totality of all being." Referring to Whitehead's use of Tennyson's "flower in the crannied wall," Wieman stated that this means "this flower is what it is because all the rest of being is what it is."[2] Other things in the past and possibilities for the future come to a focus in each entity such as the flower. There are degrees of relevance with which each particular thing prehends the various factors in the universe. So the universe becomes concrete in the flower. Prehension refers to the relation of inheritance in this complex of constitutive relationships in concretion from the aspect of the thing concreted, so that the thing, such as the flower, "prehends" all of being.[3] Concretion involves more than a relationship to all actuality, it involves a relationship to all possibilities, again with ever-widening circles of relevance.

The image in the notions of prehension and concretion is similar to Bergson's view of the function of memory in the creative thrust of the present into the future. As with Bergson, the theme of novelty in these notions is upheld. However, Whitehead's view of the sense of a structured relationship of the present to the past for the future becomes a more dominant aspect of the image for Wieman.[1] This emphasis on structure and order is brought out in Wieman's interpretation of the principle of concretion. "But why," asked Wieman, "is this entry of all being into every particular thing called the principle of concretion?" The answer, he found, is "because the concrete is precisely the unification of many into one."[2] There can be no particular concrete apart from the coming together of a wide range of relations in the constitution of any entity. Wrote Wieman,

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[1] WRT, p. 182. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 183.

> The principle of concretion is this system of organization which makes all abstract forms and all events have some share in the constitution of any flower or grain of sand. . . . And why does all being do this? . . . All being does this because it is its nature so to do. This inherent nature of all being is God. . . . That order pervading the universe that makes it concrete is God. God is not himself concrete, says Whitehead, but he is the principle which constitutes the concreteness of things.[3]

Wieman would not identify the order which is God as a conceptual order by which events would be ordered "from outside." Such an imposed order would be a return to an idealistic metaphysics. The principle of order for Wieman is a world ordering function within events. Since the most immediate awareness of this order ingredient in events is in aesthetic experience, Whitehead identified the fundamental order as aesthetic. He regarded moral order as one aspect of this fundamental aesthetic order. Conceptual knowledge abstracts other factors from the fundamental order.

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[1] For Whitehead's response to Bergson, see Science and the Modern World, p. 52. Whitehead objected to Bergson's judgment that the spatializing of the intellect is necessarily a vice. Whitehead contended that "this spatialization is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical construction."

[2] WRT, p. 184. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Accordingly, the process of abstraction which yields knowledge is at best a partial apprehension of order in events. But abstraction is not, as in Bergson's estimate, a degenerate product of the life process but may serve the function of creativity in human events.

As Wieman elaborated Whitehead's notion of God, we can see a continuity with Wieman's notion of world individuality presented in "The Organization of Interests." God is not the totality of the existent world, if for no other reason than that he excludes evil from his being. In contrast to God, evil, said Wieman, is "the principle of discretion or anti-concretion."[1] Evil is the destruction of relatedness and concreteness: the disruption of creative function. As a fragmenting activity evil is dependent for its reality upon the principle functional for the actualization of the world. Evil is accordingly a dependent function, not just the lack of the function of concretion.

Wieman rejected the conception of God as the world totality also because He is not the concreteness of the world. He is rather "the constitutive, aesthetic order of all being," the foundation of concrete order. He is not concreteness but the functional condition for concreteness. There is no concreteness apart from order or relatedness. By analogy, Wieman suggested that God as the principle of concretion can be compared, in relation to the concreteness of the world, to the relation of the principle of the uniformity of nature to any particular theory of nature.

Wieman noted that God may be spoken of as more than the world. God "transcends the existent world inasmuch as he is not only its constitutive order, but also that order which pervades and gives system to all abstract forms."[2] God is the order of possibility as well as actuality; the ground for rationality as well as concretion. Again we find the appeal for Wieman in the notion of an ultimate conceived as a functional structure of relations.

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[1] Ibid., p. 187. [2] Ibid., p. 188.

In regard to the notion of God as the order of possibility, Wieman developed Whitehead's notion in a direction which anticipated his later rejection of Whitehead's doctrine of Eternal Objects. In the *Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, Wieman assented to the point that the forms of possibility do not change, but argued that there is a constant reorganization of their order in the passage of events. Wieman saw God as the reorganizing function.

> It is God who constantly reorganizes this realm of abstract forms in order to preserve and often enhance the concreteness of each thing and of the universe. . . . Because of the principle of concretion all the infinity of abstract forms assumes a different relevance whenever any new thing comes into existence.[1]

Whitehead did not so describe the function of God in the actualization of entities. Whitehead stated that "an actual occasion is to be conceived as a limitation."[2] The actual occasion "selects" certain forms or eternal objects as forms of definiteness for that occasion. Whitehead wrote of this as a gradation, not as a reorganization of the realm of eternal objects. Whitehead ascribed to the realm of eternal objects an analytic character, by which each possibility is seen as in a definite relationship to other possibilities. "Every such relationship of each eternal object," wrote Whitehead, "is founded upon the perfectly definite status of that object as a relatum in the general scheme of relationships."[3] The function of God for Whitehead is the "ultimate limitation."[4] As the ultimate limitation of possibility, he is the ultimate order by which any thing is actualized from given antecedents.[1] Consequently, God is envisaged as functioning to relate specific possibilities to various occasions. But Whitehead's notion of God is not well represented in the image of God constantly reorganizing the realm of possibilities. God is the abstract order of possibilities for realization.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 194-95.

[2] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 162.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 164.   [4] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

Wieman's interpretation of Whitehead on the point reveals his notion of God as a functional structure in events. Because of this, he eventually was unable to accept Whitehead's realm of eternal objects as an ideal order of possibility.[2] God, as the principle of concretion, is, for Wieman the principle of concretely active creativity, and as such makes new possibility relevant for actual occasions. God is a structure of activity in events, functional for the creation of new actualities. The divine function involves the reorganization in events of relevant possibilities for the present occasion. This virtual creation of new possibility reiterates the convergence of themes from Bergson and Royce, namely that the ultimate is in the immediate and that the ultimate is a functional structure of relations in events. Further, in Wieman's identification of God as a creative function in events, the image of the Roycean ultimate is retained. The contrast to Whitehead makes this evident. Whitehead presented the notion of eternal objects as forms for realization in discussion of the function of abstract entities in actuality. Whitehead saw all actual occasions as connected to and transcended by a realm of ideality.[3] This ideal realm is the formal precondition for any actuality but is not identifiable with realized patterns in actual occasions. We see a different image regarding possibility and its relation to actual occasion in Wieman's thought. Wieman employed the language of Whitehead, but the notion that God is an operative function in particular situations is more dominant. This trend of thought we find to be rooted in a spatial image of the ultimate. Wieman's notion of God is fundamentally a spatial function. This was the thrust of his notion of the world individuality in the "Organization of Interests" and his appeal to Whitehead's Total Event as significant of divine function.

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[1] Ibid., p. 178. [2] Below, p. 254. [3] Whitehead, ibid., p. 158.

In a paper entitled "Consciousness is Spatial," Wieman examined in the context of his developing world view a notion which had been central to Absolute Idealism. We noted that in the development of evolutionary thinking the idealists' response to the Spencerian position was to point out the lack of recognition that human consciousness introduces novelty into the evolutionary process. With the human will functioning for novelty by the introduction of formative ideas into concrete situations, the idealist saw survival values to be significantly modified. Royce saw consciousness to arise in a structure of relations in the growth of experience which he specified as the relation of interpretation. Wieman retained the emphasis on the understanding of consciousness as emergent in a unitive and creative function in experience.

In "Consciousness is Spatial" Wieman contended that consciousness is never one part or element within the totality of immediate experience. Instead, consciousness "is that totality taken as a single, indivisible, organic unity."[1] Just as Whitehead had said that the whole of nature is not an object for thought, Wieman points out that consciousness as the "totality of immediate experience" escapes observation, since it cannot be isolated as a factor in experience. Wieman uses the analogy of a molecule and its constituent atoms. Consciousness is like the molecule, not identifiable with any of the elements, but is the whole. This whole is not just the aggregate of parts, it is an individuality in its own right, something more than the sum of the parts.

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[1] H. N. Wieman, "Consciousness is Spatial" (unpublished paper from the files of Professor B. E. Meland. Chicago, 1928), p. 1. (Typewritten.)

In answer to the question of how we become conscious of our consciousness, Wieman answered that we become aware of consciousness as we become aware of certain contrasts: such as things passing in and out of awareness and things being under the control of things not in consciousness. From this we make the distinction between that which is in consciousness and that which is outside of consciousness. Also we come to identify certain types of behavior with attentive consciousness, such as overt physical movements in following an object of interest. Wieman pointed out that no one is directly conscious of the consciousness of another individual. We observe the behavior of others and discover signs of consciousness.

Can consciousness be conceived to be anywhere? Wieman answered that consciousness characterizes a complex situation involving the human individual with his physiological equipment in relation to the physical environment. Consciousness, he contended, emerges in the space of this biological and physical environment.[1]

> The actual space of immediate consciousness is an integral part of physical space. . . . Consciousness is made up of the brain and innumerable other factors all interacting in a certain definite system of relations with one another. Consciousness is this total system of related factors.

For instance,

> when we perceive a star there is some space extending out beyond our eyes for an indefinite distance in the direction of the star which we immediately experience and which is therefore a part of that totality of immediate experience which is consciousness. Just how extensive the space of consciousness may be, we cannot tell. But we do know that consciousness is made up of a system of interactions between spacially separated objects and hence in some sense must be spacial.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 6. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.

Consciousness is thus a total happening in experience. We would interpret consciousness in Wieman's meaning as a "whole function" in experience. Obviously not all experience is conscious. In fact, without making the step to the metaphysics of a world of pure experience, an individual's consciousness encompasses only a small portion of the experience of an organism. Wieman here suggested that consciousness is the emergence of a total structure of experience.

Wieman's concept of consciousness is rooted in a rejection of the type of view Whitehead referred to as theories of the bifurcation of nature. This is required to give a basis for the acceptance of relations with their spatial characteristics as immediately involved in consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness emerges giving a total structure to a vaguely defined spatial field.

In "The Organization of Interests" Wieman had found the highest good to be the growth of consciousness. Growth of consciousness meant an enlargement of awareness of the actual relationships of the individual in his environment. This growth of consciousness, Wieman found to be a model for the ultimate world individualizing process which in the relation of the individual and the divine is indicated as "mutual creativity."

What I am suggesting here is that in this discussion of the notion of consciousness we have presented a model for the understanding of the process of integrative interaction as the ultimate value creating process. The important feature of this model is that consciousness is not only a unity for an individual in a field of relations in which he is at the experiential center, but that it is a spatial unity integrating physical relations. Similarly, the process of integrative interaction is not only a process producing unities in a limited field, it also is an enfolding of the pluralities of a space for the sake of future possibilities. The implicit suggestion is that creativity in the integration which is consciousness, and in the process of integrative interaction in events, is a function of a spatial structure of relations.

We have found that Wieman appealed to Whitehead's philosophy of nature as a vehicle for the expression of his view of the religious object as both an absolute function and an absolute image. To accomplish this Wieman employed Whitehead's notion of "total event." Wieman saw the total event as a terminus of attentive awareness. As a terminus of awareness he understood that the total event could signify God as an ingredient of the total event. By this development from Whitehead, Wieman sought to bring together creative function and the image of the structured event in the religious object. In this effort he joined in one object the function and image which had earlier been separately identified with the notions of mutual creativity and the Concrete Individual. This conjoining of function and a structural image in the religious object issued in a notion of creativity which was in contrast to Whitehead's notion of God. Wieman was able to move toward an increasing emphasis on the specification of the structure of creativity, whereas Whitehead considered the ultimate notion to be that abstract metaphysical condition required for the emergence of any structure in events.

Wieman did not rest content with Whitehead's conception of religion. He found the identification of religious experience with aesthetic experience misleading unless certain precautions were taken.[1] The word "aesthetic," Wieman contended, must be understood to include the full range of feeling relations in experience, including the sense of inexhaustible richness in events, and the sense of possibilities for good and evil.

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[1] This response by Wieman to Whitehead's use of "aesthetic" indicates a different mood in the two men. Whitehead was willing to take a word and refine its meaning for its technical employment. Wieman here shows his dominating analytic concern. He was concerned that a meaning be misconstrued because of common associations of a word. Thus in Wieman's judgment the word "aesthetic" in its common meaning is too narrow to carry the meaning Whitehead placed upon it.

But beyond this, Wieman pointed out, the designation of religious experience as an aesthetic mode is seriously deficient if it "does not readily connote the strenuous practical nature of religion and above all that desperately experimental character which is expressed in the word faith."[1]

This conception of faith as experimental introduces us to that aspect of Wieman's thought which has been deemed his most characteristic, namely, his religious instrumentalism. We have found the philosophy of science and the metaphysics of Whitehead to have provided a resource for a coherent expression of the doctrine of God as a process of transcendence in events. But it was Dewey who provided the philosophical resource for his development of a method of religious inquiry. To this aspect of Wieman's development we will now turn.

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[1] WRT, p. 210.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGIOUS INSTRUMENTALISM, THE HUMAN FUNCTION IN RELATION TO THE TRANSCENDING FUNCTION OF GOD

To Wieman, the modern development of science meant two things for religion: "(1) that certain finely devised experiments yield certain results with a very high degree of uniformity, and (2) that a certain awareness of the concrete fullness of experience yields values indispensible to human living."[1] The second point has been in part developed in the previous chapter in relation to Wieman's appeal to Whitehead. By the first point Wieman acknowledged the power of the empirical method of the sciences. It was in the mood of this question that Wieman appealed to Dewey, although his relationship to Dewey was much more far reaching than the question of method implies. In Whitehead, as we have seen, Wieman found a metaphysical orientation which could serve as a vehicle for his own thinking. However, the orientation of Wieman's concern to discern the divine-human relationship operative in events for the sake of more fruitful adjustment of human life, received a powerful thrust from Dewey.

As we have seen, this movement of thought did not have its roots in Dewey, but found initial expression in Wieman's thought in relation to the conversation which took place between absolute idealism and creative evolutionism. The identification of creativity with a certain type of structure of relations in events we have found to be characteristic of a philosophical effort that can be traced from Royce's appeal to Pierce's relation of interpretation through Wieman's notion of mutual interpretation to the conception of God as a process of integrative interaction. A common feature to be noted is that all of these notions direct attention to a definite functional structure of relations in events. From Wieman's early work, one could assume that this structure of relations is held to be the object of an inquiry which can yield knowledge of this structured process. Such knowledge is evaluated according to its effectiveness in instrumentally furthering human adjustment to the creative process in events. In short, the assumption is that in important respects the pattern of relations in the process of transcendence is specifiable as a definitely structured function in events.

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[1] RESM, p. 158.

Dewey's impact on Wieman's thought can be seen in Wieman's growing emphasis on the instrumental function of the concept, and the consequent possibility of the control of events through the attainment of instrumentally employable knowledge.

It was in Dewey's instrumentalism that the themes of experimental method and immediate awareness were joined in a view which encompassed an analysis of experience, a view of nature, and a theory of knowledge and inquiry. We find this view summarized by Dewey in his attribution to nature of three defining characteristics.

> In the first place, it is implied that some natural events are endings whether enjoyed or obnoxious, which occur, apart from reflective choice and art, only casually, without control. In the second place, it implies that events, being events and not rigid and lumpy substances, are ongoing and hence as such unfinished, incomplete, indeterminate. Consequently they possess a possibility of being so managed and steered that ends may become fulfilments not just termini, conclusions not just closings. Suspense, doubt, hypotheses, experiment with alternatives are exponents of this phase of nature. In the third place, regulation of ongoing and incomplete processes in behalf of selected consequences, implies that there are orders of sequence and coexistence involved; these orders or relations when ascertained

> are intellectual means which enable us to use events as concrete means of directing the course of affairs to forecast conclusions.[1]

Dewey pointed to three patterns of happenings found in the experience of nature. We can see in this analysis a similarity to the threefold typology of activities and interests which Wieman had earlier employed in "The Organization of Interests." Wieman's adaptive interest is illustrated in activities of the first type which Dewey characterized as casually occurring endings. This is nature providing immediate satisfactions or dissatisfactions without reference to any purposes or patterns of relationship. In the second place, Dewey suggested nature is a process of events which can be ordered into a pattern, such that several events can be organized to find fulfilment in a "concluding" event. This aspect of nature seems to correspond to Wieman's level of instrumental value, but we find that the third aspect of nature which Dewey distinguishes charts out the instrumental employment of this characteristic of nature.

In making this comparison we can see at the outset that despite similarities between Wieman's earlier analysis of activities in nature and that of Dewey, a difference in viewpoint is evident which we will find to divide the two men sharply. This issue arises in connection with the third level of these analyses. At the third level Dewey presented the notion of instrumental control as the method for the achievement of selected ends, whereas Wieman found a level of activity to which any pattern of control can become instrumental, but is itself a pattern in events which is not a pattern of human control. We will find, however, that a considerable ambiguity arose in Wieman's appeal to Dewey's thought since Wieman sought to relate the themes of these two functional analyses. The result for Wieman was a tension between the theme of fruitfully applied instrumental control in events and the instrumental relation of controls to a given functional structure in events.

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[1] John Dewey, Experience and Nature (2nd ed.; New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 159.

Dewey did not neglect the aspect of the given in events. In fact he attributed to the qualitative given the status of a gift of grace. Dewey wrote of values as immediate qualities given in the passage of events:

> The satisfying quality of esthetic objects, their power to compose while they arouse, is not dependent upon definite prior desire and effort as is the case with the ideally satisfying quality of practical and scientific objects. It is part of their peculiar satisfying quality to be gratuitous, not purchased by endeavor.[1]

Value objects are apprehended as given experienced qualities. Practical objects are defined by concepts. In this contrast between two types of objects, Dewey pointed to a givenness in the basic flux of experience. This is the first aspect of nature in its character as immediately felt: the uncontrolled occurrence of endings in experience.[2] Awareness of this "uncontrolled" passage of endings is what Dewey saw to constitute consciousness. As he stated, "Consciousness is flux in which nothing abides."[3] But events are also constituted by determinate orders or sequences, and these orders can be discovered by reflection on experience.[4] Reflection functions to discriminate and abstract the conditions which give rise to particular immediacies. The discovery and formulation of this order in an abstraction or an idea, makes possible the application of what is found in one area of experience to other experiences as an instrument of control. As Dewey stated, by control of sequential processes, ends become fulfilments of purposes, not just termini of processes.[5]

The philosophical resource which Wieman found in this view of immediate awareness is evident in Wieman's statement in Religious Experience and Scientific Method that his purpose

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[1] Ibid., p. 63. [2] Ibid., p. 159. [3] Ibid., p. 113.

[4] Ibid., p. 110. [5] Ibid., p. 159.

> is to show that religious experience is experience of an object, however undefined, which is as truly external to the individual as is any tree or stone he may experience. It signifies something which extends beyond that space-time occupied by the individual undergoing the experience.[1]

Wieman identified the religious object as having the apprehendable structural character of Dewey's practical and scientific objects. A difference in conception will become apparent, as we have already suggested, but we can see that Wieman's reading of Dewey yielded support for the contention that the religious object so conceived is an empirical given. This empirical ground of religion was central to Wieman's orientation, as he testified that he was "very sure that religion must plant itself firmly on the data of sense else it will become the plaything of the sentimentalist and nothing more."[2] For Wieman, the ravages of subjectivism and sentimentalism in religious piety is something to be fought as the plague. This vigorous response undoubtedly was reinforced by encounters with pietism in American churches, although I would contend that such a response is of a piece with the insistence on the objectivity of the religious focus of concern which Wieman consistently voiced.

We can see that the religious method which Wieman developed with the themes of awareness and the instrumental employment of scientific method found support in his reading of Dewey. However, as Wieman was ready to admit, these two themes are related in the structure of Hocking's Principle of Alternation as well. In religious inquiry, Wieman saw the principle of alternation to indicate a total function of creativity in human inquiry. It was in the light of this total functional structure that he found the significance of Dewey's distinction between "meaning" and "meaningless experience."[1]

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[1] RESM, p. 5. [2] Ibid., p. 5.

Dewey made a basic distinction between meanings and events. Meaning or significance to Dewey is a pointing function which some events may have for other events. Any event which "may occur in one's experience without signifying anything to the individual" is a meaningless event.[2] An event is meaningless when attention is entirely taken up in the immediacy of the event without pointing to another event. Wieman held that this analysis provides a characteristic description of mystical experience, as he found mysticism interpreted by W. E. Hocking and J. H. Leuba.[3]

Wieman argued that the occurrences of meaningless experience does not necessarily involve diminution of consciousness.[4] For Wieman, this involved a self-conscious rejection of the thesis of the Absolute Idealism which he attached to the name of Bradley (but not Royce or Hocking!) that any experience ultimately has a meaning reference as constitutive of that experience.[5] However, he did admit that immediate experience, as meaningless experience, has a positive value in the discovery of new meaning.

We saw that Whitehead defined the significance of an event as the relatedness of things. For Dewey, meaning is relatedness; but relatedness in its functional or operative character. As Wieman stated Dewey's position, "meaning, otherwise called concept or judgment, is the method by which we control the content of experience."[1] For an event to acquire a meaning is to become a symbol for another event, or, for another meaning. As a meaning gains fullness and accuracy, it will function symbolically within a system of meanings which refer to an event, or a class of events. This process of acquiring meaning, in Dewey's judgment is the reason for the preoccupation of traditional philosophies with systems of meaning. He saw this concern to issue in attention to abstractions apart from concrete reference. If meanings and events are divorced, such that the events to which meanings refer are lost sight of, then, he contended, meanings lose their function in experience. An abstraction is then in danger of being reified merely as an object for rational or mystical intuition. Consequently, Dewey held that the contemplative approach to knowledge is the sickness of philosophy.[2] If attention is redirected to the sources of abstractions, in their function as sign relations between events, then meanings cannot properly be considered mere objects of cognitive attention. Wieman agreed that "meaning is the method by which we control experience."[3] Accordingly, he pointed out the two types of situations in which experience may be meaningless: (1) in the case of the lack of a sign relationship, or (2) in the case where the system of meanings has turned in upon itself and ceased to function in the control of events. By this, he suggested, Dewey did not deny the practical function of such systems of abstraction as mathematics and logic, and the fact that the practical application of these systems may become possible only long after the development of the system. But in the immediate situation, any system which closes in upon itself "has lost at least a part of its capacity to render life more abundant," by becoming divorced from concrete experience.[4]

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 322 ff. [2] _Ibid_., p. 322. [3] _Ibid_., p. 323.

[4] _Ibid_., pp. 325 ff. We should note the connection of this point with his criticism of Whitehead (even though somewhat misdirected) and with the point for which he contended in "The Organization of Interests," namely that consciousness diminishes as life becomes routine, and that consciousness is most full when the individual is attending to the fullness of the given for its own sake.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 330.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 98-102.

[3] RESM, p. 334. [4] Ibid., p. 338.

Wieman contended that when meanings fully function in reference to other meanings and to events, then the transformations in human life which lead to the development of culture and growth in the life of the spirit can take place. Such growth of meaning is what meets the basic human drive toward more abundant life. This more abundant life "means to have access to wider ranges of experience for use and enjoyment."[1] Here we find the theme that had first been expressed in "The Organization of Interests": that the highest good is the fulfilment of creative interest, which is interest in the growth of consciousness. To this is added the emphasis on the function of empirically rooted abstractions in the control of other experience to further the growth of consciousness. However, at this point it may be noted that for Dewey the expansion of the system of meanings is of a primarily practical import: it increases the power of control. The aim of this control is for the increase of values, which are intrinsic satisfactions. For Wieman, basing our judgment at this point on the viewpoint in "The Organization of Interests," it is the engagement in the process of the growth of good which is the ultimate satisfaction. The contrast here will be heightened as we consider differences in value theory, and understandings of the nature of the process of the increase of good.

The appeal of Dewey's instrumentalism for Wieman's mind was obviously powerful. It is suggestive to note that both men emerged philosophically from Absolute Idealism, so that it is not surprising to find a similarity of response on many issues. As former idealists, they both found a pivotal point for their reconstructive efforts in a reconception of the nature and function of consciousness, since self-consciousness was a key term for Absolute

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[1] Ibid., p. 339.

Idealism. We noted that Wieman found consciousness to be a fulfilment rather than a formative factor in value experience, and as a self-maintaining feature of life was sustained only by creative interest. Dewey made this "turning of the tables" on Idealism even more explicit.

> Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation. The current idealistic conception of consciousness as a power which modifies events, is an inverted statement of this fact. To treat consciousness as a power accomplishing the change, is but another instance of the common philosophic fallacy of converting an eventual function into an antecedent force or cause. Consciousness is the meaning of events in course of remaking; its "cause" is only the fact that this is one of the ways in which nature goes on.[1]

Or, as Dewey expressed elsewhere, consciousness is the subjective and private aspect of process. But again, we can see that for Wieman the roots of this inverted understanding of consciousness are found in the idealism of Royce and Hocking. Both idealists identified consciousness with a structure of happenings in events. This is not to deny that it remained for the functional pragmatic emphasis to complete the inversion of the relationship between consciousness and structures in events.

Wieman referred to the type of consciousness which characterizes the response to events in religious experience as the "consciousness of bare event."[2] He distinguished this consciousness from the consciousness in events instrumentally ordered "which manipulates received objects and essences to derive new ones from their relations and implications."[3] "Consciousness of bare event" is a mode of engaging immediately in the flux of events, a process of ceaseless transformation in which old meanings undergo dissolution, and within limits, there is a sense of raw possibilities for future meanings.

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[1] Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 308.

[2] RESM, p. 342.

[3] Dewey, ibid., p. 222.

But the flux of meaning is intrinsically ineffable. It is such a condition of mentality that Wieman saw to be a basic condition for the emergence of radical originality, the process of discovery, wherein old structures of meaning are dissolved and replaced by new, richer, and more adequate systems of meaning.[1]

For his interpretation of meaning, Wieman drew together the notions of meaningless experience, meaning, and Whitehead's "total event" with a sensitivity to the claims of mysticism that there is a good not our own, functioning in events. Wieman drew these lines together as he stated: "Now it is our claim that religion is precisely our response to the undefined significance of this total wealth of experience when we take it as a single datum signifying the supreme and total object with which we have to do in all the conduct of our lives."[2]

We cannot see this statement growing from the development of a philosophy of religion rooted solely in Whitehead and Dewey. There is a factor operative in Wieman's thinking here which is expressed in the high value given to immediacy for its own sake. This is seen when Wieman adds to the function of the religious experience delineated above a second function as an ecstatic stimulus. This second function is that the religious experience "gives us an ecstatic and stimulating experience of that ultimate substance out of which new worlds may be made by developing new ways of reacting to it."[3] In this statement, Wieman pointed to the factor in his perspective which operated in his appeals to Whitehead and Dewey. This is an appeal to a functional structure operative as an ultimate in events; an ultimate in which one becomes related in the world as a specific channel of creativity. In other words, I am contending that in Wieman's work we find a restatement of the theme that events contain an ultimate function which is empirically discernible, and that this theme was initiated in Wieman's background. This theme was continued in the way in which Wieman appealed to Dewey for support of the contention that in events is to be found an ultimate resource for human fulfilment.

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[1] RESM, p. 352. [2] Ibid., p. 368. [3] WRT, p. 156.

To examine further evidence in relation to this general judgment about Wieman's work, we will turn to an article in which he sought explicitly to develop a philosophy of religion which he saw implicit in Dewey's experimentalism, particularly as presented in The Quest for Certainty.[1]

Wieman restated many of the features of Dewey's instrumentalism to which we have given attention, and summarized by saying that "Mr. Dewey's instrumentalism . . . consists in the claim that everything should be both instrumental and consummatory."[2] That this is not only important as a method for religion but constitutes a religious assertion, is a thesis that Wieman sets out to defend. As quickly becomes evident, this amounts to a restatement of his position in terms of Dewey's instrumentalism.

The conception of religion which Wieman found basic in Dewey's view consists in passionate devotion to the best that is and can be, even if this is unknown. "The function of religion in life," wrote Wieman, "is to provide the invincible striving and unquenchable zest; the function of science is to provide the specifications for the guidance of this striving."[3] To gain knowledge to guide religious striving, Wieman limited the attention of inquiry to those processes which bear possibilities for yielding good in human life. The discrimination of these aspects of events is the work of scientific method, effected "by observing the conditions and consequences of physical operations."[1] In the study of empirical processes many diverse factors are found which contribute to human good, but in answer to the question of whether there is a unity or plurality of value producing processes, Wieman replied: "It is not the several discrete and separate factors at all which sustain and promote value, but it is a kind of interaction between them all."[2]

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[1] H. N. Wieman, "Religion in John Dewey's Philosophy," The Journal of Religion, XI (January, 1931), 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] Ibid., p. 7.

> The several different factors that enter into this process of interaction, such as earth, air, social heritage, institutions, sciences, organic functioning, and so on, have their important function; and we must deal with them. But if we do so in such a way as to promote values, we must always do it with a view to promoting a certain kind of interaction between them. Hence it is this interaction which is the object for our supreme concern. To this process of interaction we must give our devotion.[3]

To clarify the nature of this kind of interaction, Wieman turned to Dewey's value theory. The raw material of value, for Dewey, consisted of enjoyments. Wieman interpreted Dewey to say that "Value is only that particular kind of enjoyment which is derived from my judgment that what I am doing is a sustaining and promoting function within a whole system of mutually sustaining and mutually enhancing enjoyments."[4] The increase of value is the increase of this "system of mutual interdependence and support among all enjoyments actual and possible."[5] The increase of this system is the work of the process of progressive integration. "Process of progressive integration" is Wieman's descriptive phrase for "that upon which we are dependent and to which we must commit ourselves completely if the greatest possible values of existence are ever to be realized."[6] This process of growth in value then can be accepted as the religious object, Wieman argued.

In Dewey's value theory Wieman found another way in which to state the meaning of God as a functional process in events, wherein the particular individual and his experience is taken into a larger unity, and thereby transformed, or given new value, and enabled to function in new and wider structures of meaning. With Dewey, Wieman emphasized the necessity for attention to conditions required for the occurrence of any particular value. With knowledge of these conditions, and the technical ability to produce these conditions, man has control over the production of a value situation. But another factor was operative in Wieman's appeal to Dewey's value theory. This is of the nature of an assumption, or of a way of looking at events, such that the value creating process was seen as a process which functions transcendently. This assumption or perspective had two aspects. First, there was operative the assumption that there is a definite highest good, or greatest value. For Wieman, to specify this was to point to a certain type of happening or process in experience, as a type of happening among values. Dewey was unable even to make use of such a notion as the highest good or the greatest value, either in the abstract or in reference to a concrete situation. For him, such a notion harked back to the reification of abstraction, and seemed to be a denial of the indeterminate character of the passage of events and the possibility of alternate possibilities for value and systems of value. Beyond speaking of the possibility for greater value, for Dewey there was consequently no point in applying superlatives to values.[1]

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 8. [2] _Ibid._, p. 10. [3] _Ibid._, p. 11.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 12. [5] _Ibid._, p. 13. [6] _Ibid._, p. 18.

A second assumption basic to Wieman's value theory, was the status given to a unity of structure in a value system. Dewey saw the process of value-enlargement to be one in which a unity is created in a system of concrete relations, judgments and enjoyments. Wieman, with Dewey, recognized the pragmatist's transposition of the role of the notion of unity in the empirical processes from that of an ontological precondition to that of a system of relationships and processes arising in events. However, in addition to this, it is evident that in Wieman's thought the process of progressive integration by which values are created and transformed had a unity apart from achieved empirical unities. This creative process had a unity of structure which for Wieman was the object of religious inquiry apart from the empirically knowable unities which Dewey agreed may arise in events. But, as becomes more apparent in his later conversation with Wieman, Dewey could not see why the production of these relative unities should require the notion of a unitary process in their creation.

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[1] Below, p. 232.

Another way in which to state this point, is to speak of the logic of the argument implicit in Wieman's response to Dewey. The basis of the argument for the development of Dewey's position for a conception of religion was that in any situation where values are to be increased, a plurality of factors of many sorts must become mutually adjusted and integrated to produce and sustain value. The unifying or integrating of activity into a specific system of relations, implied, for Wieman, a unity in the process of integration operative throughout a field of diversified events. Dewey's analysis of the nature of the good implied for Wieman that when a concrete good emerges there is operative some structured aim for the good, or some purpose which finds expression in specific occasions. This feature of his thought is seen in Wieman's direction of attention to the common structural aspect of all occasions in which the growth of value takes place. This tended to bypass the unique, pluralistic characters of individual occasions of growth of value, and to limit attention to this uniqueness by treating it as possessing value primarily because of its structure. Even in cases where Wieman called attention to the restrictive possibilities of the cognitive response, his emphasis was on the achievement of a greater unity or integration in an increasing range of relationships. The drive of religion is then toward the ever more inclusive totality (as in Dewey) but at the risk of passing over the gem-like character of unique particular goods, and the richness and depth in regional processes.

To further test this judgment that Wieman presupposed an operative unity of structure in the process of value creation, we will turn to the exchange between Wieman and Dewey in the pages of the Christian Century. This conversation arose in response to Dewey's review of the Wieman-Macintosh-Otto conversation which appeared in the Christian Century, and had been published under the title Is There A God?[1]

In his comments on Wieman's contribution to the conversation, Dewey indicated that he saw in Wieman's position something of a caricature of pragmatism, since beyond the analysis of religion as an answer to a human need, he understood Wieman to be seeking in religious inquiry "an objective counterpart for human love and devotion."[2] Dewey recognized this to be an oversimplification of Wieman's position, but in the final analysis he was ready to contend that in some sense this is true, considering the way in which Wieman delineated that which is the objective fulfilment of concrete human needs, especially the urge toward the achievement of greater good. Dewey's judgment was that Wieman's argument moves from an inclusive generality about human experience to an exclusive Christian theist conception. "The shift is," Dewey stated, "between the fact that men find conditions and forces in existence which generate and sustain the goods of living, and the assertion that these things constitute a unified and single object which rightly demands the supreme devotion of all human living."[1] The argument moves, contended Dewey, from the first fact of experience to a second claim which is not a fact of experience, but involves an exhortation to devotion. Dewey commented that without this shift involving an appeal to an objective unity which "rightly demands devotion," theism is not involved in Wieman's view. Dewey contended that all that is given in experience is a collection of forces "unified only in their functional effect: the furtherance of goods in human life."[2] There may be emotional values in unifying this collection of goods, Dewey admitted, but he held that it is a much saner course to choose "*distribution* of objects of devotion, service and affection rather than hypostatic concentration of time, seasons, objects." He noted the general similarity of Wieman's aim to his own, in that he saw Wieman to be one who recognized the humanistic need to expand meanings and distribute goods. But he saw Wieman also as one who is restrained from implementing this concern since he is "overmastered by emotional overtones derived from the earlier conception of an exclusive and jealous God."[3]

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[1] Henry Nelson Wieman, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, and Max Carl Otto, Is There a God? (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1932).

[2] John Dewey, Review of Is There a God? by H. N. Wieman, et al., The Christian Century, L (February 8, 1933), 195.

Wieman responded directly to Dewey's contention that unity is lacking in the conditions and forces which advance the good, and set out to demonstrate that there is in such events "a unitary object which does command our supreme devotion."[4] Wieman responded with his argument that that which can command devotion is whatever has the greatest value. Another way in which Wieman stated this, and which resulted in an ambiguity which Dewey picked up, was in saying that if there is anything which can be an object of devotion, it is that which creates the greatest value. Wieman did not directly meet Dewey's pluralistic counter contention for a distribution of objects of devotion, but reiterated that the "highest value is found in organic unity," therefore the object of devotion is a unity.[1] This unitary good is found in any situation in which various activities focus to serve some needed function "in the total organization of life." The product of this sort of organization of activities is culture. But what, Wieman asked, is the nature of the process which accomplishes this?

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[1] *Ibid*. [2] *Ibid*., p. 196. [3] *Ibid*.

[4] H. N. Wieman, A letter to the Editor, *Christian Century*, L (March 1, 1933), 299.

> Such culture cannot be constructed or manufactured by human intelligence. It must grow. . . . The process of its growth is that of integrative interaction between individuals, groups and successive generations, a great part of which is unconscious and unintended. This organic unity constitutes greatest value, grows in our midst, when favorable conditions are provided.
>
> Since organic unity in this sense can alone constitute highest value, it alone should receive our highest devotion.[2]

Wieman here indicated that unity is found at several levels. We must distinguish these levels of unity if we are to avoid the ambiguity with which Dewey charged Wieman. First there is the unity of relations in any good as a cultural achievement. A culture is an order in happenings. In a culture, certain specific goods are valued and supported. We can also distinguish the organization of these goods in the field of cultural unity. This is a second locus of unity. A third level of unity is in that process which is productive of cultural unities. Another way to state this, is that there are three levels of value to be appreciated, even as intrinsic values. First, there is the atomic value, the value of an object as given, the aspect of sheer enjoyment of the immediate quality. The second level is that to which Dewey pointed as the ordering of values in ever expanding systems of mutually signifying values. This is the value which the individual may find as a functional structure of relations fundamental to his or any other culture. Wieman did not here make these distinctions explicit, yet they can be seen to operate as separate meanings. These distinctions are similar to the three categories of value which Wieman presented in "The Organization of Interests."

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[1] Ibid., p. 300. [2] Ibid.

Because of a certain lack of precision regarding types of values in this discussion, an ambiguity in Wieman's use of the word "unity" resulted. This is reflected in an ambiguity of reference when he spoke of the object of human devotion. The object of this devotion is a unity, but which sort of unity? First, supported by his claim that evidence can be produced to moderate Dewey's radical pluralism, Wieman contended that in given occasions there is a coming together of forces, a unifying of happenings which produces empirical cultural unities. The ambiguity arose because Wieman spoke of organic unity as receiving our highest devotion. Now, organic unity is a unity of the process of relationships. Organic unity can be identified as a process of growth, so that it is a space-time unity. This may be illustrated in a biological organism, or a culture. But then, Wieman would respond that the object of devotion is not the specific pattern of organic unity of a biological individual or of a culture, although this is the meaning which a person of Dewey's perspective would find in Wieman's words. Wieman sought to make clear that this was not his meaning when he described the nature of that reality which can be the claimant for human devotion as

> the growth in our midst of that organic unity wherein the activities and situations which engage us acquire maximum value by reason of fulfilling a worthy function in that total system of mutually sustaining activities and situations which should include as much of human life as possible. It is that for which all human life should be lived.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

It is such a "functioning unity" that can be designated by the name "God" if any reality at all is to be called God. However, Wieman admitted, the use of the name "God" is not necessary since the focus of religious concern is not a word but a life of devotion whereby the good may be maximized. Life, under this devotion, must be adjusted to this "functioning unity," not to the specific cultural unity of concrete relationships.

Wieman came to recognize that his theory of value was not identical with Dewey's, but added the judgment that the difference is not too important. But we can see that the difference is of major importance, and is part of the reason why to Dewey's mind Wieman did not succeed in demonstrating theism from Dewey's value theory.

Dewey stated that value involves both structural and appreciative factors. An enjoyment is a value as it serves a structure of relationships to other values, and is consciously acknowledged to serve this structure of relationships. Accordingly, the ethical aim for Dewey was the control of events and their relationships such that the system of interrelationships between enjoyments is enhanced, and entered into with greater awareness by each individual. For Wieman, values were similarly constituted by relationships. But just as there are different levels of experience, there are different levels of value. Accordingly, and this is in line with the emergent evolutionism to which Wieman had been attentive, value is a fact which is not just something to be associated with the human consciousness in awareness of an individual's relationships. Wieman had contended that in the emergence of values, there is a total relationship of the world to any instance of value.[1] Wieman had stated this position when he was responding to Whitehead's philosophy of nature. But this same contention was presented in another guise when he found in Dewey the more congenial, empirically restrained spirit. Working within the imagery of social interaction, Wieman here contended that there is a unity in the process which characterizes the creation of ever wider fields of integrative interaction. He pointed to a purposive unity of process, an urge toward ever widening ranges of the function of integrative interaction. Wieman held that this *nisus* toward integration of interactions is a functioning discernible at all levels of the world process.

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[1] WRT, p. 162.

Dewey argued that the evidence supports his judgment that the occurrence of integrations is haphazard. The only large scale unities which he could find are those introduced through human control. It is of the nature of human life, argued Dewey, to increase the good, i.e. enjoyments. The increase of good is most fully served by developing methods of inquiry and means of control such that the range of interrelated good can be increased. Dewey voiced this contention in his reply to Wieman that:

> the important thing is the fact, the reality, namely, that certain objective forces, of a great variety of kinds, actually promote human well being, that the efficiency of these forces is increased by human attention to and care for the working of these forces.[1]

Dewey argued that Wieman made an illicit transition in his argument "between God as the power which *makes* for the greatest good and God as the Greatest Good."[2] For Dewey, this is a transition which can only be effected by human effort. "The transformation of objective forces which *make* for good into the Good itself," Dewey wrote, "is unqualifiedly dependent upon human desire, loyalty, devotion."[1]

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[1] John Dewey, Correspondence entitled "Dr. Dewey Replies," *The Christian Century*, L (March 22, 1933), 395.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 394.

In his reply to Dewey's last contribution to the conversation, Wieman particularly noted Dewey's words that "that which makes for good . . . demands care . . . from man in order that it may do its work, . . . But there is nothing about it or them particularly to demand love and adoration."[2] Dewey was speaking about the specific forces which produce good. Wieman pointed out that by "that which makes for good" he meant not a chemico-physical process, but "the actual present growing good." Wieman sought to clarify his position by continuing with the assertion that the present growing good exemplifies the progressive integration to which he is directing attention. Because the growing good depends upon the growth of organic unity, "the growing good is not many but one," it is a unity both as means and as a supreme end.[3]

Certain assumptions regarding the nature of the good in Wieman's thought militated against understanding on the part of Dewey. One assumption, growing out of Wieman's early work in value theory, is that the greatest good is not something that can be made, such as by accumulating more and more goods in a system of relations. The greatest good for Wieman was a contrasting kind of value, a value which is enjoyed through participation in the process of the growth of good. Such an understanding of the nature of the highest good accordingly leads one to look for a structure in the process of growth in value which is an ultimate object of value. Such a structure is distinct from particular goods in concrete events, although it is fundamental to these goods.

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] H. N. Wieman, "A Communication: Mr. Wieman Replies to Mr. Dewey," *The Christian Century*, L (April 5, 1933), 466.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 467. Of course, this sort of reply did not clarify anything for Dewey.

Wieman sought to define the basic difference between himself and Dewey. In his estimation the issues which divided humanism and naturalistic theism were twofold:

> (1) Can man dominate and control the process which makes for the good of life or must he rather serve and follow it?
>
> (2) Can he exploit and use it or must he give his loyalty and affection to it?[1]

Wieman assented to the latter of each alternative on the basis that there is an operative reality which is a functional unity in events. It is small wonder that Dewey did not further pursue this conversation when Wieman confirmed Dewey's suspicions by stating that:

> God is whatever organic unity there is to human desires, institutions, activities, situations, this organic unity including also wide regions of the physical and biological universe. . . . Also this organic unity extends far beyond present day humanity into the depths of physical and biological existence on the one hand, and into the realm of possibility on the other.[2]

The discussion continued in a further exchange in which Bernard E. Meland sought to point up Dewey's response to Wieman.[3] Meland offered a clarification of the issue by distinguishing those respects in which God could be understood as a plurality from those respects in which the divine is a unity. Dewey's favorable response to Meland's statement indicated that this was a constructive reply to Wieman in keeping with Dewey's intent.[4]

Meland noted an ambiguity in Wieman's writing, in that on one hand he wrote of those (pluralistic) conditions which are of supreme value, and on the other hand, of that something which is of supreme value. To clarify this problem and in an effort to resolve the issue between Wieman and Dewey, Meland made a distinction between the religious and the practical response to the religious object. The religious response, Meland suggested, is synthetic. The religious response is one in which the worshipper "unifies the many to visualize the abundance of life's fulness in its totality."[1] In contrast, Meland pointed out that the practical responses to the religious data tends to be analytic. In analysis one attends to the functional aspect of a structure or process. Meland emphasized the plurality of functions in any system of empirical conditions of support and growth. He did admit a systematic character in that which sustains and creates values.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid

[3] B. E. Meland and H. N. Wieman, "Is God One or Many?" The Christian Century, L (May 31, 1933), 725.

[4] Ibid.

> There is a working together, a coordination of functions, but that coordination is the abstract pattern. The system in operation is a multiplicity of functions.[2]

Meland suggested that the problem of thinking of reality as pluralistic or unified can be resolved by saying that reality is both: "Oneness is reality synthesized; the many is reality analyzed."[3] The religious object is a unity in the synthesis of the appreciative response of worship. Understanding and use of reality involve analysis in attention to the pluralistic character of reality.

In response to Meland's distinction between the aspects of unity and plurality in God, Wieman sought to counter any reading of the empirical religious datum which would exclude a unity in the given.

> I hold that the oneness is just as empirical as the manyness. We truly experience the oneness of God whenever we experience that great goodness that consists in the unity of many conditions, each of which is indispensible to the goodness experienced. Our experience of the goodness is experience of the oneness of the operative conditions which sustain and constitute it.[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 726. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., 727.

In terms of our study of the image and function of Wieman's notion of the religious object, we can see in Wieman's insistence on the functional unity of God, that his resistance to Meland's suggestion stems from an unwillingness to separate the function and image of the religious object. Seen in this way, Meland's identification of the empirical oneness of God with the synthethetic response of the worshipper divorces the image of divine unity from the divine function. If so divorced, for Wieman the image of God would be identified with the activity of the worshipper, not the reality of God.

But we must ask a remaining question: Is the oneness which Wieman found in the empirical given, the oneness which is central to his theism? If we admit an empirical unifying of relations in value experience, does this empirical flowing together for a good beyond the collective goods of the confluent parts demonstrate that unity to which Wieman was seeking to direct attention?

This is certainly the datum to which Wieman pointed. But just as certainly, Wieman said that more is given in this datum than Dewey or Meland were ready to admit. These men did not deny that there are empirical unities in events, but found unities as emergents in company with a plurality of other individual unities. Wieman contended that in the plurality of empirical unities there is discernible a unity of function operative in the coming together of the multiplicity of individual events. Meland had suggested that if anything can be known of this sort, it can only be known as any generalization can be known, as the result of analysis, and only in such a way could be a given unity.

To restate, the nature of this issue on the unity of God, let us consider the argument in a somewhat different form. We are given two occasions:

occasion A and occasion B. Also let us assume that both occasions display a growth of value, such that both occasions contain the religious datum. Wieman asserted that the religious datum in both occasions is an operative reality which is a unity in both events. Meland said that the divine reality in each occasion is a distinct datum for that occasion, such that the divine in occasion A is distinct from the divine in occasion B. The divine becomes operative as a unity for the worshipper in the response of worship. The divine is a particular functional unity for the particular worshipper. In contrast to this pluralism Wieman contended that the divine is a unity for both occasion A and B apart from any human synthesizing activity.

Now, we may ask, why does Wieman place such a premium on the attribute of the Oneness of God, especially since this point is not integral to the issue of theism and humanism (except for Dewey's judgment regarding the appropriate definition of "God")?

My contention is that this insistence on the attribute of unity in the religious object is a persistence of the image of the Absolute as a functional unity operative in all creative historical processes. In the late developments of Royce's Idealism, the Absolute in its temporal aspect is a unity of purpose functioning as a structured process, specified as the process of interpretation. The persistence of this image of the ultimate can be seen in the retention of emphasis on unity of aim and a unity, or general uniformity of modes of functioning. Further, this function is seen as universal: it operates at all levels of reality, or at least at all levels open to human experience. At the human level, this functioning is apparent in value experience, as experience of a transcending function in events, given in the growth of value.

One aspect of this image was lifted up and given a particular emphasis in alliance with Dewey's theme of the ethical demand to control experience for the sake of greater good. This is in the definition of the cognitive aim of religious inquiry as the specification of the religious object in terms of required conditions and definite types of happenings. The insistence on the unity of the religious datum is of a piece with this aim of religious inquiry. We can then see that the unity of the religious object for all occasions is a presupposition for a method of specification.

This instrumentalism of adjustment to the growth of good which is God is similar to Dewey's instrumentalism to the extent that the aim is an efficient integration into natural processes for the production of greater good. However, even as Wieman drew the line between the theist and humanist orientation, he suggested an inversion of the instrumentalist method. This inversion became most explicit in Wieman's conversation with Professor Robert Calhoun published in Christendom.

In Wieman's statement of the nature of faith in his discussion with Calhoun, he gave one of his most compelling presentations of religious instrumentalism, pressing instrumentalism as a philosophical principle in a way which Dewey would hardly recognize.[1,2,3] Yet Wieman's basic notion of faith as commitment stands in a family relationship to Dewey's conception of faith as commitment to the growth and realization of the ideal.[4] Wieman's notion of

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[1] H. N. Wieman, "God is More Than We Can Think," Christendom, I (Spring, 1936), 428-42.

[2] H. N. Wieman, "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, I (Autumn, 1936), 762-78.

[3] H. N. Wieman, The Absolute Commitment of Faith," Christendom, II (Spring, 1937), 202-14.

[4] John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 50-52, 56, 57.

faith is stated in terms of "commitment" and "growth," but the object of faith distinguishes his notion sharply from that of Dewey. For Weiman, the object of faith is that which is operative for the increase of value in human life. This points to an important difference between Wieman's and Dewey's understanding of the function of the object of faith. The result is an inversion of instrumentalism in Wieman's conception of faith as absolute commitment.

Wieman sought to make his conception of faith explicit by stating its relation to knowledge. Faith is not related to knowledge, he stated, as assent to assertions made in the absence of knowledge, nor in compensation for a high degree of uncertainty. Faith is not such a substitute for knowledge, but is man's response of self-commitment to an object of knowledge on the basis of some true judgment. The judgments on which faith is based is known to be true on the same methodological grounds that any judgment can be said to be true. Knowledge of the object of faith is true just as any judgment verified by scientific method is true. Truth is important, but the essence of faith for Wieman is in self-commitment, not in the truth status of the proposition to which one gives assent. On the other hand, faith does not wait on complete knowledge of the object of faith. Wieman concisely stated his position when he wrote that "a worthy faith is knowledge plus commitment plus the recognition that our knowledge is not complete. Such faith does not require any belief that goes beyond knowledge."[1] Consequently, Wieman argued that we may have knowledge without faith, but not faith without knowledge. "We know God by rational knowledge; and when we commit ourselves to God, this knowledge becomes faith."[2]

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[1] Wieman, "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, I, 764.

[2] Ibid., p. 778.

The distinguishing mark for Wieman of that commitment which is faith is its absolute character. The absolute commitment of faith does not mean assent to belief beyond knowledge. A notion of faith which is bound to any particular statements of belief if not absolute, especially if belief asserts more than that which is knowledge according to the basic criteria for any sort of knowledge. Wieman pointed out that a commitment to belief beyond knowledge would be a limiting commitment. Consequently, the term "absolute" cannot be applied to any cognitive assertions. It is only the self-giving of the individual which can be absolute. It is the nature of the object of religious commitment that requires absolute commitment if the fullest good of life is to be served. What is served in faith is the best that there is. To clarify his meaning, Wieman described the value context of human life.

> My point is this: every concrete situation, no matter how drab it may seem, is pouring down upon me an infinite flood of value. . . . There are no words to express the magnitude of the diverse potential values which throng upon me all the time, although I can be conscious of the specific forms of only a microscopic area of it all.
>
> God is in every concrete situation. God is the infinite unexplored totality of good that beats upon the shores of my consciousness but cannot awaken my appreciative response save to an infinitesimal degree compared to the greatness of what is offered.[1]

God is not just the aggregate of good which "beats upon the shores of my consciousness," but is a totality of this good. Recalling the conversation with Dewey, we can interpret "totality" to refer to a total value character of this unexplored good.

> Faith is absolute self-commitment to this unexplored totality of value that throngs and pours and throbs upon me in the form of innumerable stimuli playing upon my psycho-physical organism in every concrete situation. Masterful faith cuts free from the dominating control of every specific good, every specific belief, idea, object, object of desire and aversion, because this faith renders the individual subject to one and only one dominant control. This dominant

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[1] Wieman, "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," Christendom, II, p. 204.

> object of devotion which frees the individual from the control of every specific object of desire and fear, is God, the uncomprehended totality of all that is best in this concrete situation.[1]

In short, the form of faith must not limit the appreciative response of the individual, since this is in fundamental opposition to the direction of the divine activity. Wieman stated that God is the highest good, whatever that good may be. However, it is apparent that he had a clear notion of what this highest good is. The purpose inherent in this highest good functions in human life to break bondages to specific goods, etc. This again is a function which Wieman had identified with a pattern of happenings in events in his initial effort in value theory in "The Organization of Interests." In the statement above, we can see that God is more than "the uncomprehended totality of all that is best in this present concrete situation." God is also a function in the present concrete situation, and in any concrete situation, to free the individual from limiting devotions.

With the creative function of faith in transforming the function of individual structure, Wieman saw faith as an operative commitment to yield a new awareness of the character of the events in which the individual lives. Wieman contended that the awareness of faith cannot properly be considered knowledge. Consistent with his distinction between knowledge and awareness as expressed in *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, he held that this awareness is not conceptual cognition. However, prior to the *Christendom* articles he had discussed this awareness as a kind of knowledge different from scientific knowledge which is gained under a life of commitment.

In the *Issues of Life*, Wieman had said that there is a kind of knowledge which is "the most rare and precious knowledge which simple folk seek and find by reason of their loving devotion to the object under investigation."[1] This is the knowledge of community, mutual understanding and love. The difference between this knowledge and other knowledge corresponds to the different data which are a resource for each type of knowledge. Which type of data becomes available for knowledge depends upon the way in which we open ourselves receptively to experience. This emphasis on human receptivity stands forth in Wieman's notion of faith as commitment, in that one aspect of the practice of faith is that the man of faith finds data for the knowledge of God given to him only as he frees his sensitivity through the commitment of faith.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

Wieman's own varying response on the question of knowledge and faith indicates a recognition on his part of a "knowing response" of the sensitive individual to the structure of his life relationships which is not clearly specifiable in conceptual form. But the fact that he did see this at one point as a type of knowledge indicates that the object to which the response is made is a structured reality with a qualitative character bearing value possibilities for events. Wieman recognized this "knowledge" of the qualitative character in events to be formative for the response of the individual, even though it does not reach the stage of explicitly communicable conceptualization. However, as we have noted, the dominant movement in Wieman's thought was to reject this as a matter of knowledge in any proper sense, and to distinguish this response as a type of awareness. In the Christendom articles, he explicitly rejected Bergson's non-intellectual form of knowing, but indicated his indebtedness to Bergson's work in his contention that the attainment of knowledge does not itself constitute the end of human endeavor.

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[1] H. N. Wieman, The Issues of Life (New York: Abingdon Press, 1930), p. 200.

He held that knowledge and its formal character, truth, are only instrumental in function.

> Truth is merely a means to an end. This much more important end is the deep appreciative awareness of the fullness of good which dwells in God--God who is pervasively and intimately and abundantly present in each concrete situation.[1]

Wieman saw a basic religious problem to arise from the fact that appreciative awareness is inhibited by the cultural situation in which we find ourselves. Wieman saw cultural institutional structures to be the root of man's wrong attitudes and personality dispositions which hold him back from a full deep appreciative awareness of God. It is only through the function of faith as absolute commitment that the individual is enabled to overcome these limiting human cultural structures. These cultural structures arise from the human effort to control his environment and to promote achieved goods and their mutual enhancement.

In this, Wieman followed Dewey's analysis of social value structure, but restated his conviction that this is not a complete understanding of the process of growth of value and the human function in this process. The absolute character of faith undercuts the dominance of the concern for human control by inverting the instrumental relationships in the human structure. Faith for Wieman involved the breaking of patterns of relationships by which the individual both seeks to control and is controlled, for the sake of freedom from particular goods, that the individual may be placed under the control of the divine totality of good, which he cannot ultimately control. This inversion of the theme of instrumental control is concisely expressed in Wieman's words as he suggested an approach to the implementation of the absolute

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[1] Wieman, "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," Christendom, II, 207.

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commitment of faith.

> The formula for this absolute commitment of faith runs somewhat like this. Commit yourself entirely into the keeping and into the control of the uncomprehended totality of the potential meaning and value which floods each concrete situation like a hidden glory. This hidden glory is God. Be receptive, alert, sensitive and responsive to every intimation of this hidden glory. Treat every belief, every program and ideal, every construction of the intellect, and intelligence itself, as instrumental. Treat these all as instrumental to the end of making yourself and your fellowmen ever more responsive, receptive and open to the hidden uncomprehended goodness of God.[1]

Ultimately, the aim of faith as absolute commitment is to make the individual an instrument of the "uncomprehended goodness of God," which means that the individual is made an instrument for the realization of good. The individual structure is integrated in a process which is itself the uncomprehended good. Wieman seemed to indulge in an ambiguity between the notion of God as the totality of concrete although uncomprehended good, and a view of God as a goodness which is an activity producing good. At times in these passages he writes as if the concrete goodness and the goodness of the divine activity were the same. Although we can see from his notion of God as creative process that the latter notion was the central understanding which he offered regarding the reality of God, this tendency toward an ambiguity in isolated expressions reflects the underlying view of creativity as a definite structured process working in concrete events.

We find this inverted instrumentalism of faith to issue from Wieman's understanding of the nature of God as an object of knowledge. God, as a power within the natural world, is in the concreteness of experience, not something pressing on the process of natural events from without. The reality of God is a creative working for concreteness, a process which "displays one kind of interaction, namely, that of unifying as in bonds of love."[2] However, since knowledge is the result of a process of abstraction and verification of specifiable structures in the data of experience, human knowledge of the reality of God can only be abstract. There is nothing wrong in this as long as the limited function of cognition is recognized. In religious living, man is related to the reality of God, not to an abstraction about God. The abstraction about God's working can be an instrument for the relating of human life to the work of God, but it is only an instrument. Abstraction is the distinctively human response to experience, as an effort of intelligence to understand and make experience manageable. Abstraction is the characteristic function of the human mind which seeks understanding by simplifying and conceptualizing. The limitation of knowledge is rooted in the fact that the reality of God in concrete creative activity transcends the abstractiveness and selectivity of mind. Wieman summarized this in saying that the reality of God is an "other" than mind and personality.[1] He was later to contend that his notion of "otherness" is a more appropriate religious contrast than that defended by the transcendental theologians.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 206.

[2] Wieman, "God is More Than We Can Think," _Christendom_, I, 430.

Faith defined as absolute commitment means that human life itself is ultimately considered instrumental to a function in events. God is a purposive happening which can function through human life. This theme is heightened when we note the contrast to which Wieman points between the control of particular goods over human life, and the control by "the hidden uncomprehended goodness of God." The control exercised by particular goods is a limitation and thereby an ordering of human life for the sake of the maintenance of that particular good. The linking of this control by specific goods to the theme of idolatry is not accidental for Wieman, since this results in the giving of the individual to the service of this limited good, thereby excluding other goods. This is a commitment which is not absolute.

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[1] Ibid., p. 432.

The object of faith as absolute commitment is that which is operative for the production of the greatest possible good. Strictly speaking, what then controls a life of faith is not any specific good, no matter of how wide the range. What controls is God defined as the growth of organic connections or the growth of meaning.[1] Such good continually functions to create new totalities of good and meaning. In this notion again is emphasized the aspect of a total structure, or a function of relating goods into a totality, rather than the specific body of good. This is not to minimize the concreteness of the divine working, but to emphasize that this is the embodiment of a functioning, and that it is this functioning which is God.

Additional support for this contention can be found in Wieman's specification of definite results of the act of faith. These results can be read as functions which are performed in human life by the creativity which is beyond human life.

> First, one is freed from blindness, inertia, narrow preoccupations, fear, fixations, so that one can turn outward toward all this uncomprehended fullness and be progressively responsive and appreciative to more and more of it. Second, every painful experience, every trouble, disaster, difficulty of any sort, becomes a device by which one is rendered more sensitized to the fullness of all that is precious, becomes more open, receptive and appreciative. Third, this commitment to God enables one to rise above every circumstance because no loss of any specific good and no positive evil in any specific form can be overwhelming.[2]

These results specify the operation of the control of human life by the "totality of good" which is beyond human life. This control operates to release the human structure from specific limiting goods to make it possible to relate the functions of the human structure to the function of the divine event. In this relationship, human cognition, the abstractive function which is characteristic of human life, becomes instrumental, not to humanly defined ends, but to the divine function. "This kind of faith," Wieman wrote, "is what is meant by the perennial cry of all great religious devotees to be emptied of self and to have no will save the will of God."[1] This institutes an inversion of the function of abstractions in Dewey's instrumentalism, in that the abstraction may perform its function by being broken by the divine function in the growth of good. We find here the strong theme of the power of the good responded to in faith, in spite of our inadequate knowledge.

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[1] Ibid., p. 442.

[2] Wieman, "The Absolute Commitment of Faith," Christendom, II, 205.

As for the historically constructive source for this "inversion," we must note a striking similarity to the relationship which Wieman proposed in "The Organization of Interests" as the normative relationship between creative value and instrumental value. Instrumental structures have their function, not as an ultimate harmonization, but in providing organizations which make possible a widening range for creative interest. This again points to contrast in Wieman's thought between the good which human life can control, and the good which can control human life for the greatest fulfilment of human life. Also we find the roots of this contrast in the earlier concern of the idealists to state the relationship between the idea, pragmatically understood as an abstractly known but operative concept, and the ultimate function of world creation. For Royce, the function of world creation as apprehended in the Beloved Community transcends the function of any "natural" human community just as for Wieman the function of the goodness that is God contrasts to the function of human cognition.[2] This contrast in function was alluded to by Royce as transcendence, and again we will find that Wieman's own notion of functional transcendence lifts up this functional contrast.

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[1] Ibid., p. 206.

[2] H. N. Wieman, "Man's Work and God's Work," The Christian Century LIII (April 8, 1936), 531-33.

We have noted that Wieman's conception of God is not just "goodness," nor the aggregate of all that is good, but a total structure creative of the good. This totality of good, is held to be functional in events, and fundamentally, this total function is what God is. The reality of God is the working of God.[1] Consequently, we must not rest with the notion of God as total good, unless we can see in this totality a structure as a functional reality. This structural aspect of Wieman's conception of God is more apparent as we examine Wieman's redefinition of substance which in turn he employed to define God.

Wieman defined substance as "that which is fundamental." Wieman distinguished three ways in which one can meaningfully speak of substance in this sense. According to his first meaning, substance is "simply the total system of all the activities, actual and possible, that are required to maintain the integrity of the system."[2] The second meaning is "an activity which underlies all other."[3] This activity which is a precondition for all other activities may be called a process, since it goes on in time, even though it is conceived to go on forever. The third meaning is the "changeless factor found in all change." This could be called an eternal form or structure. By this Wieman meant that although in the movement from possibility to actuality there is a change in the status in forms or structures, this does not mean a change in forms. Forms are accordingly understood to be basic to any actuality.

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[1] Wieman, "God is More Than We Can Think," Christendom, I, 440.

[2] Wieman, "Faith and Knowledge," Christendom, II, 771.

[3] Ibid., p. 772.

Wieman combined these three notions of substance into one and saw this combined notion to point to that reality which can be identified as God. "God is (1) the most inclusive and organic system of activities, (2) the underlying system of activities, and (3) the eternal form of this system."[1]

All activities, or empirical happenings, have in them "the temporal process of change and also the form of that process which is eternal. God is both immanent in the temporal process as growth of value and transcendent over that process as eternal form."[2] This is about as close as Wieman ever came to explicit reiteration of the late idealist's notion of God as an absolute function. This judgment finds additional support as we examine Wieman's major effort to specify the structure of the creative event. His notion of God as a functional structure is brought to even clearer focus as we will see, when he came to diverge pointedly with Whitehead on points which play into this reconception of substance.[3]

In a discussion of theological aims in education held in 1943, Wieman worked with men who freely employed notions of theological transcendence. Wieman was frequently criticized for his lack of attention to this theme, which had become fashionable with the rise of neo-orthodoxy. It is reported that when Wieman rose to present his paper, he startled his hearers by announcing that he tood had a doctrine of transcendence.[4] The development of this presentation appears in The Source of Human Good in his discussion of the notion of functional transcendence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 773. [2] Ibid.

[3] H. N. Wieman, Source of Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 189.

[4] Recounted in conversation by Professor B. E. Meland, May, 1961.

Wieman remarked that Christianity "has come to be identified with a faith directed to a transcendental reality."[1] He characterized the traditional understanding as holding that this transcendental reality is above history and the events of nature, but is also a power which reaches down into history and natural events with saving power. Wieman was particularly disturbed by the unintelligibility of the logic of transcendental theism. He found the doctrine of revelation particularly questionable in its claim to transcend rationality. Anything involving value distinctions Wieman considered to be a matter involving reason, and he found such distinctions implied in religious discourse.[2] However, the basic problem in this view is religious. Transcendental theism with its superhistorical object of faith, in Wieman's estimate, produces a mood of indifference and a sense of religious irrelevance in regard to the particular historical events in which human life is involved.

In contrast to this transcendental theism, Wieman offered functional theism as a conception of divine transcendence. Wieman's view, while not metaphysically transcendental, characterizes the source of human good as "functionally transcendental."[3] This he held to be a more accurate response to the religious datum than transcendental theism. He contended that the view of God as a functionally transcendent reality retains the functions of God identified with transcendental reality in traditional Christianity.

Wieman found six "saving functions" associated with what he called the "metaphysical myth of supernaturalism" in traditional Christianity.[4] These functions are:

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[1] Wieman, ibid., p. 263. [2] Ibid., p. 34. [3] Ibid., p. 26.

[4] Ibid., pp. 264-65. This statement of the six functions is a paraphrase of Wieman's statement.

1) the preservation of faith from idolatry,

2) the establishment of a standard of righteousness beyond any social standard,

3) the establishment of a fundamental "super-institutional" community,

4) the demonstration of the cosmic scope of evil in its opposition to transcendental reality,

5) the revelation of an ultimate aim and obligation of human life, and

6) the revelation of possibilities of creative transformation beyond any human expectation.

In this analysis Wieman sought to distill what is in effect asserted in Christian faith apart from the mythical elements. In this there is a method of "demythologizing" which is similar to Royce's effort to determine the "essence" of Christianity. Royce and Wieman found this "essence" not in a group of moral teachings or centered in the figure of a founder, but in something which happens in events enfolding the founder, the moral expressions, and the lives of individuals who share this faith. Royce's analysis proceeded within the context of his philosophy of loyalty. The philosophy of loyalty issued in the statement of the essence of Christianity as loving devotion to the Beloved Community. In the relations of the individual to this community Royce found the meanings for the Christian doctrines of creation, sin, salvation, redemption, grace, the church, and eschatological fulfilment. For Wieman it was in the notion of faith as absolute commitment to the creative event that content is found for the Christian affirmation.

Neither Royce nor Wieman were concerned to make a detailed analysis of the literature of the Christian church to develop their positions. However, both were concerned to respond interpretatively to the Christian tradition. Both found the inherited Christian doctrines to possess meaning within a picture of the relations of the individual in the world, because they are found to point to specific relations and relations between relations, or functions in events. For both men, to discern functions in events to which the tradition seeks to relate life, and functions for human life, is not sufficient. A basic assumption in method is that these functions cannot escape the status of illusion unless these functions are displayed in a philosophically defensible analysis of human relationships.

The conception of the reality of God as a transcending function is further developed in the attention Wieman gave to specify the relationship of the creative good and personal structures. He pointed to the creative event as the creative source of personality, a working or activity in interpersonal relations, which does not do what personalities do. The personality structure cannot create itself, or other personality structure. For him this implied a functional difference which makes the category of the personal inappropriate and inaccurate for designation of the creative good. However, he saw another consideration to allow the ascription of personality to the divine. He admitted that in most cases such characterization is indispensible, because the growth of individual and group relationships may be furthered through the use of the personal ascription, whereas the impersonal mode of discourse might close off the desired response to the creative event.[1] Consequently, he admitted, use of a mythical symbol of the person in worship may be necessary to serve the function of the creative event. The use of the category of the personal then is admissable as instrumental to participation in the creative event, as long as it is not considered an adequate specification of the creative event itself.

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[1] Ibid., p. 267.

As a basis for an answer for the question as to what we can know about the truth of the creative event, he defined "truth" as specifiable structures in events and "knowledge" as specified structures.[1] The creative event as truth is a specifiable structure or order in events. This does not impute to Wieman a static conception of an absolute behind the creative event, although it must be acknowledged that the term "structure" has a connotation of static form. Even though Wieman did not intend to say that the creative event is static, yet there is a characteristic in his notion of the process of creative transformation which is an unvarying structure, as an order for the achievement of definite creative transformation. The creative event is the basis of any structure of truth, or all specifiable structures. However, the creative event, in some sense, Wieman dealt with as a specifiable structure, so that it is that truth which is fundamental to all truth. This is not to deny his contention for the concreteness of the working of the creative event. This is to contend that the concretely working creative event has a structure of its own, apart from the structures which it creates.

In his discussion of the nature of truth as specifiable structure, Wieman wrote:

> A substratum of the structure of truth is never changed by creativity so long as the human mind and its appreciable world continue to preserve any identity whatsoever. This statement is a tautology, for identity can be nothing other than identity of specifiable structure pertaining to the matter under consideration.[2]

Self-identity means continuity of structure. Having identified a structural and qualitative character of the creative event, we can say that the self identity of the creative good is an absolute. The creative good is an absolute as the universal structural unity and self-identity of the creative event.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 164. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

In the words of the statement above, the creative good is the ultimate substratum of the substrata of the structures of truth. As Wieman noted regarding his own metaphysics, "while structures are created, there is one kind which cannot be. It is that minimum structure which energy must have to be creative."[1] So as was intimated in Hocking's "biological equivalent of idea," structured energy has replaced the world-idea as the ultimate world condition.

In the Source of Human Good, Wieman clearly distinguished his notion of the creative event from Whitehead's principle of concretion, and rejected Whitehead's notion of God as the primordial ordering of possibility. This view, for Wieman, is clearly an instance of static formalism. The rejection of this view, with his insistence on the creation of possibility in the creative event, is a consistent move when we see the creative event as one formulation within an effort which has an intellectual ancestry in Royce's specification of the relation of interpretation in events. Royce conceived the Absolute to be operative in history as a definite functioning, so that the specifiable relation of the Absolute to the world must be of an empirical structural character, not fundamentally as an ideal order of possibilities. For both Royce and Wieman it may be said that God is the One Eternal Object, the sheer possibility of a world. And for both, this can be apprehended as a concretely functioning transcendence, which is specifiable as to the structure of its functioning.

Wieman wrote of the creative event as creative good. In fact, the creative event first enters awareness in value experience, and is not distinguishable as truth until linguistic signs can be employed to specify the order in events.[1] Specified organic relationships are only aspects of complex events in which human life meets the issues of good and evil.[2] "Thus the totality of all structure includes far more than can ever be specified."[3] Wieman reserved the term "truth" for "specifiable structure" rather than the totality of all structure since it is only specifiable structure "that is relevant to any inquiry within the bounds of possibility for the human mind and its world as now created."[4] Consequently, Wieman saw that "truth is never the whole of any concrete embodiment of value but is always one abstract feature ingredient in concrete value as experienced by human beings."[5] Wieman herein admitted to an agnosticism regarding knowledge of any total structure although he assumed that there is such structure, even though not empirically available. He did see the total structure as bearing upon human experience in value experience.

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[1] Ibid., p. 191.

To determine what is the proper value object for religious inquiry, Wieman distinguished three kinds of good. The distinction between creative good, intrinsic created good, and instrumental created good is a restatement of the distinction made originally in "The Organization of Interests." The earlier distinction was between adaptive, instrumental and creative values. The distinction between adaptive and instrumental value contrasts the satisfaction of an interest in its sheer immediacy and the ordering of interests for the satisfaction of an all enfolding or harmonizing interest. In the Source of Human Good intrinsic created good is "ingredient in every instance of satisfaction."[6] However, as qualitative meaning, this basic value is a structure of relations which gives to value experience more than qualitative immediacy. "Qualitative meaning is that connection between events whereby present happenings enable me to feel not only the quality intrinsic to the events now occurring but also the qualities of many other events that are related to them."[1] Value is a characteristic of a context of relations. Value is the qualitative aspect of a structure in events. The contextual character of this structure is immediately presented in experience as a complex of qualities. This quality-supporting and quality-interrelating structure is the objective character of that situation which yields what Wieman called intrinsic value.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

In the "Organization of Interests" Wieman had employed the Bergsonian category of instinct as a correlate with adaptive value. Something persists in Wieman's thought of the Bergsonian analysis of instinctual adaptation as an immediate response of a behavior mechanism to a pattern of relations focussed in an immediate quality. However, the more immediate philosophical resource for this theory of value as qualitative meaning is John Dewey. Dewey described the value situation as that in which there is a free interplay of the qualities associated with various interrelated activities, such that these qualities may be appreciated in any one of the related activities.

Wieman's description of an occasion dominated by instrumental value would not be a value situation for Dewey. The interrelationships between activities, as chopping wood and the life of the home, are actual for Wieman, apart from any consciousness of a qualitative interrelationship.[2] Instrumental value is value of an activity for some end apart from the immediate qualitative character of the activity-experience. Instrumental value, like the function ascribed to instrumental interest in the "Organization of

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Interests," tends to be mechanical. Certain events are instrumental to the support of other events in a mechanistic relationship without any qualitative interplay.

Wieman's recognition of one level of immediacy in percept and response as the level of automatic behavior, is in part similar to the idealist's contention, that percept is feeling moving toward idea. Basic to this is the assumption that there is a determinate structural basis of immediate experience. The structures basic to any specific qualitative meanings may be separate systems of relations yielding various disconnected intrinsic value satisfactions, and connected only by an instrumental system of relations which does not enrich any particular enjoyment by being qualitatively related to any other enjoyments.[1] Such a purely instrumental relation cannot be creative.

Instrumental and intrinsic goods characterize events exhibiting structures of interrelationships wherein actual qualities are enriched and sustained. Creative good is distinguished from these goods as the increase of growth of good. "When good increases," Wieman stated, "a process of reorganization is going on, generating new meanings, integrating them with the old, endowing each event as it occurs with a wider range of reference, molding the life of a man into a more deeply unified totality of meaning."[2] This "process of reorganization" is an event of events, or an event in events, since it is a kind of happening within the contextual situation described as constituting occasions of qualitative meaning. God as the Creative Event is the growth of qualitative meaning.

A fundamental contention in Wieman's conception of the creative event is that this value-ultimate is a patterned happening. The pattern to which he points is a spatio-temporal structure which is a function in events creative of other structures. The Creative Event is qualitative and structural. In some instances, there may be no human awareness of the quality, but only appear as a structure of happenings in a reorganization of patterns in human life.

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[1] Ibid., p. 55-56.

[2] Ibid., p. 56.

The Creative Event is similar to intrinsic value in that it possesses a qualitative character of its own. This qualitative character of the transforming creative event may be vividly appreciated, as in the emergence of new ideas, interpersonal communion, or personal transformation as in religious conversion. In each case, it may be the qualitative character of the total happening in events that is dominant, over-shadowing the specific qualities of particular events and their relations.

Wieman stated that the creative event is similar to intrinsic good in its immediate total qualitative character, yet it is different, since its working is usually directly apprehended, but only recognized in the awareness of newly created good produced by the creative event.[1] What Wieman in effect is saying is that the creative good is the ultimate intrinsic good. This ultimate structured functioning has its own quality. Therefore, the creative event can enter awareness either as quality or functional structure operative in the emergence of specific qualitative meanings.

This is similar to the total character of an event to which Wieman pointed in his appeal to Whitehead. However, again the notion cannot be defined adequately as a presented totality but as an organizing, unifying happening not limited to the structure of human interest and appreciation. Wieman emphasized his basic assumption that the creative event is a function with a unity of structure when he asserted that the creative event, although made up of four subevents, is indivisible.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

> The creative event is made up of four subevents; and the four working together and not any one of them working apart from the other constitute the creative event. Each may occur without the others and often does, but in that case it is not creative. We have to describe them separately, but distinctions made for the purpose of analysis must not obscure the unitary, four-fold combination necessary to the creativity.[1]

The four subevents are briefly characterized as follows:

> . . . emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from other persons through communication; integrating these new meanings with others previously acquired; expanding the richness of quality in the appreciable world by enlarging its meaning; deepening the community among those who participate in this total creative event of intercommunication.[2]

He did not intend to say that the four stages of the creative event are a serial division of happenings. He saw all four subevents to be constantly functional in the maintenance of human life. However, one or the other of the subevents may be most prominent in experience at any one time.[3] One point on which Wieman insisted was that his general description of the creative event was intended to characterize the creative good at the level of human life and experience. However, it should be immediately apparent that more than this is involved.

The creative event is defined essentially as a function among values, thus as a value among values. In brief, this function is the increasing of the interrelationships and structures of relationships in events such that greater qualitative meaning emerges. Similarly, the four subevents may be described as four subfunctions, thereby placing emphasis on the event as a happening to the human structure with consequences unforeseen and undesigned by the human structure.

The first sub-function is the awakening awareness in the individual of the context of relations to other individuals in which he lives. This awareness of interrelation is "an emerging awareness in the individual of qualitative meanings communicated to it from some other organism."[1] This subevent is an awareness of "communication," a certain type of structured happening in an event. The subevent structures receptivity, the physical conditions, other individuals, etc., into a relationship which communicates qualitative meaning.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 58. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

The second sub-function is that of the emergence of individuality from the matrix of relations in which qualitative meanings are shared. Wieman described this subevent as "internally creative integrations."[2] The mass of qualitative meaning which has been received must be integrated into the life of the person. This integration requires time. "If new meanings are coming in all the time, the integration is hindered by the new ingressions."[3] For this to take place solitude is required, as a moment of contrast to immersion of the individual in the immediacies of social relationships. The integration into the personal structure of the mass of new qualitative meanings actually involves the transformation of the personal structure. This integration of a plurality of varied, if not conflicting, goods into a new unity is a creative function which cannot be performed by the person undergoing transformation, if for no other reason than that the new integration is not foreseeable. The individual does not create his own individuality; this is the work of this subevent as a function of the creative event.

The third sub-function is that of the expansion of the appreciable world of the individual. This includes the awareness of a growth of qualitative meaning in the actual interrelations of events. This aspect of this subevent is inseparable from the first two subevents. However, a second aspect of this sub-function is the increase in awareness of the range of possibilities, both as available in one's context of relations, and as possibilities which contrasts with actual values.[1] Creative good functions in this third subevent to create this new range of possibility, and functions to open human awareness to discern this possibility as well as an increased range of qualitative meaning.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 58. [2] Ibid., p. 60. [3] Ibid.

The fourth sub-function is the "widening and deepening of community between those who participate in the total creative event."[3] This new creation in the deepening of community involves the deepening of awareness of relations between individuals. This awareness of relations includes awareness of contrasts and conflicts as well as mutually appreciated goods. For this reason, "increase in community is not necessarily pleasant; the good produced by the creative event brings increase in sufferings as well as increase in joy; community brings a burden as well as a release."[4] The standard of the working of this creativity in value experience is not human good, although this creativity is the source of human good. Creative good is a certain kind of happening, an integrity in events which functions to create good. This functioning for the creation of unanticipated good enfolds human life in the unity of a structure in events. This "being enfolded" is itself an ultimate good, a good not issuing from human control; a function in human life but not of human life.

In each of the four sub-events we can see structural aspects with a unitary character. In the first sub-event a structural qualitative unity emerges in a relation between two individuals. In the second sub-event a structural unity of experience emerges within the individual. In the third sub-event there takes place the growth of a structure of meaning in the relations of the individual and environing events. The fourth level is that of community structure, which has a unity emergent in cooperative production and in meaningful and creative conflict. These four levels of structural unity in events also, according to Wieman, appear as a unity when they are ingredient in the Creative Event.

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[1] Ibid., p. 61. [2] Ibid., p. 62. [3] Ibid., p. 64. [4] Ibid., p. 65.

We have contended that the ultimate good, here known as a specified functioning in events, is conceived by Wieman to be a universal function with a unity as a functional structure, as a spatio-temporal order of happenings, and as a qualitative character in events. This character is further emphasized in Wieman's depiction of creative good as absolute good.[1] This absolute character as a universal function with a unity of structure is apparent in the five ways in which Wieman empirically specified the absolute good of the creative good.[2] By "absolute" he meant that creative good is the only unqualified good: it is good in any and all situations. "It is a good," he wrote, "that remains changelessly and identically the same in character so far as concerns its goodness."[3] It is absolute in its contrast to the relativity of the good which it creates. Such a specification implies a universality of functioning. It is a functioning basic to any good, or even any events at all. The creative good is also an absolute function in its demand for an absolute subordination of any human functioning to this creative functioning. This is the inverted way of stating that only in the context of this functioning is human life fulfilled. Creative good is both the condition and the fulfilment of good. In contrast, qualitative meanings are values for only certain levels of relationships, and specific values pertain only to certain contexts of relations.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 79 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-81. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

In addition to this development of the theme of the specifiability of the religious object, the notion of creativity as a spatio-temporal functional structure issues again in a judgment regarding the human mode of response to the religious object. Wieman saw as a consequence of his analysis of four-fold structure in the creative event that "the human problem is to shape human conduct and all other conditions so that the creative event can be released to produce maximum good."[1] This emphasis on control of the response as a means to release the creative event assumes that the human structure is controllable and can be formed by human design into an instrumental structure for the creative event. Wieman's judgment here on the human problem stands in contrast to his own analysis of the absolute function of the creative event. In this context he wrote of creative good as absolutely trustworthy in that "when all other good is destroyed, it springs anew; it will keep going when all else fails."[2] This latter judgment suggests that the creative event works to transform any situation, regardless of the conditions. This latter response reflects more the mood of the "Absolute Commitment of Faith," as commitment focussed on releasing human control to that of creativity for the sake of unenvisioned good and transformation of the human structure. The alternate emphasis on the human control of preconditions for the working of the creative event at the level of human life, I contend, is one consequence of the view of creativity as a specifiable functional structure in events.

In the absolute character of the creative event, we find a striking similarity to Royce's reconception of the absolute which issued from his effort to specify the empirical functioning in events of the relation of interpretation. For Royce, the order of advance of the world from the past to the future, in which the creation of new good takes place, was a definite structure in events. This structure was understood as absolute in its universality and unqualified goodness and, Royce contended, is a function of the absolute World Idea. This function is the creation of new community among men, in its concrete working is the ultimate community. This ultimate Beloved Community is an operative reality which both functions in life relationships to create good, and is in itself the highest good. In this community human life is saved from the bondages and conflicts which characterize human societies organizing for the ordering of human relations. The ultimate community is that ordering of life wherein the individual's life becomes a function of the ultimate world purpose expressed in the continual transformation of the world in love. The absolute functioning as a transformative process is that which seeks the unqualified loyalty of all individuals. It is also that which is supremely worthy of unqualified loyalty. It is an unqualified good in that it always bears the possibility of greater good, regardless of the occasion of betrayal. For both Royce and Wieman, there is real loss and tragedy, but both also see operative in the world an unfailing resource for the saving and transformation of human life. For both men, the ultimate is an absolute as the creator and the standard of the good. Ultimately, the highest good is what is creative of good in human life, and the good in human life is not seen as good according to a humanly established standard.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 69, 77. [2] Ibid., p. 81.

The lure of Bergson's thought persists in Wieman's thought, even though it is reinterpreted within a framework of concern for the specification of the structure of creativity. We can see this illustrated in his treatment of the notion of intuition. Wieman was suspicious of claims made for intuition as a special way to knowledge. Rather than a means of cognition, he interpreted intuition as "the creative integration of diverse meanings to form a new, more ample meaning."[1] We can see Bergson's meaning reflected in this definition. Intuition for Bergson was immediate knowledge of evolution or of the duration of the present in which the fund of the past is thrust into the present for the creation of the future. Wieman continued this theme when he stated that "intuition in the sense noted is going on all the time and is another word for creativity."[2] He identified intuition with Whitehead's "concrescence" at the level of conscious awareness.[3] Intuition, as creativity at the level of consciousness functions in communication between human minds, since creative integration is required in the intercourse of minds with its give and take of many different meanings. Also, he suggested that through such intuition we can know God in the sense that God would be known as a "spectacular instance of creative integration of meanings re-creating the mind and personality."[4] Intuition as awareness of an immediate creative happening is what Bergson pointed to as an experience of reality itself. Bergson chose to speak of reality as pure duration, unpetrified by matter or intellect. For Wieman, however, to speak of an ultimate in experienced events involved speaking of a structure basic to creative passage. In this attention to creativity as structured event we can see the persistence of the function and image of a world Absolute in the specification of creativity.

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[1] Ibid., p. 184. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 185. [4] Ibid.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The thesis which I have been defending is that Henry Nelson Wieman's specification of the religious object as creativity or the creative event retains the function and image of the Absolute presented in the late idealism of Josiah Royce and William Ernest Hocking. This inheritance was in part acknowledged by Wieman when he stated that he understands his work to be in continuity with Royce's own development "whereby idealism was becoming increasingly a kind of interpersonal activity."[1]

Although I am not contending that we find a conscious employment of Roycean notions in Wieman's naturalistic theism, yet in Royce's effort to specify that relationship which is the function of the creativity of the Whole in concrete events, we find specifications regarding the activity of the religious object which later appear in Wieman's work. This common characteristic of thought is what I have designated as the function and image of the Absolute. By the "function of the Absolute" I mean the activity of creativity in the emergence of definite novelty in concrete events from a past of variegated and conflicting factors. Royce understood this activity in events to be a function of an ultimate purpose of community creation. Royce found the highest level of community creation for human life in a community of grace which he called the Beloved Community. By the "image of the Absolute," I mean the structure of this unifying and community creating function in events. Royce argued that this structure could be specified by C. S. Pierce's relation of interpretation.

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[1] Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 8.

Wieman's response to Bergson's Creative Evolution gives evidence of the persistence in his thought of the Roycean contention that the ultimate is operative in the immediate as a functional structure. Bergson's notion of duration as reality itself was presented as an alternative to the mechanistic explanatory principle of scientific materialism, or the rationalism of idealism. The structures discriminated in events by the intellect, for Bergson, are abstractions from reality which do not grasp reality itself but attempt to deal with reality as a mechanism. The intellect in its function corresponds to the structures precipitated as "matter" from the flux of duration. Consequently, intellect was viewed by Bergson as a function which is particularly responsive to such material structures in events, and thus inevitably tries to reduce reality to such structures. If human consciousness is to grasp reality itself, Bergson argued, an appropriate mode of consciousness must be employed, namely intuition. Intuition is the mode of participation in duration whereby creativity becomes functional in the human structure. In Intuition one becomes aware of the thrust of the fulness of one's past into the present for the creation of novelty. By intuition the individual is able to participate in events to serve the ontological "need of creation" rather than the determinate ends envisioned by the intellect.

When Wieman undertook to develop a theory of creative good as the highest good in his revision of R. B. Perry's interest theory of value, he employed Bergson's categories of the adaptive, the instrumental, and the creative to correlate types of interests and values with types of activities and consciousness. In defending his thesis that the highest good is the fulfilment of creative interest rather than the harmonization of interests, Wieman interpreted the function of Perry's coordinating interest as instrumental interest. He sought to move beyond Perry with the notion of creativity as an organization of interests which is creative of new community from the conflict of interests. In the process of creative conflict Wieman undertook to specify that which Bergson contended could not be so specified. In this move to specify the creative function Wieman implicitly made the same criticism of Bergson that Royce had made in The Problem of Christianity. Both men argued to the effect that if a definite creation is to emerge from a definite past, there must be some structure of relations operative in relating a particular past in all its diversity to the present with its possibilities for the sake of the creation of a future. Royce wrote of this order as interpretation, and Wieman found mutual interpretation to be one phase of the process of mutual creativity. In the process of mutual creativity Wieman saw an activity fulfilling a super-personal creative interest operative in conflict situations. Wieman went on to identify "mutual creativity" as the fundamental process operative in world creation, or as he stated, in the creation of world individuality.

For this metaphysical development in Wieman's thought, the idealist contention that the ultimate is functional in structures in empirical events was undoubtedly held before his mind by the persuasive expression of W. E. Hocking. Hocking's principle of alternation, particularly as related to his own notion of creativity and his suggestion of "potential energy" as a biological equivalent for "idea" were formative notions for Wieman.

In the movement out of idealism expressed in Wieman's "The Organization of Interests" he resisted the doctrine of the supra-temporal Absolute, but developed the notion of the "concrete individual" which retained the image of the World Individual of idealism. Wieman evidently defended this notion self-consciously against Hocking's definition of the Absolute as the "concrete universal." In this contrast of notions Wieman emphasized the image of the world ultimate as a structure fundamental to the world, and ingredient in its particular events. However, Wieman found this ultimate unity or individuality as a total structure in the world emergent in temporal passage. This suggests Royce's Absolute as a world of interpretation divested of its trans-temporal aspects. With the distinction in Wieman's thought between mutual creativity and the concrete individual, we can see the function and image of the idealist's absolute divided between these two notions. Supported by his appeal to the philosophical resources of Whitehead and Dewey, these two aspects were later brought together in the specification of the religious as creative event.

Another trait of idealism appeared in Wieman's attention to the theme of whole functions of the structure of creativity. Bergson had characterized creativity as a continual creation of unities from the pluralities of the past. This ultimate creative function, although fundamental to all events in the movement of reality itself, is discernible in immediate events. Idealism, in Royce and Hocking, sought to delineate the mode of function of the ultimate in the immediate, and consequently saw the creative event as a function of the Whole. The notion of the creative event as a total function given in immediate experience was given another context of expression in the philosophy of nature of A. N. Whitehead. Whitehead's notion of the Total Event as a creative emergence given for immediate awareness became for Wieman a model notion by which to interpret the religious datum. Wieman found awareness of total event to signify God as an ingredient of the total event. Here the attention to the structure of the religious object is dominant, as indicated by the important role of the relation of "significance." Within both

Whitehead's and Dewey's thought "significance" indicates a structure of relations. The theory of prehension and the definition of God as the Principle of Concretion were further contributions of the philosophical vehicle which Whitehead offered for Wieman's philosophy of religion. In brief, Whitehead provided a systematic alternative to the metaphysics of idealism consistent with the emphasis in religious inquiry which Wieman had carried out of idealism. Although Whitehead's philosophy provided a context in which the function and image of the religious ultimate could be reintegrated, an important difference can be seen between Wieman's and Whitehead's conceptions of the religious object. Whitehead's Principle of Concretion is a primordial abstract condition for any actuality, whereas Wieman's inquiry moved to discover the structure of creativity in events.

However, after Bergson, it was probably John Dewey who most effectively undercut idealism for Wieman. Wieman came to consider his effort as a development of the philosophy of religion implicit in Dewey's instrumentalism. The effect of this direction of effort was to add impetus to Wieman's inquiry about the religious object as an object for specification. Dewey's instrumentalism can be seen in Wieman's definition of the aim of his inquiry: the specification of creativity as a structure of activities in interpersonal relations to which human life can adjust by providing appropriate conditions. However, Wieman's persisting effort to specify empirically the creative event did not obscure the fact that Dewey and Wieman did not share the same understanding of the growth of value in human interrelationships. Wieman's "process of creative integration" as a process of growth of value proved not to be amenable to the human control to which Dewey would submit social relationships. Even though Wieman contended that conditions could be provided for the working of creativity, he argued that creativity itself was not subject to control:

it can be served by human life, but not used. As a structure of events not subject to human design, Wieman understood creativity to be an order functional far beyond the ranges of human consciousness and interpersonal relationships.

The function and image of the idealist's ultimate are evident in this view of creative happenings as emergences of unanticipated goods from a structure of happenings. This function and image come more explicitly to the fore in Wieman's notion of faith as absolute commitment. This understanding of faith and its object moderates the drive toward specification, although the notion of God as the totality of good preserves the structural emphasis. As the totality of good, God is seen to be a structure in events with its own total qualitative character. As a structure, God is knowable. Such knowledge can only facilitate the control of human life by the object of faith, although the working of God is not limited by human knowledge of this working. The work of God and the work of man are different in type. Man acts on the basis of abstraction, whereas God acts concretely and creatively. The object of absolute commitment is not concrete, but a structure in events.

The structural conception of the religious object in Wieman's thought eventually issued in an explicit effort to specify the creative event. In connection with his specification of creativity as the four-fold creative event, Wieman developed themes which seem to be part of a continuing response to his idealistic beginnings. His delineation of the absolute character of the creative event and his presentation of the theme of functional transcendence again reiterate themes associated with the function and image of the absolute in events.

In the development of the notion of functional transcendence, we find a central contribution of Wieman's philosophy of religion to liberal religious thought brought to focus. In this notion is suggested some of the resources in religious naturalism for the interpretation of Christian faith. In this connection it also seems evident that Wieman has underrated the theological potential in his notion of functional transcendence.

In defense of this understanding of divine transcendence, I would contend, with Wieman's support, that the super-historical notions of transcendence derive their religious power from the consequent contrast between human and divine functions. However, for many in the Christian tradition, Wieman's case is less than convincing probably because his specification of creativity seems to be offered fundamentally for the sake of human good, overriding the theme of the response of faith to that good which could possibly shatter all human good, and suggests a view of the divine Other as constrained within a structure of activity. These apparent limitations on divine grace reflect a continuing tension in Wieman's thought issuing from his effort to deal with the religious object both as a free creativity in events and as a specifiable unitary structure. This tension persists in his statements concerning the nature of faith. Lately Wieman has written:

> I distinguish two levels in the self-giving of faith. At one level commitment is guided by the ideas which one happens to have at the time concerning what transforms man creatively. But there is a deeper level of commitment. At this second level one is motivated by the intention to give himself in the wholeness of his being so far as he is able to what in truth does save and transform, no matter how different it may be from one's ideas about it.[1]

The theme of the functional transcendence of the religious object suggests that the first level of faith is at best impoverished, since it tends to be directed inwardly to one's ideas, rather than outwardly to the reality. If God is functionally other than the human abstractive activity, then it is difficult to see how the idea can be more than a highly limiting pointer to the superhuman function of God. To point to a functional other, ideas could only be effective as their inadequacy is recognized. But this immediately moves one to the second level of faith.

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[1] Wieman, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 6.

The meaning of Wieman's second level of faith depends on what is meant by the "wholeness of one's being." We must ask whether or not "wholeness" can be understood as a total integration, or integrity of the individual. Integrity in the individual could conceivably result from two different principles of organization. First, the individual could achieve an integrity on the basis of specific ideas which would be accepted as the principles for organization of experience. This type of organization would be capable of faith at the first level, but would not be open to the transformation which is envisaged at the second level of faith. Consequently another meaning of wholeness must be involved. If integrity is not an organization according to some principle explicitly or implicitly accepted by the individual, then integrity may be understood to result from some principle of organization external to the individual in the sense of not being under the control of the individual. This is evidently a part of the meaning which Wieman gives to the second level of faith. However, if integrity is an organization which results from the relationship of faith to the ultimate creative and saving power, then we would have to conclude that this level of faith is not a self giving in integrity, since integrity is seen as the outcome of faith rather than a precondition for faith. Consequently, "wholeness" in this connection cannot have the meaning of "integrity" as a total organization of the individual.

Another meaning of "wholeness" seems closer to Wieman's intent. If "wholeness" is taken to mean "totality," then the second level of self-giving in faith would be the giving of oneself as a "total event," including experiences and attitudes which do not contribute to integrated individuality.

Unfortunately, "wholeness" suggests that the individual is a coordinated integration. However, in terms of our inquiry into Wieman's development of thought, "wholeness," as designating that which is given in faith would have the meaning of "totality" in that it would be inclusive of a plurality of conflicting factors. If the whole offered in faith is a self-harmonization, then certain factors in the experience of the individual will unavoidably be excluded. Such an offering of the wholeness of the self would be only partial, at the best.

The partiality of any commitment in faith was indirectly acknowledged by Wieman when he appended the qualifications that faith at the second level means motivation to give oneself in wholeness "so far as he is able." This leads one to raise the question of whether one must conclude that the aim of faith is fulfilled to the extent that wholeness in self giving is accomplished. Since this is evidently not the case, we are led to question whether it is meaningful to speak in terms of self-giving in one's wholeness. The thrust of Wieman's thought would suggest that the second level of faith would be more accurately represented as the self giving of the individual that he might be transformed in his wholeness. A related question to be raised about this notion of faith is whether Wieman intended to say that the functioning of the object of faith is dependent on the extent to which one intends a wholeness of self giving. The theme of functional transcendence suggests that creativity functions in all situations, but that some conditions permit certain creative integrations which others do not. However, because of the functional separation between human and divine behavior, it is questionable whether it can be concluded that creativity for integrity of the individual as an activity is dependent on a self-conscious aim toward integrity in the act of faith.

The notion of God as functionally transcendent would suggest that any integrity in human life is a divine creation. If creativity is the highest good, and this Wieman has contended throughout his work, then faith would seem to be commitment for the sake of creativity, regardless of what creativity may do. Wieman did express himself this way under the theme of the absolute commitment of faith. Such faith would include the recognition that one's individuality is not whole, and that almost unavoidably, because of the nature of the human structure, factors in one's individuality will be resistant to creative transformation. Consequently, it seems that self-giving in the wholeness of one's being is an ideal notion which functions for Wieman as an object of intent, but is not an actual possibility for human life.

Another understanding of the meaning of faith growing out of the notion of functional transcendence of the divine is the viewpoint which recognizes man and God to function distinctively in events without detracting from the religious importance of the function of either. Also, in the relationship of faith between human and divine functions, it need not be assumed that man must work to overcome his own structures in preparation for a divine response to this faith. It is here recognized that it is the function of God to overcome the limitations of the human structure. This means that in faith men responds to God through the structures that he has available. Faith then means a definite decisive response, expressive of a commitment, but an expression that may be transformed in meaning by the creative function of God.

Further, such an understanding of the nature of the relationship between the divine and human functions in events should need to place less reliance on specification as a religious method. Correspondingly it would give attention to the life of faith in its dimension of sensitive discernment of creativity active in the creation of new structures and possibilities. This discernment would seek the concrete working of creativity in the whole range of human cultural expression, seeing these expressions, individual and social, as expressions of faith. Such expressions would be seen as human channelings of creative processes, which are also factors in events to which God creatively responds, creating new depth of meaning.

This understanding of the faith relationship gives a positive assessment to human achievement without being limited to the claims of humanism, and would illuminate the contrast between the divine and human without denying a dimension of faith in cultural expression. Functional transcendence need not imply that faith express itself in an effort to specify the most productive relationship between the human and the divine. If the image of absolute structure in the divine activity is relinquished, then it can be recognized that the structure of the divine creativity may be a highly variable response to different occasions. In this respect, it is metaphysically conceivable that there is divine self-creativity. This God would be envisioned as the redemptive reality working in response to human limitations, including those limitations on human awareness of the fulness of God's work in the events of human life.

This view of faith offers possibilities for the interpretation of aspects of Christian notions of faith. The doctrine of grace has asserted that God works creatively in human lives and community through and in spite of human limitations. The understanding of the forgiveness of sins as an act of divine grace in response to human faith can also be seen to be interpreted by the notion of functional transcendence, as it points to a divine activity which responds creatively in the particular events of our lives, regardless of the quality which we individually may contribute to these events.

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